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SYMBOLS 
 
A    partition on graph G that divides it into coalitions  
c   cost 
c (si )   cost of security value si for vertex vi  
c ((sij), σij (sij )) cost of security value sij for edge eij  given constraints σij 
d (j)   data of node j 
E   set of edges 
eij   edge from vertex i to vertex j 
e
-ij   all other edges besides vertex i to vertex j 
G   graph composed of the set of vertices and set of edges 
Γ   game of G 
i   node (player) i, represented in the graph by vertex vi 
j   node (player) j, represented in the graph by vertex vj 
∏   potential function 
rij (d(j))  read access from i to j 
   set of positive real numbers 
S   non-decreasing sequence of nonnegative security levels 
si   security level of player i 
s
-i   security levels of all other players besides i 
sij   security level of eij 
s
-ij   security level of e-ij 
s*i     optimal action for player i 
s*
-i     optimal action for all other players besides i    
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s*   action profile in equilibrium  
(sij , σij (sij )) security of sij given constraint σij ; also known as move sij for 
player i 
, 		   suboptimal move for player i 

, 
		  optimal (equilibrium) move for player i 
cij(sjk , σjk (sjk ))  side payment move for player i to j to induce change in sjk 
σi    constraint of player i  
σ
-i    constraints of all other players besides i 
σi (si )   constraint of security value si for player i  
σ
-i (s-i )   constraint of security value s-i for all other players besides i 
σij (sij )   constraint σij of sij  
u   utility function 
V   set of vertices 
vi   vertex i, also referred to as node i or player i 
vj   vertex j, also referred to as node j or player j 
wij (d(j))  write access from i to j 
yij    current encryption strength of connection eij 
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DEFINITIONS 
 
• Action: assigning a value to a variable. 
• Action profile: a sequence of actions for each player in the game; there is one action 
corresponding to each player in the sequence. 
• Coalition: a group of players who share a common security level and preferences. 
• Constraint: a function which maps the domain of possible values a variable may take 
to the codomain or range of values that do not violate the constraints.   
• Constraint satisfaction problem: abbreviated CSP, it is a problem defined by a set of 
variables and corresponding constraints on the variables.   
• Cooperative game: a game in which players make binding commitments that require 
the consent of all parties to break the commitment. 
• Cost: a measure of lost utility.  Cost is denominated in units of security.   
• Edge: see Link  
• Equilibrium: the best possible move a player can make based on the assumption that 
all other players also make their best possible moves.  Equilibrium maximizes utility, 
and is a partial order on the actions: they are reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive 
with respect to one another. 
   
xiii 
 
• Finite Improvement Property: all potential games possess this property whereby there 
is a best possible move for each state of the game.  Neither the game nor the 
improvement can go on forever, and there can be no repeated states, as the game must 
have a finite end with unique moves and finite utility. 
• Game: a game consists of the Players, Information, Actions, and Utilities. 
• Game theory: the study of actions by decision-makers who are aware that their 
actions have an impact on others. 
• Information: a player’s knowledge about the set of variables describing the game, 
which includes constraints on what actions can and cannot be taken.   
• Incomplete Preferences: see Partial Preferences 
• Link: a one-way directed connection between nodes. 
• Metric: see Security metric 
• Mixed Strategy: a plan that maps a player’s information to a probability distribution 
(ranging from 0 to 1) over the set of pure strategies. 
• Nash equilibrium: see Equilibrium  
• Node: nodes in graph G represent computers in the network.  Nodes are the players in 
the game. 
• Noncooperative game: a game in which any commitments made can be unilaterally 
broken. 
• Objective function: describes a function to be maximized by all variables in the 
constraint satisfaction problem.  Not all constraint satisfaction problems have an 
objective function. 
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• Pareto optimized: a state in which a player can take no action deviating from this state 
without decreasing utility for itself or some other player. 
• Partial Preferences: equations in which a set of variables may have intermediate or 
unassigned values. 
• Partition: to form coalitions, the network is divided into non-overlapping subsets 
according to a pairwise disjoint function known as a partition. 
• Pay: compensation measured in utility to or from another node.  
• Player: an individual making decisions and taking actions in the game.  See also 
Node, as players are represented by nodes or computers in the network. 
• Potential function: the potential function takes the same input as the utility function, 
and returns a calculation that is either the same sign (for an ordinal potential function) 
or equal to (for an exact potential function) the value calculated by the utility function 
of each player.  The exact potential function is defined as applicable when players 
move according to mixed strategies, while the ordinal potential is defined to be 
applicable when players move according to pure strategies.   
• Potential game: a game possessing a potential function. 
• Preferences: the current best values for the variables in the game.  Since the variables 
in the game represent security levels, the preferences are the current optimal security 
levels.  They correspond to the environment and its current state. 
• Problem state: some, but not necessarily all, variables have values assigned to them.   
• Pure strategy: a plan that maps a player’s information to a single action. 
• Security: the opposite of vulnerability.  In our game, security is optimized by 
minimizing vulnerability. 
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• Security metric: quantitative measurement of some aspect of security.  Our metrics 
are cryptography, data sensitivity, and access control. 
• Side payment: an action that consists of a payment made from node i to node j to 
induce j to change the security of its link sjk to another node k. 
• Solution: a complete assignment of values to variables in a constraint satisfaction 
problem that do not violate the respective constraints. 
• Strategy: a plan to take a specific action in a game. Each player has a set of strategies 
that govern the player’s actions in every conceivable situation. 
• Utility: the quantity of positive feedback (which in our game is security) which a 
player receives for taking an action.  Utility is denominated in units of security.   
• Utility function: the utility function takes as input the set of possible actions available 
to a player and determines a player’s preference over the given set of possible actions.  
These preferences enable a player to choose the best values that can be assigned to 
the game variables and maximize its utility at each turn in the game. 
• Vulnerability: a weakness whereby an outsider may destroy, alter, or steal one’s 
possessions, which is the data possessed by the nodes as well as the nodes 
themselves.  Vulnerability is the opposite of security. 
• Weighted potential game: a type of potential game that possesses a utility function 
which is directly related to other players’ utility functions.  A weighted potential 
game possesses a potential function for either mixed or pure strategies. We use a 
weighted potential game to optimize network security. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Computer networks have changed significantly since their first invention.  In the early 
days of the Internet, the network was composed of nearly identical computers connected 
to one another by wire, whereas today’s wireless network consists of increasingly 
heterogeneous devices ranging from PCs to iPhones to servers.  Not only are today’s 
networks more complex to secure, but the attacks on the network are far more 
sophisticated.  The advent of cloud computing and of cyber-physical systems composed 
of sensor networks, actuators, and control systems has only increased the heterogeneity 
and complexity of securing such a network.  While a great deal of work has been reported 
on security for individual computers or devices, very little work has been done to 
optimize security for the overall network when all devices forming the network are not 
only heterogeneous but also autonomous.  The security of the entire network itself is 
critical and cannot be done piecemeal.   
The problem considered in our work is how to maximize an entire network’s 
security when it is made up of computers or devices that may be very different from one 
another.  The computers act independently and autonomously, with no broad or central 
coordinator.  There has been previous research with focus on individual components 
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forming the network, such as Agah [26,27] and Demirbas [29], but these approaches are 
limited as they fail to optimize security for the entire network.  In these approaches, 
network security is only as good as the security of the weakest component.  Our work 
proposes to allow individual computers to work together to achieve the optimum security 
for the entire network using game theory. 
The problem considered in our work centers on a general representation of 
heterogeneous computers, each with different hardware and software.  We consider 
hardware to include all physical, non-software related computer components such as 
CPU, RAM, and available power or battery life.  Software thus includes both system 
software, which refers to the operating system, and application software, which includes 
all other software.  The hardware and software of a computer will subsequently restrict its 
ability to sustain maximum security, which is only possible in an ideal world.  The 
network under consideration is a wireless network, where connections between nodes are 
assumed to exist a priori.  The nodes themselves are not physically mobile, but we 
assume connections change.  These connections change during the network security 
optimization process.   
Game theory is one solution to address the problem of maximizing security within 
a system’s limitations.  Game theory, as defined by Rasmusen [8], is the study of actions 
by decision-makers who are aware that their actions have an impact on others.  A game 
consists of the players, information, actions, and utilities.  The players are defined as the 
individuals making decisions and taking actions in the game.  We define the computers in 
the network as nodes, and these nodes are the players in our game theoretic security 
solution proposed in our thesis.  In this situation, the players are the computers, or nodes, 
3 
 
in the network.  The information is defined as the players’ knowledge about the set of 
variables describing the game, which includes constraints on what actions can and cannot 
be taken.  These variables are input to a player’s utility function, which determines a 
player’s preference over a given set of possible actions.  The utility function takes as 
input the set of possible actions available to a player and determines a player's preference 
over the given set of possible actions.  These preferences enable a player to choose the 
best values that can be assigned to the game variables and maximize its utility at each 
turn in the game.  This plan of action is its strategy.  The player then takes the best action 
by assigning these best values to its variables, resulting in a new state of the game.  At 
each turn in the game the player applies new information to its utility function, 
determines its preference over a given set of possible actions, chooses the best values that 
can be assigned to the game variables, and maximizes its security. 
Game theory as an optimization technique offers several advantages over other 
rule-based, linear programming, tree-pruning or backtracking algorithms, as well as 
artificial intelligence (AI) techniques.  Game theory allows the game designer to arrive at 
a solution by developing the model and evaluation criteria for players so they can 
determine the optimal next move to make in the game to maximize their utility; as the 
game plays out, the solution evolves, giving the optimal configuration for the network.  
The designer of the game need only model the moves of the game and their context, 
allow the players to act autonomously according to these rules, and an optimization 
results.   
Furthermore, game theory has the advantage of finding solutions to problems that 
would otherwise be difficult to solve using other approaches.  Game theory can be used 
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to model complex interactions and environments, which in our problem is a 
heterogeneous network.  The use of mixed strategies is unique to game theory and allows 
for modeling more complex decision-making processes than could be done by other 
techniques.  Through the use of mixed strategies, the game designer is able to model the 
possibility of mistakes made by game players.  With pure strategies, players always 
choose the optimal strategy.  With mixed strategies, however, a player chooses a move 
according to a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies, thus taking the 
optimal action some percentage of the time and less than optimal otherwise.   
In our thesis, we will examine the methodology behind how certain game subsets 
have been proven to have mathematical advantages over others and how such game 
subsets make it easier to prove a solution is optimal.  Furthermore, our thesis will take 
advantage of the modeling techniques exclusive to a game theoretic problem-solving 
approach through mixed strategies.  It will also allow coalitions, which are otherwise 
known as groups, to be formed among the game players as part of the game optimization 
process.  Coalitions can be used to improve efficiency as well as give a broader and 
greater overall security than would be possible in the absence of coalitions.  We will 
develop a heterogeneous game theoretic distributed security model in which game 
players choose the move that optimizes security; once a player acts on its choice of 
moves, the state of the game changes, and game play leads to security optimization of the 
network. 
An important aspect of our work is that the security optimization found can be 
validated as opposed to existing or traditional solutions, whose effectiveness is 
subjective.  Traditional security definitions such as “works as expected” [31] are no 
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longer sufficient.  An April 2009 report by the Homeland Security Newswire [34] 
revealed that because they are now connected to the Internet, a significant number of US 
power plants have, over the past few years, had their systems compromised by intruder 
programs, and that these potential sleeper agents are still in place in the systems across 
the entire US electrical grid.  Furthermore, these programs have become embedded in 
other parts of the US infrastructure, which includes water treatment plants.  To date, no 
one is certain how to remove them, or what these programs' function truly serves beyond 
gathering intelligence, but the sophistication with which they are embedded suggests a 
well-financed organization with skilled members, and is thus most likely related to a 
foreign government.  If so, it is likely that these programs indeed will become active if 
the US goes to war with the foreign government that put the sleeper software there, and 
can potentially devastate the US infrastructure.  Still, the systems are continuing to work 
"as expected," and "officials...do not see an immediate danger" [34].   
We believe that statements such as these are representative of the traditional 
security paradigm and do not preclude the possibility that these programs will prevent our 
power plants to continue to work "as expected" in the future.  Clearly, there is a 
significant need for paradigm shift in the definition of security from a qualitative 
definition to one that can be measured quantitatively.  Security metrics can be used as 
means to accomplish this paradigm shift.  Security metrics is a new field of computer 
security and its viability as a field of study was first recognized as serious work only a 
few years ago, but it is beginning to become more widely used.  The goal of security 
metrics is to be able to better analyze security by evaluating a system and quantitatively 
representing its inner workings and relationships between entities that form the system 
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itself.  Security metrics can thus be used as a basis to give quantitative meaning to the 
qualitative definition.   
To use metrics in our security solution, we must devise a method of introducing 
security metrics themselves to a game.  To date, no one has done so.  However, we 
believe defining the problem itself as a game possessing a system of variables and 
constraints on security and energy can allow for the introduction of security metrics.  
This type of problem, with constraints and variables, is referred to as a constraint 
satisfaction problem.   
We define constraints as functions that restrict the domain of values a variable 
may take to a subset that forms a codomain or range.  Constraint satisfaction problems 
are a traditional AI approach and can represent a multi-variable problem with varying 
domain and ranges.  Constraint satisfaction problems are traditionally solved using 
backtracking, tree pruning, or linear programming.  In our work, however, game theory 
will be used to solve the constraint satisfaction problem, allowing us to model optimal 
and suboptimal decisions along with problem constraints, and validate our work using 
security metrics.  To further validate the security optimization by our algorithm, we will 
compare its results with that of the established Kerberos algorithm, which is similar to 
our own algorithm in that it is designed to provide security for an entire network and uses 
methods of encryption and access control.  For a more complete description of Kerberos, 
we refer you to [35].   
Our work can be generalized to optimize security for almost any network or 
system because it can be applied to a network made up of computers that possess any 
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degree of heterogeneity.   With regard to the sleeper software in the article mentioned 
earlier, since the parties responsible for securing the power plant have not divulged the 
manner in which the sleeper agent programs were detected, our only conclusion can be 
that their method is not one they wish to divulge to protect classified security methods or 
the programs were discovered by accident.  We believe that since the past definition of 
security is based on the "works as expected" definition in [31], those individuals 
responsible for power plant security were simply following this definition.  Since even 
today there have been no deviations in power plant expected performance, by this old 
definition the power plant is secure, and authorities even attest this when they say that 
there is "no immediate danger" [34].  We believe this event exemplifies the need to 
improve and redefine security; a first step in doing so would be to ensure that definitions 
of security are no longer quite as qualitative, as in the "works as expected" definition, but 
can be measured quantitatively.   
Our work is the first of which we are aware that uses a weighted potential game 
for a network security optimization solution.  We will use a noncooperative instead of a 
cooperative game because it better fits our problem definition: noncooperative games 
focus on strategy and utility maximization, whereas cooperative games do not.  
Noncooperative games model relationships that may be unilaterally changed by players; 
there are thus no binding contracts.  At each turn of a game, a player chooses its best 
move to maximize its utility.  The best possible move a player can make versus all best 
possible moves of all other players is defined as an equilibrium, which is also known as 
Nash equilibrium.  This equilibrium is not necessarily the best outcome, because there 
could still be multiple equilibrium or even a solution that goes beyond what is achievable 
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by equilibrium using traditional noncooperative game analysis.  Such improved outcomes 
and “best” equilibrium are defined as Pareto optimal equilibrium.  Potential games are a 
subset of the class of noncooperative games that indeed do find these Pareto optimal 
solutions to game theoretic problems. 
Pareto optimization goes beyond the definition of equilibrium.  It is, informally, 
the best of the equilibrium or more optimal solution than equilibrium.  Pareto optimized 
is defined as a state in which a player can take no action deviating from this state without 
decreasing utility for itself or some other player.  That said, the best way to illustrate the 
difference between Pareto optimal and equilibrium is by the example of the game known 
as the Prisoners’ dilemma.  In the Prisoners’ dilemma, two players are accused of 
committing a crime. The players are separated and cannot communicate with one another.  
The following Table 1.1 illustrates the respective utilities for each action, with units 
measured in years of imprisonment: 
 
 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 Stay silent Blame 
Stay silent -1,-1 -10,0 
Blame 0,-10 -8,-8 
 
Table 1.1: Prisoners’ dilemma 
 
Clearly, the solution in equilibrium is for each player to Blame the other and accept 8 
years imprisonment because of the real possibility of being blamed while staying silent, 
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thus receiving 10 years in prison.  However, the Pareto optimal solution is for both to 
Stay silent because it gives the most utility for all players.  If prisoners could cooperate 
and had incentive to do so, they could get better than equilibrium.  Shapley is recognized 
as being the first to develop a technique that can lead to a Pareto optimal solution for all 
players and games [2], which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter II below.  
Chapter II contains the literature related to our security solution.  In Chapters III - VI, we 
present the methodology of our solution and illustrate its improvements over previous 
work.  Chapter VII contains our prototype simulation and its results, and Chapter VIII 
contains our conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Game theory is the analysis of games.  Games can range from simple games, such as 
chess or checkers, to more complex games used in economic or strategic planning.  While 
some roots of game theoretic strategy can be found in the philosophical writings of Plato 
and Kant [33], the first real work studying games themselves did not begin until the 19th 
century.  This initial exploration into game theory was very simple and straightforward.  
Working separately, Cournot and Bertrand analyzed simple games where players chose 
the optimal move to maximize their utility [32].  While both made only initial 
contributions to game theory, Cournot is more widely recognized today due to his work 
on games that have an economic application.  Regardless, nothing went beyond initial 
examination due to the lack of formal mathematical specification.  True game theory 
began in the 20th century with the work by four men: Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
Nash, and Shapley.  In 1944, Von Neumann and Morgenstern wrote the groundbreaking 
“The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” [17], which contained the analysis 
techniques, general formula for calculating utility to a player, and game terminology still 
in use today.  VonNeumann and Morganstern’s work created the tools necessary to 
successfully analyze games, which led to a number of future discoveries.  In addition, 
their work ensured that future explorations of game theory to solve problems were 
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restricted to situations and problems that could be fully described by mathematics.  For 
example, using games to model computer problems has been largely successful for the 
reason that the factors affecting a problem with computers can be modeled with a great 
degree of certainty.  As we know, although computers can malfunction, they are not 
capable of panic.  Modeling a computer problem using game theory thus has greater 
likelihood of reaching an optimal result. 
Building upon VonNeumann and Morganstern’s work, John Nash developed the 
noncooperative game and defined game equilibrium in the 1950s.  At the same time, 
Shapley [21] - [22] took VonNeumann and Morganstern’s work and used it to define the 
field of cooperative games.  Cooperative games tend to spend little effort focusing on the 
strategy of each player in the game; noncooperative games do the exact opposite.  While 
noncooperative games are now more widely studied than cooperative games, with [8] 
devoting an entire textbook to them, Shapley is the only living member of the four 
founders of game theory, and he continues to publish to this day.  His efforts have turned 
toward noncooperative games, but they contain new ideas of how to create 
noncooperative games that go beyond their traditional definition, giving these games 
cooperative characteristics.  His most recent work [6] developed a game that allows 
coalitions to form even though variables possess intermediate values.  Furthermore, 
Shapley has made significant improvements on the class of noncooperative games known 
as potential games [2]; this work is one of the foundations of our thesis.   
A potential game is a game possessing a function, called a potential function, 
which is similar to a players' utility function.  The potential function takes the same input 
as the utility function and outputs a value; in the case of an exact potential function, the 
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output is equivalent to that of the result given by the utility function; in the case of an 
ordinal potential function, the output has only the same sign (positive or negative) as the 
result output by the utility function. When players move according to mixed strategies, 
games possessing a potential function can have only an exact potential function; when 
players move according to pure strategies, the game possesses an ordinal potential 
function.   
Let us give the definition of a potential function in its relationship with a utility 
function as given by Shapley [2].  Given utility function u and potential function v, move 
m in the game is an element in the set of moves M, denoted 
        (2.1) 
where M is a member of the set of positive real numbers, denoted 
       (2.2) 
When move m is input to the ordinal potential function and also to the utility function, the 
value calculated by the ordinal potential function is positive or zero if-and-only-if the 
value calculated by the utility function is positive or zero, denoted 
	  0  	  0      (2.3) 
For the same utility function u, let us give the definition for the exact potential function 
according to [2].  For the exact potential function, which is also denoted v, the value 
calculated by the utility function u is equivalent to the value calculated by the exact 
potential function v for input m, denoted  
	  	       (2.4) 
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Before delving further into Shapley’s work with potential games, we must 
examine the history of the potential game and its definition.  In 1973 Rosenthal [14] did 
the earliest work with a type of potential games called congestion games.  These games 
built upon Cournot’s initial work on analyzing oligopolies, whereby all players are 
selling the same item at different prices, and no new players are introduced once the 
game begins.  The game players were all identical, and contained a finite set of actions.  
The utility was dependent upon the actions of other players.  A linear inverse demand 
function, with respect to the item being sold in the game, was used to calculate utility.  
All moves in Rosenthals’ work were considered to be “pure” and were not subject to a 
probability distribution.  Prior to Shapley’s proof in 1996 [2], showing that congestion 
games were an isomorphism of noncooperative games, a considerable amount of work on 
potential games was still done using Rosenthal’s work as a foundation.  Even today, 
much of the research still focuses on Rosenthal’s work [11], [13] to the point that it 
contains the flaws that Shapley has pointed out in 1996.  In this respect, it is somewhat 
myopic; it still follows the pattern of excluding mixed strategies and does not reference 
Shapley’s recent work in 1996 [2], with the exception of the recent work by Komali [4]. 
Shapley’s work with potential games [2] is significant.  It improves on 
Rosenthal’s work by adding proofs that give enhanced definitions of potential games and 
their requirements, making it easier to design a game that has equilibrium and is also 
Pareto optimal.  Shapley’s research deals with mixed and pure strategies and 
heterogeneous players, which was something that Rosenthal was unable to solve.  
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Shapley was also able to develop an improved type of potential game, the weighted 
potential game.   
Defined by Shapley [2], a game that possesses a utility function which is directly 
related to each of the players’ utility functions is a weighted potential game.  A weighted 
potential game possesses a potential function for either mixed or pure strategies, and has 
efficiency and convergence improvements over other potential games or myopic, greedy 
strategy games.  Weighted potential games possess at least one equilibrium, and are 
easier to prove Pareto optimal.  Furthermore, the weighted potential game is valid for 
both mixed or pure strategies and players with any degree of heterogeneity.  Shapley’s 
work with potential games extends to graph theory as well, containing a proof that any 
game containing a network using weighted potential for utility evaluation is connected, at 
minimum, by a simple cycle. 
Shapley explains why the weighted potential game gives a result that is more 
likely to be optimal than other types of potential games.  Because the utility function that 
determines the weight of benefit between two players is piecewise continuously 
differentiable, results can be mathematically analyzed prior to any empirical simulations 
by using the equation of the potential.  Non-weighted potential games do not possess this 
property, as was also proven by Shapley in [2].  Furthermore, the weighted potential 
game will lead to an optimal solution regardless of the weight used.   
Besides these improvements, Shapley also recognized and established rules for 
what leads to optimal solutions for a potential game, which is something not studied by 
Rosenthal.  Foremost is what Shapley defined as the Finite Improvement Property: all 
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potential games possess this in that there is a best possible move for each state of the 
game, but this alone is not enough to guarantee an optimal solution.  In addition, neither 
the game nor the improvement can go on forever, and there can be no repeated states; the 
game must have a finite end with unique moves and finite utility.  This particular 
property contradicts Rosenthal and Shapley has a mathematical proof to back it up.  In 
addition, Shapley defined the requirements for non-weighted mixed and pure strategy 
potential games.   
As a result of his work Shapley discovered that a potential game admits a 
cooperative solution to noncooperative game; in theory this would allow the players in 
the Prisoners’ dilemma to collaborate indirectly by maximizing the potential function.  
To explain this further, the incorporation of a potential function gives the noncooperative 
players, which have no binding contract to one another by the nature of the 
noncooperative game, a type of motivation and nonverbal collusion which creates a 
unique hybrid of noncooperative and cooperative games; if all players try to jointly 
maximize the potential function it effectively acts as a binding contract between the 
players.  Hence in the case of the Prisoners’ dilemma, instead of each accusing the other, 
both players play the move to remain silent by jointly maximizing the potential function 
between them.  The Pareto optimal solution would thus be reached concurrently by both 
players because the potential function changed the conditions of the game, allowing for a 
more beneficial solution for both players to be reached.   
Our understanding of Shapley’s work in [2] is that Pareto-optimality supersedes 
equilibrium by its definition.  While it is not spelled out in English words, but in 
equations, much of his most groundbreaking work takes this form.  We have not found 
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any other works that reference this point about Pareto optimality, although the work by 
[4] implies that he understands it.  However, despite the lack of other sources found, 
based upon the fact that much of Shapley’s work is purely in the form of an equation with 
little written English-language explanation, and that no authors found thus far are aware 
of Shapley’s contributions until referenced second-hand by another author who does 
understand Shapley’s equations, we believe that we are correctly reading his work.  
Shapley goes on to say in [2] that the existence of a potential function guarantees 
the existence of equilibrium.  However, there may be several local equilibrium in 
addition to the best equilibrium overall.  Rosenthal had previously postulated that the way 
to find the best equilibrium, which yields the Pareto optimal solution, is to solve for the 
maximum of the function, known as the argmax.  While it seems obvious, it is not game 
theoretic, and defeats the purpose of the game.  Still, other authors [4], [11], follow 
Rosenthal’s bad example despite this, and even go so far to use it as a method of proof as 
suggested by Rosenthal.  Shapley’s work in [2] sheds light on Rosenthal’s shortcomings: 
experimental results showed that solving for the argmax could be used to determine 
which equilibrium is the optimum, but formal proofs demonstrate why solving for 
argmax is an invalid proof or predictor of the game itself.  If one considers it logically, 
Shapley’s reasoning becomes obvious: solving for the maximum value of an equation is 
insufficient to describe the complexities of a game.  Instead, Shapley said, argmax should 
be used as a refinement tool to identify and eliminate any possible false equilibrium.  As 
stated earlier, authors such as [4], [11] have ignored much of Shapley’s work in this area, 
correctly using argmax as a refinement tool but incorrectly using it as a proof of 
equilibrium.   
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Komali’s proof for Pareto optimality of the equilibrium is similar to [11].  The 
optimal point is examined; once reached, change in utility would result in a player 
disconnecting from the network and subsequently cause the player to no longer be 
optimal or in equilibrium, which is correct.  Ironically, parts of the Pareto optimality 
proofs by [4] and [11] are both logically unsound.   
Our understanding of logical equivalence leads us to believe that the proofs on 
Pareto-optimality in [4], [11] are overworked via proof by contradiction to the point that 
they do not prove their original goal; these Pareto optimal proofs instead prove a logical 
in-equivalence of their original statement.  We refer the reader to [4] and [11] for the 
proofs themselves.  We select the proof in [4].  To help clarify our own argument, we 
reproduce their statements; a game that meets these criteria is considered Pareto optimal: 
If the potential function will converge to equilibrium in the game, then no player 
can deviate from an action in equilibrium without violating its constraints and 
thus decrease utility and make the action not in Pareto optimal equilibrium. 
Let us examine the logical statements used in their proof-by-contradiction of a Pareto 
optimal game to explain our reasoning.  Let the statement p represent the first logical 
statement of the proof in [4] 
p: the potential function will converge to equilibrium in the game.   
Let the statement q represent the first part of the second logical statement of the 
proof in [4] 
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q: no player can deviate from its equilibrium action without violating its 
constraints. 
Let the statement r represent the second part of the second logical statement of the 
proof in [4] 
r: no player can deviate from Pareto optimal equilibrium action without 
decreasing its utility. 
Let the statement s represent the third logical statement of the proof in [4].  We 
understand the action causing deviation from equilibrium to mean “deviates from 
equilibrium action,” giving 
s: if a player deviates from its Pareto optimal equilibrium action, then the 
action is not in equilibrium. 
Note that statements q, r, and s are negations of statements.  The first part of 
statements q, r and s address deviating from an equilibrium action, which is the 
opposite of playing an equilibrium action.  The second part of the statements 
addresses violating constraints and decreasing utility, which is the opposite of 
preserving constraints and maximizing utility, respectively.  Let us now break up 
q, r, s even smaller using the following statements: 
t: player plays action in Pareto optimal equilibrium 
u: player preserves constraints of its action  
v: player maximizes utility 
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We can now write q, r, and s symbolically: 
     ,           ,       
The latter statement 
      
is what [4], [11] focus their proof-by-contradiction upon.  However, proof-by-
contradiction works when the hypothesis and conclusion are different, which is 
not what we have here in statement s.  Proof-by-contradiction works by assuming 
the hypothesis true and conclusion false, and using this to arrive at a contradiction 
of the negated conclusion. We understand statement s above to be vacuous as it 
literally reads, “if a player plays an action in equilibrium, then a player does not 
play an action in equilibrium.”  The authors in [4], [11] did not break down 
statement s into its sub-statements.  Writing the statements symbolically has 
exposed the over-complexity of this proof-by-contradiction approach. 
 
This work by Komali in [4] focuses optimizing communications energy consumption in a 
network with game theory.  In combination with ordinal potential functions, Komali 
constructs a game with graphs and greedy strategies where all players are identical and 
use pure strategies only.  This work builds upon a proof by Shapley stating that said 
graphs are connected, at minimum, by a simple cycle.  Specifically, Shapley states [2] 
that a graph representing a game is connected if the function used to calculate utility and 
thereby determine the best strategies is a potential function.  Komali’s resulting game is 
noncooperative, and achieves an equilibrium that is Pareto optimal.  However, its game 
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only addresses homogeneous players and ordinal utility with pure strategies, and does not 
examine heterogeneous players or mixed strategies.  Its equation to calculate utility using 
linear inverse demand is a variation on Shapley’s [2] and Rosenthal’s [14] work: each 
player receives diminishing utility for every other player to whom it is connected, but 
also receives additional constant utility for maintaining network connectivity.  Our 
understanding of the utility equation in Komali [4] is that it differs from the work in [2] 
because Komali has tailored his solution to fit his greedy strategies that determine player 
moves in the game; the utility calculations are only part of the players’ strategy.  The 
proof that Komali’s algorithm in [4] is in equilibrium is in his earlier work [30]: however 
his proof ignores Shapley’s instructions [2] and instead uses argmax as a method of 
proof, which is invalid according to [2].  Thus Komali’s work leaves open the possibility 
of a subset of solutions not in equilibrium.   
In our own simulations of Komali’s algorithm in [4], its utility improvement 
fluctuates back and forth in a sine-wave-like pattern around a threshold, never completely 
reaching the Pareto optimal equilibrium; see Figure 2.1 below.  These results indicate 
Komali is indeed taking argmax of the final set of utilities fluctuating around a threshold 
to distinguish between optimal and sub-optimal equilibrium.  We believe this should have 
been incorporated into his algorithm; as it stands, this inability to distinguish between 
Pareto and sub-optimal equilibrium is a flaw.  We conclude the flaw is most likely caused 
by Komali’s greedy strategy used by players, which Shapley [2] says can tend to a 
suboptimal solution for potential games.  However, Komali’s earlier work in [30] 
acknowledges that the optimal utility indeed does transition around a threshold and that 
this is sufficient for him for convergence. Regardless, we do not agree as mentioned 
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earlier, and believe improvements could be made in his work.  Our own simulation of the 
energy optimization algorithm in Komali [4] is shown in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Our own simulation of the energy optimization algorithm in [4] 
 
Besides the work by Komali, other work has been done in the area of tying 
noncooperative games to Pareto optimality.  Heikkinen [11] examines a quality-of-
service bandwidth allocation scheme in a distributed homogeneous network within the 
framework of a pure-strategy noncooperative game, and uses Pareto optimality to prove 
that the equilibrium reached is best overall.  It also shares a common approach to [4] in 
that the algorithm used by the players to maximize utility is a greedy one, and was 
successful at achieving results for equilibrium that is also Pareto optimal for the 
examined cases.  However, the work is applicable to homogeneous players and pure 
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strategies only, as it does not build upon Shapley’s work in [2] despite its publication at a 
later date. 
In addition to his work with potential games, Shapley also determined how to 
combine players in a game into coalitions by using a function that became known as the 
Shapley value [8], [21].  The Shapley value ensures that an individual player receives, as 
utility, an average of the utilities that other players receive for the player's actions; it acts 
as a sort of "golden rule" for players, and it was discovered by Shapley [2] that it is 
required for a game to have a potential function.  In doing so, Shapley discovered 
additional requirements for all games using potential functions that were not listed before 
Shapley’s 1996 work.  The game must also have a finite end with unique moves and 
finite utility.  These requirements were not even hinted at in Rosenthal’s work.  Shapley's 
2008 work on multiplayer utility [6] continues this, examining forming coalitions without 
negotiation when only partial player preferences are known.  This work assumes that that 
preference can be quantified.  Preferences are the current best values for the variables in 
the game.  Since the variables in the game represent security levels, the preferences are 
the current optimal security levels of the connections in the graph. 
Partial preferences, which are sometimes called incomplete preferences, are 
equations in which a set of variables may have intermediate or unassigned values.  In the 
case of a game, the variables correspond to the players or variables maximized by the 
players, and the partial preferences themselves refer to the intermediate states of the game 
prior to equilibrium.  Coalition formation in [6] is done by quantitatively comparing 
partial and complete preferences of players and coalitions.   
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Individual preferences are used to facilitate coalition formation.  These 
preferences are combined using the mathematical fact that equilibrium is a partial order, 
and any remaining unknowns are combined using a weighted sum.  This technique is able 
to aggregate individual preferences to coalition preferences without needing to arbitrate 
between the players.  While Shapley does not explain it in words, we understand his 
equations to indicate that the reason the coalition formation algorithm works so well with 
partial preferences is that it takes advantage of the mathematical foundations of game 
theory to form coalitions.  Specifically, Shapley’s coalition formation algorithm uses the 
property that an equilibrium is a partial order on the strategies as established in the 
mathematics of VonNeumann and Morganstern [17].   
In addition, Shapley proves in [6] that because the design of a weighted potential 
game means the players are already receiving utility based upon the weight used, it leads 
more easily to coalition formation because of the collaboration already inherent in the 
weighted potential game.  Coalition formation involves forming what are known as 
coalition preferences.  We understand that these coalition preferences are quantified from 
a Cartesian product, which defines the actions of the game as described earlier, to a real 
number by using a weighted sum of the individual preferences that already exist prior to 
coalition formation.  This is not the game theoretic weight as defined earlier in the 
context of a potential game, but refers to the algebraic definition, whereby a number is 
multiplied by each of the elements in the Cartesian product, and then the elements are 
added together.   
Shapley points out that there is no formula given in past work indicating how to 
best determine these weights for coalition preferences, but if there is an already existing 
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schema then it will facilitate easier coalition formation.  Since this weight is between two 
players, and the coalition examined contains the same two players, it is in and of itself an 
optimized coalition preference weight.  Coalitions themselves are already in wide use; for 
example, any network containing a Windows-NT system divides users into coalitions, 
which are usually referred to as groups in a Windows environment.  It restricts certain 
users in a coalition from having access to resources on the network, while other users 
belonging to a different coalition are granted such access.  The primary advantage of 
using coalitions to grant permissions is its speed: it is faster than other approaches.  The 
first approach commonly used, a zero-knowledge based system, grants permissions to 
individuals if they can prove secret knowledge; but by doing so they do not reveal the 
secret itself.  A graph isomorphism is a means of implementing a zero-knowledge based 
system, whereby a graph representation of knowledge is shown to be identical to another 
graph with different vertex names.  The problem with this approach is its inefficiency: 
proving the two graphs are an isomorphism of one another involves examining all 
possible combinations.   The other approach commonly used for granting permissions 
involves secret-key encryption, but it is expensive to implement.   
Other work besides [4], [11] studies Pareto optimal potential games: the work by 
Bauso [13] examines this in a network resource sharing game.  Bauso builds primarily 
upon Rosenthal [14] for potential games.  But, like [11], he does not build upon Shapley 
[2], [6] despite the later publication date; this in turn causes Bauso’s results to be sub-
optimal.  Specifically, Bauso examines pure-strategy noncooperative non-repeated (one-
shot) and repeated games.  Bauso correctly uses argmax to refine his answer and select 
the best equilibrium, but again like [4], [11] also uses it incorrectly to do an empirical 
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proof for Pareto optimality in one-shot games.  This is not all: by overlooking Shapley 
[2], [6], Bauso’s work fails to find a Pareto optimal solution for coalitions and repeated 
games.  Furthermore, Bauso’s coalition formation algorithm does not work.   While 
Bauso’s game is partially correct in that it uses the Finite Improvement Property, 
according to Shapley [2] the Finite Improvement Property does not guarantee that a game 
possess a potential function.  Rather, as stated above, the game must also have a finite 
end with unique moves and finite utility.  What Bauso did with a repeated game 
possessing a potential function is violate its requirements according to Shapley [2]: the 
game is repeated and so each time it is restarted and played again, there exists at least one 
state that is not unique as it was played identically the last time around.   
Like Komali [4], Johari [1] develops interesting solutions using noncooperative 
games represented by a graph, but avoids potential functions altogether.  Johari’s work 
addresses energy conservation for message passing in networks, and uses both 
noncooperative and cooperative games.  In these games, all strategies are pure, and all 
nodes homogeneous, but unlike Komali uses the idea of bids between nodes to establish 
connections between nodes.  Bidding takes place using a type of currency and occurs in 
sequence from one player to the next.  Johari found several types of simple topologies 
that result when game theory is applied to graphs for the purpose of reaching some type 
of equilibrium.  If the cost is applied only to the initiator of a connection, as characterized 
by noncooperative games, the star topology has the least cost to all nodes and will form.  
Otherwise, if cost is applied to both parties, as in the case of a cooperative game, a simple 
cycle or wheel forms.  The simple cycle was also found by Johari to be a degenerative 
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topology: soon after the network formed by the noncooperative game degenerated from a 
star to a simple cycle, the network disconnected.   
While the above work is significant with respect to the game theoretic aspect to 
our security optimization solution, it does not address security.  All previous game 
theoretic work with security deals with individual elements or components in the 
network.  Only a few authors have examined using game theory to help solve security 
problems, and none of these authors have examined optimizing overall security, let alone 
overall security in a network.  In addition, we are not aware of any previous game 
theoretic security optimization that validates its work using security metrics. 
For the little work that has been done in the area of game theory and security, the 
primary work has been done by Agah [26] - [27] to model a scenario where an attacker 
drops packets to cause communication disruption in a network.  Here, game players 
represent nodes in the network, and players receive utility based on the number of 
successfully transferred packets.  As a method of defense and attacker detection, each 
player individually examines the percentage of its own message packets not forwarded by 
other players.  If another player fails to forward a percentage of messages beyond a 
threshold, then that other player is removed from its network.  All other work in the area 
[28] - [29] follows a similar pattern.  
The work by Demirbas [29] is similar in that it also examines network games that 
optimize security for each component.  However, their work focuses more on 
reconfiguring individual nodes to stabilize the network so that it may address the problem 
of defending against a direct attack against each individual player.  The third significant 
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work with game theory and security is done by Sun [28], who uses game theory with 
security and economics at the component level.  Each individual part of a network is 
examined, and cost/benefit analysis is done with respect to additional investment.  
Results showed that the cost inflicted by an attacker on each component is directly 
reduced by the security investment.  While interesting in a broad sense, the results are 
generic and do not list any particular types of investment, but includes every possibility 
in one category.   
Recent work in the area of security metrics has examined the shortfall caused by 
generic security definitions.  Security metrics are based on the idea of going beyond 
traditional qualitative security definitions into the area of quantitative measurement and 
analysis.  Past definitions of security include such phrases as “works as expected” [31].  
Such qualitative definitions, while traditional in security, depend upon perceptions of 
environment; they do not preclude the possibility of hidden vulnerabilities or sleeper 
agents that fail to affect the expected workings of a system until they are activated and 
cause destruction, illustrating that the system was never secure even though, up until that 
point, it did indeed work “as expected” [31].  Preventing such types of attacks is one of 
the purposes of quantitative security metrics.   
The earliest work on building a foundation for quantitative security analysis based 
on security metrics that received attention is by Almerhag and Woodward in 2005 [10].  
The paper describes security levels related to the types of operations or rules of 
composition used to define them; these three levels from least important to most 
important are neighbor authentication, cryptography, and access control.  Authentication 
is measured by whether or not a neighboring node computer’s identity is able to be 
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verified by a trusted third party in a network.  Cryptography is expensive to implement, 
but prevents a transmission from being altered or decoded by an unwanted third party.  
Access control is cheaper to implement than cryptography, and works to directly stop 
individuals from gaining access to unauthorized information, such as user IDs and 
passwords.  Payne [23] of the SANS Institute has a somewhat different definition of 
security metrics, stating that its core foundation lies in analysis of security data.  Here, the 
essence of effective security analysis is risk analysis, with three core areas: asset value, 
threat, and vulnerability.   
Another technique that can be used to quantitatively analyze security is attack 
trees, which are sometimes called attack graphs.  Attack trees are a data structure with 
nodes representing states of the environment; transitions exist between states.  These 
transitions represent the conditions for moving from one state to another, much like a 
finite state automaton.  Authors Sheyner [9] and Wang [25] have called for the need to 
quantitatively analyze security using attack trees, but their work lacks a means of 
quantitatively measuring security for the purpose of attack tree analysis; still, their work 
is one more step toward finding a means of tying this quantitative analysis to a practical 
security implementation.  Existing approaches using attack trees, such as the work by 
[40], are representative of the implementation problems attack trees pose, as these works’ 
analyses degenerate into an NP-complete problem of analyzing all connections between 
all nodes in a tree.  In fact, much of the work in the area of attack trees, exemplified by 
[39], are on finding new ways to improve speedup for analyzing this NP-complete 
problem.  This work by [39] uses a backtracking and sorting of the relationships between 
nodes in the attack tree prior to any actual analysis taking place. 
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 As stated earlier in Chapter I, our thesis will use constraint satisfaction problems 
as a means to better describe our problem and tie metrics to our game theoretic solution.  
The idea of constraints in games themselves goes back to the coalitions of games 
possessing information, capacity, participation, and incentive compatibility constraints.  
Information constraints are limitations imposed by a game designer on the players, 
whereby they have limited information about some aspect of the game, be it observing or 
predicting other players’ moves.  As a result, information asymmetry between players 
results in these games and players must make decisions accordingly.  A classic example 
of information constraints is the Prisoners’ dilemma.  The second constraint type, 
capacity, is generally tied to games involving money or currency, possibly in a generic 
sense, and the limited capacity players have to spend or produce to maximize their own 
utility while minimizing cost.  The third constraint type, participation constraints, is 
imposed on players to take part in the game.  Last, incentive and compatibility constraints 
are related to one another.  They are used in repeated games describing participation 
incentives; one example is in a game involving players that can produce products of 
varying quality to sell, but because other players know that low-quality products are more 
likely to be defective but cheaper and high-quality products are less likely to be defective 
but more expensive, players know that they must produce high-quality products to have a 
chance to generate a profit.  As a result, discounts become the focus of the game to 
maximize utility.   
A constraint satisfaction problem is an AI technique that traditionally has nothing 
to do with game theory.  Constraint satisfaction problems models variables’ constraints 
and variables in a problem, and can be generalized and solved by several different 
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methods.  These methods are backtracking or other tree-pruning techniques.  The work 
by Vickrey [16] was the first to examine the relationship between constraint satisfaction 
problems and games with complete information.  Players in the game were represented 
by variables in the constraint satisfaction problem, and constraints were used as means of 
socially forcing players in the game to follow the strategy of other players in their local 
neighborhood.  Constraints in this work were restricted to unary constraints, and it was 
thus limited by the inability to apply the constraints to any binary mathematical 
operations.   
The work by Soni, Singh, and Wellman [7], however, does apply to binary 
constraints.  It builds upon the work by Vickrey, examining repeated cooperative games 
with complete information for message-passing optimization, and reformulating the 
constraint satisfaction problem to allow binary and unary constraints.  To do so, the 
problem in [7] was changed to take place within a graph so that constraints existed 
between each variable; constraints were related to equilibrium.  In this, a constraint was 
satisfied if the player chose the best strategy to maximize its utility given the other 
players in the game also choose the best move.  Each player, or variable, had its own 
unary constraint.  While their work is significant because it is, as far as we are aware, the 
first to examine the relationship between constraint satisfaction problems and game 
theory, the solution is restricted to traditional constraint satisfaction problem solving 
techniques and can only apply to homogeneous players with pure strategies.  The solution 
uses the authors’ own variation of a backtracking and tree-pruning algorithm from [16], 
the foundation of which is a classic AI technique.  The work does incorporate game 
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theoretic means of determining tree pruning, but this is secondary to the authors’ own 
backtracking algorithm; potential functions and optimization are not considered. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we will compare our algorithm’s security 
optimization with a known algorithm; the one used will be Kerberos.  Again, we refer the 
reader to [35] for a complete description.  In the body of research with comparing new 
network security algorithms to Kerberos, there have been varying approaches to 
simulating Kerberos as exemplified by the more recent works of [36] – [38].  Older 
research in the field tends to focus on using off-the-shelf software packages to simulate 
Kerberos as well as the authors' own algorithms, while newer researchers develop their 
own model to study specific aspects of Kerberos compared to their own work.  In the 
following more widely-referenced recent articles, each explores simulating and 
modifying a Kerberos system.  The work by [36], which was published in 2007, 
apparently marks the beginning of the end of off-the-shelf software use for Kerberos 
simulations.  Here, the authors used the popular GSS-API software package to simulate 
Kerberos and their own algorithm, only to discover that the accuracy and credibility of 
anyone’s results from the GSS-API software had come into question by the international 
community while the authors (and others) were conducting experiments [36].  The 
authors of [36] discontinued and abandoned their experiments with GSS-API, publishing 
only their formal model and algorithm with a note about the fate of GSS-API and its 
discontinued use by the international community.  In [37], which was published in the 
following year, the authors compare computation time of their cryptography model with 
their own representation of standard Kerberos cryptography by using a different off-the-
shelf software package called Crypto++.  One of the most recent works is by [38], a 2009 
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journal article in which the authors abandon the off-the-shelf software approach and 
instead focus on building a mathematical model and prototype.  These authors model the 
Kerberos network through an equation derived from fluid mechanics to study bandwidth 
usage in networks; this equation follows similar methodology as the equation used to 
represent their own network optimization technique.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
SECURITY METRICS 
 
In this chapter we begin to propose our game theoretic approach to optimize overall 
security for a heterogeneous network.  As far as we are aware, our thesis is the first in the 
area of optimizing overall network security using game theory.  Security, as mentioned 
earlier in Chapter II, suffers from what we believe to be an insufficiently descriptive 
definition.  While many authors have had difficulty defining what security is, we believe 
it is relatively easy to define what security is not.  Security is not vulnerability, whereby 
an outsider may destroy, alter, or steal one’s possessions.  Possessions are, in the case of 
our network, the data stored in the computers, the computers themselves, and the 
connections between computers in the network.  We assume that maintaining control of 
possessions relates to access control, which is itself controlled by user IDs and 
passwords.  Such data is sensitive and should be guarded carefully.  Insensitive data is 
less important, but is still vulnerable to theft.  There still exists the possibility in any 
network that an outsider may intercept or alter data transferred between computers in the 
network.  These instances involving alteration, destruction, or theft of possessions 
characterize a vulnerable network.  Since a vulnerable network is clearly not a secure 
one, we will define security in terms of what it is not, namely vulnerability.  Vulnerability 
will thus be used as a foundation for our security definition, and network security will  
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be optimized by minimizing vulnerability. 
To solve the problem of optimizing security, we must first quantitatively measure 
security so that one can determine whether or not the security has improved.  
Measurement of security in the system, and not just an individual component, is essential 
if our proposed approach to security optimization is to be validated.  To do so, we build 
upon existing work in the area of security metrics to come up with our own metrics for 
quantitative security measurement.  Metrics will enable us to more fully describe the 
problem of security maximization and enable us to quantitatively measure security itself 
in a meaningful way.  Using an approach that allows entities in the network to evaluate 
their environment without having to resort to qualitative, nebulous definitions could 
significantly improve evaluation of security and security itself.  We propose the use of 
security metrics as a basis for quantifying security and validating our results.  We will 
develop our metrics, which can enable us to take definitions of security that are typically 
qualitative and quantify them mathematically.   
Attack trees are a means of analyzing security.  Attack tree analysis is not game 
theoretic, but is a way of describing the means by which relationships and vulnerabilities 
in an environment are analyzed for decision-making.  In our problem, attack trees enable 
analysis to take the action that maximizes security.  Since actions involve changing the 
value of a variable, and the context of our problem is security, we will see that actions 
involve changing the values of the security levels between nodes.  We develop a 
methodology for applying metrics for measuring security.  Since the metrics 
quantitatively measure security, these can be used as parameters to the analysis.  In an 
attack tree, the tree root represents the computer whose vulnerability is being assessed.  
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In the tree, if another node or relationship is closer to root it has more access, which can 
result in greater vulnerability.   It is clearly preferred to address a problem further away 
from the root rather than allowing it to reach levels closer to the root before addressing it.  
In an ideal world, each computer in the network would be able to implement the 
maximum possible security.  However, we are attempting to optimize security for a 
heterogeneous network in the world of the practical; there are limitations which prevent 
the ideal from taking place.  The heterogeneity of the computers forming the network 
prevents them from reaching the same maximum security and places limitations, or 
constraints, with regard to maximum security of the overall network.  Since all devices in 
the network under consideration are different from one another, there are constraints with 
respect to available hardware and software, as well as corresponding constraints of the 
hardware and software itself that limit maximum achievable security.  We believe that 
optimizing security for this type of environment fits the definition of, and at the very least 
lends itself to, a constraint satisfaction problem.  Constraint satisfaction problems have 
variables, corresponding constraints on the variables, and problem state.  A state of the 
problem represents the current values of some or all variables.  Some constraint 
satisfaction problems have an objective function maximized by all variables; doing so 
leads to its solution.   
Thus we will describe the network as a constraint satisfaction problem so that we 
may better specify the problem of optimizing security within the security limitations.  
Since we propose the application of game theory to optimize security, we will solve our 
constraint satisfaction problem using a game.  We propose players will use environment 
data, represented by variables quantified by security metrics, as input to players’ attack 
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tree analyses to determine vulnerability and thereby measure security.  In doing so, 
players may choose the move that maximizes security.  As connections change in the 
network during game play, metrics can be used to measure the changes in the network for 
attack tree analysis, choice of optimal move, and overall network security.   
But not all constraint satisfaction problems possess an objective function and can 
be directly correlated with, and thus be solved by, games.  Conversely, not all games can 
be directly correlated with, and thus solve, the corresponding subset of constraint 
satisfaction problems.  We must identify which constraint satisfaction problem subset can 
solve a subset of games that fits our problem.   Hence we propose to identify the subset of 
constraint satisfaction problems that can be directly used with a subset of games that fit 
our security problem.   
To implement more effective security we will use coalitions.  Coalition formation 
involves separation of nodes according to preferences, which are represented by current 
assignment of values to security levels of all connections.  To give an example, complete 
preferences for coalition formation takes into account a node i and its links to 
neighboring nodes.  Partial preferences, which are also known as incomplete preferences, 
take into account the links not made by node i but have been made by other coalition 
nodes j and k.  Partial preferences also include the state of links prior to final 
optimization.  Coalitions are usually formed only once all variables, or preferences, have 
had their final values assigned to them.  To integrate the coalition formation process 
directly into our security optimization algorithm, we propose using coalition formation 
with partial preferences.  Approaches to coalition formation relying on complete 
preferences would not be able to be directly integrated into the optimization process 
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itself, as they are instead formed after the optimization is complete, which can place a 
system in a suboptimal state.  Through the above solutions, we propose our work presents 
a novel optimization technique that improves overall security for a heterogeneous 
network.   
 
3.1 Problem definition 
Before examining how to quantitatively measure and optimize security, let us first 
define the problem, beginning with the network model and its notation.  Assume the 
network whose security is to be optimized is represented by an a priori connected 
directed graph  
G = (V, E)      (3.1) 
with set of vertices V and set of directed edges E.  Vertex vi, an element of the set 
vertices, is denoted 
vi  V = {v1, v2, … , vi , vj , vk , … , vn}    (3.2) 
G is minimally connected with at least one edge between each of the n vertices such that 
there are at minimum  
  1      (3.3) 
edges, and thus the set of edges is at minimum denoted 
E  , , … , !" #    (3.4) 
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Furthermore, let vertices represent computer nodes in the network.  Let the vertex vi be 
represented by its index i 
i = vi   V      (3.5) 
and let vertex vj be represented by its index j, where 
$ % &      (3.6) 
and likewise for all the other vertices in V. 
A directed edge forming a connection from i to j is written  
eij  E       (3.7) 
We define a directed edge to be synonymous with the terms edge, link, and connection. 
Likewise, an edge representing a connection from j to i is written  
eji  E       (3.8) 
Let the sequence of all k possible security levels of eij be represented by S, an n-tuple 
containing a non-decreasing sequence of nonnegative real numbers, denoted  
'  , , … , (	,    0    (3.9) 
Let all eij have numerical values associated with them.  These are commonly called edge 
weights; this definition of a weight from graph theory is not to be confused with the type 
of game described in Chapter II called a weighted potential game.  Therefore, we will 
define the edge weight as the security level of the connection between two nodes, and 
henceforth refer to it as such to avoid confusion.  Thus, let  
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)  '       (3.10) 
denote security level of connection eij between nodes i and j. 
Changing a security level sij will be a valid move, or action, in our security optimization 
game.  Hence, the moves in our game are changing the security levels of each sij. 
If we denote all nodes other than i as 
&      (3.11) 
And, likewise, all nodes other than j as 
$       (3.12) 
where  
$ % &      (3.13) 
 
We define the security levels of all direct connections node i makes to its neighbors 
forming the local network of node i as the union of the security of its connection to node j 
and its connections to nodes other than j, $ , denoted  
) * ")     (3.14) 
 
And if we assume for all direct connections i makes to its neighbors, we can define si, the 
security level of node i, as the weakest of all the direct connections from node i.  The 
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security level of node i is defined as the minimum of the union of the security levels of all 
direct connections node i makes to its neighbors, written   
  & +) * "),    (3.15) 
 
3.2 Security metrics 
We shall define our metrics to measure security.  These metrics will consider 
cryptography, data sensitivity, and access control, but exclude authentication.  
Authentication is excluded because, in our model, all aspects of the network are visible to 
all nodes.  We therefore assume that any node in the network has authenticated.  
However, we reserve exploration of the issue of authentication and false impersonation 
for future work. 
The following metrics have binary representations.  We define the binary representation 
of each metric as corresponding to security strength; thus if the vulnerability is high, the 
metric is assigned the binary number 0.   
 
3.3 Cryptography 
Cryptography allows computers to send data to one another along eij in a way that 
any outsider or third-party who intercepts the data cannot read it.  Encryption enables 
computers to implement cryptography.  With weak encryption, there is a greater chance 
for vulnerability since it is relatively easy for a third-party intercepting messages sent 
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along eij to use the message to gain access to a node.  An example of weak encryption, 
which we define as low encryption, would be a connection secured using a 32-bit key.  
An example of strong encryption, which we define as high encryption, would be a 
connection secured using a 256-bit key.  Let all connections eij have encryption.  Current 
encryption strength of connection eij is represented by  
-)  .0,       /01 2-3&0 1,      4&54 2-3&06    (3.16) 
Since connection eij has been defined as a directed or one-way connection from node i to 
node j, according to the definition of eij, yij ≠ yji. 
 
3.4 Data sensitivity  
The data stored at each node can be either sensitive or insensitive.  With sensitive 
data there is a greater possibility for vulnerability, such as if an intruder gained access to 
passwords, than with insensitive data.  Sensitive data includes, for example, passwords 
and usernames.  Insensitive data excludes sensitive data by definition.  Insensitive data 
includes, for example, time of day, schedules, or other data that does not increase 
vulnerability if it is stolen.  Let all nodes have data; all data of node j, is written  
7$	  80,         &&1,    &&& 6    (3.17) 
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3.5 Access control 
Permissions to read and write a node’s data also affect security.  Access to read 
and write data increases the vulnerability as it increases the possibility of an attacker 
stealing or modifying the data.  Let write access from i to j be represented by 
1)7$		     (3.18) 
Again, the binary number relates to security strength.  Consequently, if a node i has write 
access to data of node j, then it indicates that decreased vulnerability is false, or 0.  Thus,  
1)7$		  .0,                       07 & 49 1& 922 0 7$	1, 07 & 70 0 49 1& 922 0 7$	6   (3.19) 
Let read access from i to j be represented by 
)7$		     (3.20) 
The binary number relates to security strength.  Consequently, if a node i has read access 
to data of node j, then it indicates that decreased vulnerability is false, or 0.    
)7$		  .0,                        07 & 49 97 922 0 7$	1, 07 & 70 0 49 97 922 0 7$	 6   (3.21) 
 
With our metrics we can define sij using security metrics 
)   -)  :  )+7$	,  :  1)+7$	,  '    (3.22) 
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We will use algebra for translating a Cartesian product to a real number by 
applying an algebraic weighted sum to achieve a clearer security level conceptualization, 
translating a binary Cartesian product to a security value ranging from 0 to 10.  In this 
context, the term “weight” will always be used with the word “sum” since it refers to the 
algebraic weighted sum and not the game theoretic definition of weight. 
For node i having connection to j we translate the security definition of sij, which 
is a Cartesian product, to a real number according to the formula 
)  ;< · -) >  ;? · )+7$	, >  ;@ · 1)+7$	,  (3.23) 
 
3.6 Security metrics example 
To give an example of translating encryption, read, and write metrics to a real 
number according to equation (3.23), let us assign nonnegative real numbers to the 
coefficients of each of the metrics in the weighted sum to give a range of integer security 
values from 0 through 10, such that 
'  0, 1, 2, … , 10	
    
(3.24) 
Also, to aid in clarifying our example, we will separate the metric of data sensitivity from 
the read and write metrics.  Thus we redefine sij as 
)  ;< · - >  ;? ·  >  ;@ · 1 > ;B · 7$	  (3.25) 
We denote the set of all security levels of all h direct links from node i to all other nodes 
–i, forming the local neighborhood of i, as 
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C )D)E)      (3.26) 
Thus, for example, if node i has direct connections to nodes $, F, 9, G, 2, then 
H )
D
)E)
 ), (, I, J , K# 
Next we determine the values of each weight so security ranges from 0…10, 
chosen for convenience, according to equation (3.24).  We assume that data sensitivity is 
foremost in determining vulnerability.  Since theft of data is of little consequence when it 
is insensitive and of great consequence when it is sensitive, we weigh data sensitivity the 
most heavily.  Hence we shall assign the numerical value of 5 (out of 10) to ;B.  
Next, we consider data tampering to be the second greatest vulnerability.  Data 
tampering can cause lost passwords or system failure if data is sensitive, and is 
accomplished by writing.  Access control can be used to prevent an outsider from 
tampering with data.  Encryption can also be used to prevent an outsider from tampering 
with data.  We shall thus assign the same numerical value to the encryption and write 
metrics, 2 to ;< and ;@.  Restricting read access can prevent an outsider from viewing 
data, which we consider to be less of a possible vulnerability than any of the other 
metrics, and we shall thus assign the numerical value of 1 to ;?.   
While encryption can also prevent an outsider from reading data, we consider its 
ability to prevent data tampering to be more important, and so it outweighs any security 
consideration for an outsider reading data.  Thus, the weights add up to 10, the maximum 
security level that we assumed: 
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;< >  ;? >  ;@ > ;B  2 >  1 >  2 > 5  10  (3.27) 
 
And in combination with the binary representation of our metrics, security levels 
will range from 0 to 10.  We can now draw up a table, Table 3.1, which contains the 
Cartesian product of security metrics converted to real values using our algebraic 
weighted sum in equation (3.27), to represent the weighted sum and metrics to derive the 
security values of sij.  Note in Table 3.1, if encryption is high and read and write access is 
restricted, the data sensitivity is irrelevant; hence the same security value for cases 14 and 
15.  The same can be said of the data for cases 6 and 7, as again, read and write access is 
denied.  We denote these “don’t care” statuses using an X in the respective table cell.   
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 Encryption 
(high) 
Read  
(restricted) 
Write 
(restricted) 
Data 
(insensitive) 
Security  
s 
Weights 
 
Case 
2 1 2 5 
15. 1 1 1 X 10 
14. 1 1 1 X 10 
13. 1 1 0 1 8 
12. 1 1 0 0 3 
11. 1 0 1 1 9 
10. 1 0 1 0 4 
9. 1 0 0 1 7 
8. 1 0 0 0 2 
7. 0 1 1 X 8 
6. 0 1 1 X 8 
5. 0 1 0 1 6 
4. 0 1 0 0 1 
3. 0 0 1 1 7 
2. 0 0 1 0 2 
1. 0 0 0 1 5 
0. 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 3.1: Cartesian product of security metrics converted to real values   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION 
 
To describe our model in further detail, we will specify its constraints and explain how 
we can use it to improve representation of the requirements of our optimization problem.  
We will show how our problem can be modeled as a constraint satisfaction problem, 
which will act as an intermediate step in designing our game.  
 
4.1 Constraint satisfaction problems  
Constraints represent the limitations of security for each computer in our network, 
and consequently, constraints are related to the overall network security limitations.  A 
constraint is a function that maps the domain of possible security values S to the range of 
allowed security values for a computer.  It thus restricts the domain of security values S 
to a subset of S that is achievable by the node given its hardware and software.  There 
may be a great deal of difference in the processing power and other physical 
computational limits of the computers forming our heterogeneous network we are 
optimizing in our problem.  These hardware and software limitations lead to actual 
security limits that each computer in the network can achieve.  A constraint function is  
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thus itself a function of the hardware and software of a computer.  Each kind of software 
provides a range of security levels, and each kind of hardware provides another range of 
security levels.  The actual range of security values achievable by a computer is 
somewhat complicated, as it is related to whether the hardware and software 
independently provide security, or are dependent upon one another.  If we consider the 
domain of security values as the Cartesian product of the set of all computer hardware 
and software, trying to enumerate all the possibilities would be difficult.  The security 
function depends upon the relationship between hardware and software.  In some 
situations where hardware and software are dependent upon one another for security, if 
one element is defeated, the other may be worthless.  For example, if a security feature of 
the hardware is defeated, the software could be worthless for providing security.  For an 
example of a problem (outside the scope of this work) such as laptop theft, in this case if 
a laptop is stolen and hard drive erased, then any software encryption of data on the hard 
drive is worthless.  In other cases, the hardware and software may make each other 
stronger, such as a physical lock on an office door combined with a password on the 
computer in the office.  Here, an attacker would have to spend time getting past the lock 
before spending time getting past the password on the computer.  Because of the 
difficulty in deriving a function for all possible combinations of hardware and software, 
we will characterize the properties the function will have to develop a heuristic that is a 
reasonable model for our problem. 
For our problem, we can consider our definition of security as described above 
using metrics as first being software-related, since encryption and access control to data 
are related to software.  However, we may safely reason that a hand-held device such as a 
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cell phone is capable of a lower and smaller range of security than a server due to the 
hardware and the software differences.  Hence, we believe that for most cases related to 
our problem of optimizing a heterogeneous network, the hardware and software are 
dependent upon one another.  Granted, it is possible that in certain cases our model fails 
to make sense; we are assuming that computers in our network will have security 
constraints whereby hardware and software are dependent upon one another, and that all 
computers being optimized can be characterized by our definitions of security and 
constraints.   
If we first characterize unary constraints, which form an essential part of a 
constraint satisfaction problem, we consider that this relates to the security of one 
computer’s hardware and software.  Unary constraints pertain to the limitations on 
maximum achievable security of one computer, or rather one node in the network.  If we 
say that a function f1 takes as input the hardware of a node i, 49719, and produces a 
range of security values that is a subset of S, and a second function f2 takes the software 
of a node i, 0M19, and produces another range of security values that is a subset of 
S, and we assume that these two subsets of f1 and f2 overlap with values in common 
between them; and if we have software that worsens overall security if the software is 
weaker, and hardware that worsens overall security if the hardware is weaker, then we 
can say that the unary constraint function N!IOP49719, 0M19	 is at least as 
good as the weakest of the hardware and software for node i,  
N!IOP49719, 0M19	  & M49719	, M0M19		 
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What the security is less than or equal to is another matter.  If the quality of the software 
and hardware are good, giving high security, then we will say that this is a best-case 
scenario and consequently represents the maximum security.  Here, we assume that we 
can characterize the maximum security all the possible nodes in our network with this 
equation, whereby the security is less than or equal to  
N!IOP49719, 0M19	 Q 9R M49719	, M0M19		 
 
Putting these together to characterize unary constraints, we have the inequality 
&+M49719	, M0M19	, Q N!IOP49719, 0M19	 
Q 9R M49719	, M0M19		 
(4.1) 
There are exceptions to this model, however, because it is possible that combined 
hardware and software can work together to give a maximum security value that is 
greater than the maximum of either the hardware or software.  For example, if we have a 
computer that uses protected memory on a CPU to prevent processes from accessing 
unauthorized data in combination with encryption on the data, this computer would 
achieve a security level beyond the maximum of encryption and protected memory, since 
even if a process was able to view data it was not supposed to, it would then have to get 
past the encryption on the data.  This type of system would represent a significantly 
reduced vulnerability.  However, we are assuming that the computers optimized stay 
within our model of unary constraints on security in equation (4.1). 
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For ease of notation and to more clearly see the node to which the unary 
constraint function is being applied, let us denote an abbreviation for constraints in 
equation (4.1) for each node i as 
	  N!IOP M49719	, M0M19		   (4.2) 
 
Binary constraints are the other type of constraints in a constraint satisfaction 
problem, and pertain to the security value of an edge between two nodes.  Here, we are 
dealing with constraints on a network, albeit a small network that is between two nodes.  
Interactions are complicated, and thus the safest assumption is to base the range of values 
on the weakest node forming the link.  Here, the binary constraints range from the 
minimum of the weakest node to the maximum of the weakest node.  For a connection eij 
from node i to node j at security sij,  
& S&+M49719	, M0M19	, ,& TM+49719),, M+0M19),UV Q     
J!IOP+49719, 0M19 , 49719), 0M19), Q    
9R S&+M49719	, M0M19	, ,& TM+49719),, M+0M19),UV   
(4.3) 
 
We shall denote an abbreviation for binary constraints of connection eij in equation (4.3) 
as 
)+),   J!IOP+49719, 0M19, 49719), 0M19), (4.4) 
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Note that if the set of constraints of node i and the set of constraints of node j have 
something in common between them, a link can be formed between the two nodes.  
Mathematically, this is written as the intersection of the set of constraints of node i and 
the set of constraints of node j, denoted 
	 W  )+), % X    (4.5) 
then a link eij at sij can be formed between nodes i and j. 
Because security levels have to be determined within their constraints, we denote security 
given its constraints as an ordered pair 
+, 	,     (4.6) 
and  
T), )+),U      (4.7) 
 
4.2 Costs 
We define cost as a way of measuring lost security.  We define pay, or payment, 
as compensation measured in utility to or from another node.  Both payment and cost are 
denominated in units of security.  To give an example, payment from one node i to 
another node j for creating link eij would come in the form of security gained by j through 
i allocating some of its CPU time to j.  Because granting CPU time to node j restricts the 
available resources of node i, it decreases available resources for i to implement security, 
but increases the available resources of j to implement security.  The cost to i for making 
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the payment would be lost security.  For the connection, node i receives utility for the 
link since it is connected to the rest of the network, but node j will incur cost in the future 
from retransmitting messages sent by node i.  Therefore, future cost to j is offset by 
payment from i for establishing the link.  In doing so, our game fits the definition of a 
noncooperative game.  Cost c of payment from i to j for forming eij shall be denoted as 
cost of eij, written 
2+) ,      (4.8) 
The cost c of payment from node i to node j to form eij is determined by a varying 
price scheme, which is accomplished by bidding.  The bidding process is tied to strength 
of need to establish a link measured by the effect it has on security.  If a node benefits 
more by establishing the link, it would be willing to pay more than if little benefit was 
received.  Bidding schemes include iterative or linear movement from the minimum to 
maximum amount a node is willing to pay.  This scheme allows the player to move only 
some fixed amount each time it raises or lowers a bid; in other words, if a bid starts at 1, 
its next bid is at 2, then 3, etc…  Another type of bidding scheme implements an 
exponential movement from minimum to maximum amount a node is willing to pay.  
This bidding scheme follows the pattern of an exponential function, whereby bidding 
increments are slow initially and increase exponentially as each bid is made.  Finally, 
there exists the possibility of nodes implementing a scheme whereby bids follow a 
logarithmic movement from minimum to maximum amount willing to pay.   
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4.3 Side payments 
The calculation to decide the move that gives the most utility may indicate that it 
is not beneficial for that node to raise its security beyond some level.  In addition to 
payment from node i to node j to form a link eij, we define a second type of payment 
called a side payment.  Side payments are used to induce a node to move beyond its 
selfish motivations to benefit another node.  A side payment is defined as an action that 
consists of payment made from node i to node j to induce j to change the security, sjk, of 
its link ejk to node k.  If analysis shows that a node i gains the most utility by another 
node j altering a link to node k, where i is not connected to k, node i can take action to 
maximize its utility by paying node j to alter its link to node k.  Adding side payments to 
the set of possible moves has the possibility of raising the security level of i as well as 
other nodes connected to j beyond what would be possible without a system of side 
payments, swaying the utility calculation of an individual node in favor of distributed 
security over local security, therefore benefiting the network as a whole.  We denote a 
side payment action from node i to another node j to induce action T)(, )(+)(,U that 
changes security of j’s connection to node k as 
2) T)(, )(+)(,U    (4.9) 
Since a side payment is an action node i takes that changes a link, which in this 
case is altering link sjk, it is considered to be a move for node i.  As such, it must take 
place within the constraints of i, 	.  Since cost for the action is applied to i since i 
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must pay j to take action altering link sjk, cost c is additionally notated for clarity to 
indicate that cost is applied to i as it must pay j to take the action.  We assume that j 
cannot refuse an action once it agrees to take the action. 
By having nodes pay other nodes to make changes in security that do not affect 
the other nodes directly but can cause them to become more vulnerable, a type of 
cooperation takes place.  Side payments act as a facilitator of a form of cooperation, 
regardless of coalition membership, to increase overall security.  The end result of this 
payment is that overall security of the nodes along the attack tree from payee to payer is 
increased.  Without side payments between nodes, there may be areas in the graph or 
particular nodes for which this solution is sub-optimal.  This sub-optimality can be 
brought on by individual nodes’ strategies or security limits due to the computers’ 
constraints.  However, we believe side payments help in avoiding these sub-optimal 
scenarios in a network. 
Besides helping form links, payments between players denominated in the same 
unit of measure as utility aid in applying attack tree analysis to improve security via side 
payment.  For the above scenario for nodes i, j, and k, if a node i wishes to implement a 
change between nodes j and k, it corresponds to making a change further down the attack 
tree.  This is cheaper than implementing changes higher up in the tree; changes further 
down (node k) correspond to earlier changes versus later changes when the problem is 
imminent (node j) and vulnerability is greater.  As a result, not only would it be cheaper 
to make earlier changes or fixes in the tree, more nodes (such as other nodes connected to 
node j) can benefit from these changes.  Such a payment should only make sense in the 
context of utility: node i that received benefit should ensure the node j that made the 
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change also benefit, especially when one considers that the node j making the change 
may not directly benefit from the change.  Carrying out attack tree analyzed security 
changes through side payments enables the cooperation among the nodes.  Algorithm 5.2 
addresses how nodes perform attack tree analysis. 
 
4.4 Objective function 
The objective function is a function maximized in a constraint satisfaction 
problem.  Since we have not yet specified all aspects of our approach, describing the 
objective function beyond any general notation would be premature at this point.  We 
thus say that the objective function, u, is used by all nodes to maximize security given its 
constraints. 
 
4.5  Constraint satisfaction problems and game subset solvability 
The use of constraint satisfaction has aided in specifying our solution in more 
detail, but we must identify a subset of games that work with a constraint satisfaction 
problem subset for mathematical proof of optimization.  This is achieved, explained in 
detail below, through a noncooperative potential game and constraint satisfaction 
problem possessing an objective function.  Our reasoning is explained in Proof 4.1 below. 
 
 
57 
 
 
Theorem 4.1: 
A potential game that maximizes security can be used to solve a constraint 
satisfaction problem to maximize security if-and-only if the constraint satisfaction 
problem has an objective function that maximizes security. 
Proof 4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1 
Proving this Theorem 4.1 by contradiction is inappropriate as it creates a logical 
in-equivalence that is difficult to resolve due to the use of negation with if-and-only-if.  
Thus, we will use a direct proof.   
We will represent the statement in Theorem 4.1 symbolically.   
p: game with potential function 
q: constraint satisfaction problem with an objective function  
Since a constraint satisfaction problem with an objective function by definition 
maximizes the function per its input, let us define input as security value according to 
equation (3.9) as 
  ' 
And also define the objective function of the constraint satisfaction problem as 
maximization of s given constraint 	 
9R+, 	, 
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Statement q is thus written symbolically 
: 9R, 		 
Each player has its own variable that it maximizes, which we shall also call s because we 
are examining optimizing the same security domain as the constraint satisfaction 
problem.  The domains of p and q are the same.  Since a potential function by definition 
represents a function to be maximized by all parties, it is written 
9R	 
But if we consider that there is a corresponding function that restricts s to an allowed set 
of values that map the domain to a range of allowed values  
	 
Then we are using the maximization function 
9R, 		 
which is the potential function. 
Since  
9R+, 	,   9R+, 	, 
 the objective and potential functions are equivalent and we can write statement p as 
3: 9R, 		 
Next we need to prove   
Z3 , Z     3   
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Since we are not trying to prove that all potential games solve all constraint satisfaction 
problems with objective functions, but that a constraint satisfaction problem with an 
objective function is solvable by a game with a potential function addressing the same 
problem, we thus have 
Z3 , Z     3   
Where  
p: game with a potential function 
q: constraint satisfaction problem with an objective function 
With the above, we have       
3: 9R, 		 
which, as before, is a potential function.  We also have a constraint satisfaction problem 
with objective function, which as stated above is written 
: 9R, 		 
For the case of an exact potential function, the potential function is equivalent to the 
utility function u, 
, 		  9R, 		 
Then we do not need to break p into sub-statements describing , 		 and 
9R, 		 since they are equivalent.  We can now write symbolically what we are 
trying to prove as 
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Z3 , Z     3   [  9R, 		   9R, 		 
which gives, using a truth table to examine logical equivalence for the exact potential 
function written above  
 
 p q p ↔ q 
3. T T T 
2. T F F 
1. F T F 
0. F F T 
 
All but case 3 above are vacuous to some degree or are false.    
We must now prove true for an ordinal potential function and objective function.  We 
have  
p: game with a potential function 
q: constraint satisfaction problem with an objective function 
where 
3: 9R, 		 
and constraint satisfaction problem with objective function 
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: 9R, 		 
Unlike exact potential, an ordinal potential function by definition does not have equality 
with utility.  Instead, the potential function is greater than or equal to zero if-and-only-if 
the utility function is greater than or equal to zero, meaning p is actually written as  
3: 9R, 		  0  , 		  0 
Unlike the proof for exact potential, where , 		  9R, 		, we must break 
statement p into sub-statements.  Since the sub-statements are not equal but are the same 
sign (positive or negative) if-and-only-if the other is the same sign, we must first 
construct a truth table to prove this before moving on to the larger proof for an ordinal 
potential function and objective function.  Let us represent statement p as the sub-
statements 
: , 		  0 
: 9R, 		  0 
Then p can be written as 
Z , Z        
From the definition of p, q, r, and s, we can write what we are trying to prove as 
Z , Z, Z       	   
which gives, using a truth table to examine logical equivalence 
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 q r t (r ↔ t) (r ↔ t) ↔q 
7. T T T T T 
6. T T F F F 
5. T F T F F 
4. T F F T T 
3. F T T T F 
2. F T F F T 
1. F F T F T 
0. F F F T F 
 
 
We thus have four cases in the truth table where the result is true.  Since cases 1, 2, and 4 
are vacuous, but case 7 is valid when all exist, we drop the vacuous cases since they are 
not applicable.  Case 7, however, is true and also valid for our problem definition.  Thus 
because we proved true for the ordinal and exact potential functions, we can conclude 
that only potential games can be used to solve a constraint satisfaction problem if-and-
only if the constraint satisfaction problem has an objective function.  
 Q.E.D. 
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4.6 Utility 
Because utility is measured in security, choice of the action that gives maximum 
utility is the choice that maximizes security.  To maximize security, node i must analyze 
the security of existing connections to itself as well as those to its neighbors to which it is 
directly connected, in order to determine whether connections should be modified.  In 
addition, a node also estimates whether making a new connection or making a side 
payment to alter a connection would be the best decision to maximize security.  We have 
already denoted the security levels of all existing connections.  With their constraints this 
is denoted 
T), )+),U *  T"), ")+"),U    (4.10) 
The security levels of non-existing connections from i, with their constraints, shall be 
denoted  
+"), ")+"), ,    (4.11) 
 
The utility function is a mathematical function used by all players to make an optimal 
decision at each point in a game.  The utility function allows a player to choose the best 
values that can be assigned to the game variables and maximize its reward, or utility, at 
each turn in the game.  Utility in our game is measured in security.  Since the purpose of 
our work is optimizing security, and any game theoretic solution optimizes utility, utility 
is measured in terms of security.  As game variables are represented by all sij, then the 
utility function allows a player to choose the action that gives maximum security.  Since 
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actions involve changing security levels of connections, for connection eij the utility 
function u is defined as  
 T), )+),U   T), )+),U  2+)  ,    (4.12) 
 
4.7 Equilibrium in a game 
The optimal action 
 for node i given its constraints 
	 is to choose the 
security level that maximizes equations (4.10) – (4.12), denoted  

, 
		  9R \T), )+),U * T"), ")+"),U  * +"), ")+"), ,] 
 (4.13) 
 
The rationale for decision-making to maximize security is made according to Algorithm 
5.2, which uses attack tree analysis.   
The utility received for this optimal action is denoted 

, 
		      (4.14) 
An action profile is a sequence containing each player’s move at that particular 
turn in the game.  In some game-theoretic literature an action profile is referred to as a 
tuple or vector; this type of vector is not one with magnitude or direction, but instead 
refers to a row or column in a matrix.  Hence we refer to this sequence of actions as 
simply an action profile in order to avoid confusion.  This is not to be confused with a 
strategy, which is an action plan.  An action profile is in equilibrium if it contains the 
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best, or optimal, move for each player versus all other best actions of the other players.  
An action profile in equilibrium, denoted s*, is written 

  +
, 
		, 
, 
		, … , !
 , !!
		,   (4.15) 
In this equation, for example, 
, 
		 refers to the equilibrium action of 
player 1 given its constraints, and 
, 
		 refers to the equilibrium action of player 2 
given that player’s constraints.   
Recall that actions involve changing security levels of links to other nodes.  For 
example, if we assume best action for player i is forming a connection to player j at 
security level sij, then in this case 
, 
		 refers to  
T), )+),U        
which involves bidding to establish or change the security sij of eij. 
To give another example, it is also possible that since a side payment is an action which 
does not involve bidding but alters a connection, it can be an optimal action si* for node i.  
In this case, if node i is directly connected to node j but not directly connected to node k, 
if the side payment to j to have j change sjk is calculated to be the optimal action 

, 
		, then in this case 
, 
		 refers to  
2) T)(, )(+)(,U       
The definition of equilibrium for player i means that its utility, or security, is 
maximized.  No player has any incentive to change its action given no other player 
66 
 
changes its action.  An action that is not in equilibrium is a sub-optimal action.  A sub-
optimal action is defined, given its constraints, for player i as 
, 		     (4.16) 
where the sub-optimal action is never the equilibrium action, denoted 
 , 		 % 
, 
		     (4.17) 
The following equation describes the best action, or equilibrium, of player i; 
security of i is maximized if it takes the best action when all other players take their best 
action, thereby maximizing the utility function u, denoted 
+
, 
		, "
 , ""
 		,  +, 		, ", ""		,   (4.18) 
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CHAPTER V 
 
GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS 
 
The best action a node can take is determined by attack tree analysis.  However, before 
examining attack tree analysis to determine the best action, we need to address the 
reasoning behind the decision-making for granting other nodes access to data, which 
forms an essential component of attack tree analysis.  Read and write access form two of 
the three security metrics.  We have not specified whether or not access is granted on a 
case-by-case basis, and if it is, we need to address the reasons behind granting access.  
Addressing this raises the need for a refined security definition and analysis algorithm, 
which will be made possible through coalitions.   
 
5.1  Coalition formation for a weighted potential game 
Coalitions have the advantage of allowing aggregated or broad security levels and 
access control, which will be made possible in combination with security metrics and 
attack tree analysis. Without coalitions there is a less efficient method of analysis than is 
available with them.  Without coalitions, the reasoning for nodes granting access to its 
own data is made on a case-by-case basis.  To form coalitions, the network is divided into 
non-overlapping subsets according to a pairwise disjoint function known as a partition.   
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Coalition formation involves using the partition to combine preferences from 
individual nodes into a common coalition with one set of common constraints and 
preferences.  First, we must define what we mean by preferences.  Preferences are 
defined as the current best values for the variables in the game, which in other words is 
the current optimal security levels sij of the connections in the graph.  They correspond to 
the environment and its current state.  In our model these are the current values assigned 
to each variable within its constraints.  Coalition formation can take place during the 
game, when preferences are being formed prior to stabilization.  Otherwise, waiting for 
stabilization of preferences, which corresponds to final value assignment to all variables 
in the game once optimization is complete, could have the effect of placing the game into 
a non-equilibrium or non-Pareto optimal state.   
Integrating the coalition formation process into our optimization algorithm 
without disturbing the optimization requires that coalitions be formed despite partial or 
incomplete preferences.  Partial preferences in our algorithm are handled by the 
evaluation criteria for coalition formation, as well as the definition security si for each 
node i.  Instead of treating a node as just a sum of its links to other nodes, security si of 
each node i is evaluated to determine coalition membership.  Although nodes of different 
coalitions can communicate, each node can belong to only one coalition.  Our definition 
of security si and its constraints includes criteria that indirectly takes into account security 
levels and constraints of other nodes connected to i, in which the nodes have shared 
preferences and privileges.  Since si is defined as the minimum of all direct connections 
from node i to its neighbors, and each connection sij takes place within its constraints 
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which include constraints of both i and j, our definition of si is related to the constraints 
of the other node j. 
 In combination with the definition of link formation, whereby both nodes in a 
link receive benefit, the definition of si will cause our game to be a weighted potential 
game.  Because si takes into account the preferences of node i and all other nodes –i to 
which it is connected, the utility of node i is directly related to the utility of these other 
nodes.  In addition, the partition that evaluates si for coalition membership must consider 
the preferences, in our case partial preferences, of both i and the other nodes to which i is 
connected in the coalition.  Despite the partitioning of nodes into non-overlapping 
subsets, the graph G of our network is connected because graphs of weighted potential 
games are, by definition, connected.  Although each node can belong to only one 
coalition, in which the nodes have more access privileges to each other, nodes of different 
coalitions can still communicate. 
Coalitions can be used with constraints and metrics to form a type of access 
control list, which makes coalitions an essential part of security metrics.  Once coalitions 
are formed, there is a common set of constraints for members of the coalition.  For 
example, members of the coalition might have read access to all other members, or write 
access.  Coalition membership can be revoked if a node i changes si to violate coalition 
constraints σA which are a range of security levels for each member to belong to the 
coalition.   The node is then removed from the coalition and all rights as a coalition 
member are revoked.  The node can choose to change si or try to join another coalition.   
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Algorithm 5.1: Coalition formation 
Algorithm 5.1 divides nodes into coalitions according to security.  To form 
coalitions, the network is divided into non-overlapping subsets according to a pairwise 
disjoint function known as a partition.  Each subset has a minimum security level which 
is a function of the partition.  To do so, it applies the partition A to each node’s security 
level si and sij to place each node into a subset, or coalition, and thus determine coalition 
membership.  The partition A is a threshold function, which we assume has to be 
calculated, that gives the maximum security difference between nodes in G that can be 
members of the same coalition.  The partition gives coalition constraints σA which are a 
range of security levels for each member to belong to the coalition.  The partition ensures 
that any messages sent through the coalition are at that coalition’s minimum level of 
security.  Note that according to the definitions of security, link formation, utility, and 
potential, membership in a coalition according to the partition does not prevent a node 
from connecting to another node outside its coalition, as the determination as to whether 
to connect to another node is done according to these equations.   
Define A as a pairwise disjoint function, or partition, dividing G into non-
overlapping subsets; these subsets are coalitions on A = {{a1}, {a2}, …, {aκ},… , {aη}}.  
Note that according to the definition of a partition that *A = G, and each coalition {aκ} 
may contain more than one node, e.g. |{aκ}| ≥ 1.  The number of coalitions formed is 
dependent on the partition chosen for A.   
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Algorithm 5.1: Coalition formation: 
Input:  G = (V, E), 
 partition A, 
 difference_threshold, security tolerance for coalition membership 
Output: set of coalitions AQ for each node i  V  
Coalition_formation(G, A, difference_threshold) 
1.   for each node i  V 
2.   { 
3.    for each node j = -i  V 
4.       {   
5.        if ( eij ) 
6.                   {    
7.            Q =  A(sij ) 
8.         if ( Q ≤ difference_threshold ) 
9.                               { 
10.     Add i to same coalition as j:
 
 
11.                                                  AQ = {{i, j}} 
12.                               } 
13.    else 
14.                               { 
15.       Add i to different coalition from j: 
16. 
                                                                       
  AQ = {{i},  {j}} 
17.                                }  
18.                   } 
19.        if ( ! eij  ||   si < sij ) 
20.                   { 
21.               Q  = A(si )   
22.                    if ( Q ≤ difference_threshold )                               
23.                         Add i to same coalition as j:  AQ ={{i,  j}}                                 
24.                    else 
25.                         Add i to different coalition from j:
 
 AQ = {{i},  {j}} 
26.                    } 
27.          } 
28. } 
29.  return (AQ) 
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The advantage of our coalition formation algorithm is, by introducing coalitions, security 
of connections can be better described.  We use a table, shown below in Table 5.1, as an 
example to show the effect of coalitions on security.  Contrast this table with Tables 5.2 
and 5.3, which reflects changes made to the security when coalitions are removed; note 
the less descriptive security characterized by the data in the Table 5.3. 
 
 Level Security for connection Read self data Write self data 
Low 1 Minimum   All All 
 2 Maximum All All 
 3 Minimum   All None 
 4 Maximum  All None 
 5 Minimum  Coalition Coalition 
 6 Maximum  Coalition Coalition 
 7 Minimum  Coalition None 
 8 Maximum Coalition None 
 9 Minimum  None None 
High 10 Maximum  None None 
 
Table 5.1: Security levels with coalitions 
 
In the absence of coalitions, security levels are less precise: coalitions are an 
essential part of fulfilling the requirements for a secure network per the security metrics.  
Changes to security when coalitions are removed are shown in Table 5.2. 
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 Level Security for connection Read self data Write self data 
Low 1 Minimum   All All 
 2 Maximum All All 
 3 Minimum   All None 
 4 Maximum  All None 
 5 Minimum  Coalition Coalition 
 6 Maximum  Coalition Coalition 
 7 Minimum  Coalition None 
 8 Maximum Coalition None 
 9 Minimum  None None 
High 10 Maximum  None None 
 
Table 5.2: Security levels and changes brought about by removing coalitions 
 
Comparing Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, we see the changes that occur to the security 
definition if coalitions are removed.  The example presented by Table 5.3 below reflects 
this, as quantization of security is less precise, and shows the final result of changes from 
Table 5.1 to Table 5.2. 
 
 Level Security for 
connection 
Read self data Write self data 
Low 1 Minimum   All All 
 2 Maximum All All 
 3 Minimum   All None 
 4 Maximum  All None 
 5 (was 9) Minimum  None None 
High 6 (was 10) Maximum  None None 
 
Table 5.3: Non-coalition security levels 
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5.2 Attack tree analysis to improve security 
Attack trees model inter-relatedness of players’ securities, which we will use for 
decision-making regarding connections.  Attack trees can identify sensitive and 
insensitive data and can allow a node or a coalition of nodes to identify and fix security 
hazards, such as access to sensitive data by an intruder.   In some cases it may be 
beneficial for a node performing attack tree analysis, node i, to pay another node j at 
further distance away in the tree to address a situation that has little or no bearing to the 
further node j, but could lead to the node i’s compromise by an attacker.  Quantization of 
payment in terms of utility has the means to overcome any selfish calculations by a node j 
closer to some other node i’s problem, and induce that node j to help the other node i by 
taking action to solve a security issue related to i.  Algorithm 5.2 addresses how nodes 
perform attack tree analysis. 
 
 
Algorithm 5.2: Attack tree analysis 
 
The purpose of Algorithm 5.2 is to use security metrics with attack tree analysis 
to determine vulnerability to a node.  This algorithm analyzes each path to node i from 
any node k to j and j to i for the purpose of establishing vulnerabilities.  The level of 
vulnerability indicates the weakness in security, as security is the opposite of 
vulnerability.  Algorithm 5.2 is called by each node at each turn in the game to analyze 
75 
 
all the other connections to other nodes, within the parameters of the algorithm.  In 
general, the vulnerability posed by another node decreases as distance from self 
decreases; it also decreases if another node belongs to the same coalition as the node 
performs the analysis by calling Algorithm 5.2. 
In addition to examining coalition membership, each node examines each sij 
according to its metrics: encryption of the link, read or write permissions between nodes 
(both direct and indirect), and corresponding data sensitivity.  This includes examining 
which nodes have direct or indirect access.  The danger_threshold input to the algorithm 
is a threshold that describes vulnerability tolerance, and is not determined by any game 
theoretic means, but is established by the node doing the analysis.  Consequently, if the 
threshold is too low, it will result in disconnecting from the network and having to 
subsequently raise the tolerance to vulnerability so that it will stay connected.  The 
vulnerability is referred to as the threat_level; it represents the calculated vulnerability to 
node i. We assume node i represents the node performing the analysis. 
Recall that connections to other nodes outside the coalition are a necessary part of 
preserving graph connectivity, but this does not mean that they are granted the same 
privileges as coalition members.  Because of access control policies and coalition 
membership formation, other members of the coalition are assumed to be a decreased 
threat.   
The advantage of our algorithm is each node examines the connections in the 
local neighborhood and local plus one (distance of two), which is realistic to analyze.  
Consequently, however, the disadvantage of our algorithm is the lack of 
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comprehensiveness, as not all connections beyond this point are examined.  Examining 
all connections has the disadvantage of decreased efficiency.  We assume, however, that 
this attack tree analysis algorithm is sufficient to analyze and make the optimal decision, 
provided coalitions are used to provide information about the rest of the network.  Our 
reasoning is explained in Proof 5.2, which follows after Algorithm 5.2 below.  Figure 5.1, 
shown below, contains an example of a node i performing attack tree analysis according 
to Algorithm 5.2, followed by vulnerability reduction according to Algorithm 5.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Attack tree analysis and vulnerability reduction example diagram 
i 
j 
k x 
j has write access 
to sensitive data 
of i 
k has read access 
to sensitive data 
of j 
x has write access 
to sensitive data 
of j 
Action taken: 
1. i examines 
connection to j, 
and j’s 
connection to k 
and x 
2. i calculates 
vulnerability 
greater than 
threshold 
3. i pays j to revoke 
x’s write access 
to j’s sensitive 
data 
4. vulnerability 
diminished 
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Algorithm 5.2: Attack tree analysis: 
Input:   G= (V, E),  
  Partition A, 
  difference_threshold,  
  danger_threshold  
Output:  X, set containing all subsets of nodes connected to i with read/write permissions  
to sensitive data on a path to node i and their respective threat_level   
[0…1] 
 
Attack_tree_analysis( G, A, difference_threshold, danger_threshold ) 
1.  X = X 
2. for each node j  V  
3. { 
4.      Yj = X 
5.      threat_level = 0.0 
6.      if +)  && |$  &|  1,//if edge to self and distance is one 
7.      {  
8.            if T 1)+7&	,U//if write access to self 
9.             { 
10.                  if T+7&	,  0U//if data is sensitive 
11.                  { 
12.                      Add  1)7&		 as member of set X  
13.                      for each node k   V 
14.                      { 
15.                             if +() &&  |F  &|  2,//if indirect edge to self, distance is two 
16.                             { 
17.                                  if T 1()+7$	,U//if write access to node with direct access 
18.                                  { 
19.                                         if T+7$	,  0U//if data of that node is sensitive 
20.                                         { 
21.                                                 Add  1()+7$	, as member of set X   
22.                                                 if ( ykj = 0 ||   yji = 0 ) 
23.                                                          threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|)                                               
24.                                                 else if ( ykj = 0 &&  A(sij ) ≤ difference_threshold  ) 
25.                threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+2)                                                      
26.                                                 else 
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27.                                                          threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+1)         
28.                                         }     
29.                                  }                                           
30.                                  if T()+7$	,U//if read access to node with direct access 
31.                                  { 
32.                                         if T+7$	,  0U //if data of that node is sensitive 
33.                                         { 
34.                                                      Add  ()+7$	, as member of set X                                                   
35.                                                       if ( ykj = 0  ||   yji = 0 ) 
36.                                                                  threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+2)   
37.                                                       else if ( ykj== 0  &&  
38.                                                                                      A(sij ) ≤ difference_threshold ) 
39.                                                                  threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+4)                             
40.                                                       else 
41.                                                                  threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+3)              
42.                                        }      
43.                                 }             
44.                             } 
45.                         }              
46.                    }                   
47.            }                                
48.            if  T )+7&	,U//if read access to self 
49.            { 
50.                  if  T+7&	,  0U // if data is sensitive 
51.                  { 
52.                      Add  )7&		 as member of set X  
53.                      for each node k  V 
54.                      { 
55.                             if +() &&  |F  &|  2,//if indirect edge to self, distance is two 
56.                             { 
57.                                  if  +()+7$	, ,//if read access to node with direct access 
58.                                  { 
59.                                         if T+7$	,  0U//if data is sensitive 
60.                                         { 
61.                                                 Add  ()+7$	, as member of set X   
62.                                                 if +-()  0 || -)  0 , 
63.                                                              threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+2)                                                                                             
64.                                                 else if -()  0 && `)	 Q  
65.                                                                                     difference_threshold  ) 
66.                                                             threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+4)               
67.                                                 else 
68.                                                              threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+3)        
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69.                                           }                                                                                       
70.                                  } 
71.                                  if  T 1()+7$	,U//if write access to node with direct access 
72.                                  { 
73.                                         if  T+7$	,  0U// if data of that node is sensitive 
74.                                         { 
75.                                               Add  1()+7$	, as member of set X                                                   
76.                                               if +-()  0 || -)  0 , 
77.                                                          threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|)     
78.                                               else if -()  0 && `)	 Qdifference_threshold) 
79.                                                          threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+2)                                                                                          
80.                                               else 
81.                                                           threat_level += danger_threshold / (|k-i|+1)        
82.                                         } 
83.                                  } 
84.                           } 
85.                       } 
86.                  } 
87.              } 
88.       Add threat_level to Yj 
89.       Add Yj to X 
90.       } 
91.  }                                        
92.  return (X ) 
 
 
Theorem 5.1 
With coalitions the attack tree analysis of local, one-hop neighbors is sufficient 
for decision-making if information about the rest of the network G is provided by the 
local neighborhood, i = C )D)E) , with at least one of the nodes belonging to the same 
coalition as node i. 
 
Proof 5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1 
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Basis Step: 
According to Algorithm 5.2, node i receives information directly by examining its local 
neighbors to which it is directly connected,  
H )
D
)E)
 
having distance equal to one with one edge between i and each of its h neighbors forming 
its local graph, 
|4  &|  1 
Because it is directly connected, node i receives information from each of its h neighbors. 
at 
& > 1 
 
Inductive Step: 
Assume the basis step is true for n, and show true for n+1.   
Since we assumed true for n, node i is directly connected to its h neighbors with  
|4  &|  1 
and receives information from these nodes at  
& > 1 
81 
 
with neighbors of i+1 connected to each of their h neighbors at  
& > 2 
with 
H )
D
)E)
 
 
from which they receive information, with successive steps of information propagation 
along from nodes at  
& >  
having distance or number of edges equal to  
|  &|   
with 
H !)!
D
)E)!
 
from which nodes at  & >  receive information, giving 
'!   & > 	 · & >   1	 · & >   2	 · … · & > 2	 · & > 1	 · & 
For successive steps of n+1 we have number of edges 
| > 1  &|   > 1 
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 or, using the sequence notation for Sn above, is written 
'!    & >  > 1	 · & > 	 · & >   1	 · & >   2	 · … · & > 2	 · & > 1	 · & 
Because we assumed true for n, we have the well-known formula 
'!   ·  > 1	2  
Then for n+1 we have successive steps of information propagation along the edges of the 
graph  
!)! 
from n+1 to i equal to  
| > 1  &|   > 1 
which is  
'!   > 1	 ·  > 2	2  
 
And because we assumed true for n, we have 
'!    & >  > 1	 · & > 	 · & >   1	 · & >   2	 · … · & > 2	 · & > 1	 · & 
'!    & >  > 1	 ·  ·  > 1	2  
And since  
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 > 1  &	 
is equivalent to the distance from node i 
 > 1  &	  | > 1  &|   > 1	 
Then  
'!     > 1	 ·  ·  > 1	2  
'!   > 1	 ·  > 2	2  
And, because node i is also connected directly 
H )
D
)E)
 
and indirectly to its coalition members, denoted 
a 
node i is able to get information 
λ 
on other coalition nodes along the sum of all neighbors of coalition members 
 H ) W a % X
D
)E)
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thus allowing information λ to propagate to i to analyze network G according to 
Algorithm 5.2. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Note that this proof does not guarantee that node i has comprehensively analyzed all 
connections in G through direct analysis and indirect information passed to it by coalition 
members.  While coalition members pass along their own analysis of other nodes to 
which i is not directly connected or at distance greater than two, it is not necessarily 
comprehensive with respect to all nodes and connections in G.  We believe the tradeoff of 
time versus comprehensive analysis by each node of each connection, which is 
essentially a variation of the traveling salesperson problem, is a more than fair one.  It 
thus gives our approach the advantage with respect to time versus comprehensiveness. 
 
5.3 Pareto optimization 
Recall that Pareto optimized is defined as a state in which a player can take no 
action deviating from this state without decreasing utility for itself or some other player.  
Recall that Pareto optimization goes beyond the definition of equilibrium.  It the best of 
the equilibrium or is more optimal than equilibrium.  Pareto optimization is used to 
simultaneously minimize or maximize a finite set of real-valued functions, which in our 
optimization problem refers to each player choosing a move that maximizes the utility 
function.  In the specific context of the problem our work is trying to solve, that of 
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maximizing overall network security, the security of each node or player is Pareto 
optimal for that turn in the game if no player can increase its utility, or security, without 
decreasing the utility and consequently security of itself or another player.  The Pareto 
optimal move for player i is denoted 
b, b		      (5.1) 
The Pareto optimal move is  
b, b		  
, 
		 c , 		   (5.2) 
where all moves are members of the set of moves S.  Recall that 
, 		       
represents any of the other sub-optimal moves.  Thus, both the Pareto optimal and 
equilibrium move are better than a sub-optimal move. 
The Pareto optimal move can be the equilibrium move, but it is always at least as 
good as or better than equilibrium, written 
b, b		  
, 
		 
Despite the possibility that the Pareto optimal and equilibrium moves may be the same 
move, the Pareto optimal move supersedes equilibrium because it is always at least as 
optimal or more optimal.   
 Recall that our game is a weighted potential game for either mixed or pure 
strategies.  In a potential game, a player choosing the move that maximizes the utility 
function is also maximizing the potential function: for mixed strategies the two functions 
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are equal, and for pure strategies the two functions have output that is positive if the other 
is positive.  Hence, if a player chooses a move that maximizes the utility, hence playing 
the equilibrium move, it also maximizes the potential function.  Since a Pareto optimized 
move means that if the player deviates from this move it decreases utility for itself or 
some other player, a player cannot play a move that decreases utility for some other 
player because it would not maximize the potential function.  Hence, players who 
maximize utility maximize their security, and in doing so maximize the potential function 
and consequently are making a Pareto optimal move.  It is impossible to not maximize 
the potential function without also making a Pareto optimal move.  We will use this 
reasoning for our proof of Pareto-optimality below. 
 
Theorem 5.2 
If the game is a weighted potential game, then a player maximizing the utility 
function also maximizes the potential function and by doing so chooses the equilibrium 
action which is Pareto optimal.   
 
Proof 5.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2 
Let us break Theorem 5.2 into smaller statements.  Let the statement p represent  
p: If the game is a weighted potential game, then a player maximizes the potential 
function 
And let statements q, r, and s represent 
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q: If a player maximizes the potential function, then a player maximizes the utility 
function. 
r: If a player maximizes the utility function, the player chooses the equilibrium 
action. 
 s: If a player maximizes the utility function, it chooses the Pareto optimal action. 
 
The definition of a potential game is that it possesses a potential function, which is 
maximized by all players.  The definition of a weighted potential game is a potential 
game that possesses a utility function which is directly related to other players’ utility 
functions.  A weighted potential game possesses a potential function for either mixed or 
pure strategies.  Thus we know statement p is true according to the definition of a 
weighted potential game.  Furthermore, we also know by the definition of a potential 
function that players maximizing the utility function maximize the potential function.  
Thus, we also know statement q is true according to the definition of potential.  And 
statement r is true because of the definition of equilibrium.  However, proving statement 
s true is somewhat more involved.   
The definition of a Pareto optimized action means that if the player deviates from 
this action, then it decreases utility for itself or some other player.  But according to 
statements p, q, and r, a player cannot maximize the potential function without 
maximizing utility, and if it is not maximizing utility then it is not choosing the 
equilibrium action.  If a player plays a move that decreases utility for some other player, 
it is not maximizing the potential function because the potential function is maximized by 
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all players maximizing the utility function, and players maximizing utility choose the 
equilibrium action.  If a player is not maximizing the potential function, the game is not a 
weighted potential game, which is a contradiction.  Therefore, since a player maximizing 
utility in a weighted potential game chooses the equilibrium action, this action is Pareto 
optimal, and the weighted potential game is Pareto optimal.  
Q.E.D. 
 
 
Algorithm 5.3: Reduce vulnerability  
This algorithm is used by each node to act upon the information generated by 
calling the above Attack_tree_analysis Algorithm 5.2.  After calling the 
Attack_tree_analysis algorithm, nodes executing Algorithm 5.3 determine the best way to 
improve security by reducing vulnerability per the definition of security from equation 
(3.25).  If the node performing the analysis determines that threat_level is greater than its 
tolerance for vulnerability, danger_threshold, the node can pay another node in the 
network to change the nature of its connection, or simply change the connection itself, 
provided it is already connected.  Actions possible are related to the activities for the 
connection: security level could be increased, permissions could be revoked, or the 
connection could be broken in favor of another node.  The disadvantages are the 
possibility that the graph splits into disconnected segments, or that coalition membership 
is inadvertently revoked due to actions taken by other nodes or the node itself via acting 
to change a connection on the prompting of another node.  This algorithm allows a node 
89 
 
to maximize its utility, or security by determining which action maximizes utility, thereby 
taking the equilibrium action. 
 
Algorithm 5.3: Reduce vulnerability: 
 
Equations 1 and 2 are either equations (3.25) and (4.18) if playing according to the pure 
strategies of Algorithm 5.4, or equations (3.25) and (5.6) if playing according to the 
mixed strategies of Algorithm 5.5 
 
Input:   X, set containing all subsets of nodes connected to i with read/write permissions  
to sensitive data on a path to node i and their respective threat_level  
[0…1], 
danger_threshold, 
Output: maximized utility ui 
 
Reduce_ vulnerability(X, danger_threshold) 
1. max_ vulnerability = 0 
2. X_vulnerable = X 
3. for each subset Yj from Ystart…Yend  d 
4. { 
5.          get threat_level of Yj 
6.         if ( threat_level > max_vulnerability ) 
7.          { 
8.                     max_vulnerability = threat_level 
9.                     X_vulnerable = Yj 
10.           } 
11.  } 
12. get threat_level of X_vulnerable 
13. if  ( threat_level > danger_threshold ) 
14. { 
15.           pay j to revoke  1()+7&	, ||  pay j to revoke  ()+7&	, 
16.           ||  pay j to increase sjk  ||  revoke  1)7&		 ||  revoke  )+7&	, 
17. } 
18.  
19. best_new_action = 0 
20. for each node j == -i 
21. { 
22.       if ( ) e d)  
23.        { 
24.                analyze theoretic sij according to equations 1 and 2 
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25.                if( sij > best_new_action ) 
26.                           best_new_action = sij 
27.         } 
28. } 
29. take best_new_action to maximize ui: 
30.                preserve connection eij at sij ||  break connection eij ||  
31.                bid to form connection eij at sij || change security level of sij ||   
32.                receive payment from j  
33. return ui 
 
 
5.4 Game to optimize network security  
We denote a game using the symbol Γ.  Game Γ is composed of the players, 
which are nodes in the graph G; the actions that the players can take, which involve 
choosing security levels from S; and utility function u, with the symbols f g are used 
instead of parentheses to indicate this is a game.  Hence the game is denoted 
 Γ = fh, ', g      (5.3) 
 
5.5 Pure strategy game 
A game whereby players move according to their equilibrium action is a pure 
strategy game.  Players always choose the equilibrium action in a pure strategy game.  
Ordinal potential games are used to optimize pure strategy games.  We define a game Γ 
using pure strategies as a weighted ordinal potential game if there exists a potential 
function ∏ such that the result calculated by potential function ∏ is greater than or equal 
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to zero if-and-only-if the result calculated by the utility function u is greater than or equal 
to zero, which is denoted for the equilibrium action of node i and the equilibrium actions 
of all other nodes –i, 
Π+
, 
		, &
 , &&
 		,  0   if-and-only-if    
+
, 
		, &
 , &&
 		,  0    (5.4) 
 
 
Algorithm 5.4: Pure strategy game 
This algorithm is the actual game played to optimize security for the entire 
network.  The players play according to pure strategies per equation (5.4) to maximize 
their security.  Players form coalitions and perform attack tree analysis to determine the 
best move to maximize security, and in so doing choose the Pareto optimal equilibrium 
action.  We assume that each node -i examined does not change state until after node i 
takes action.  We denote the game using the symbol Γ as defined earlier. 
 
Algorithm 5.4: Pure strategy game: 
 
This algorithm references equations (3.25) and (4.18) for players acting according to pure 
strategies. 
 
Input: Γ = fh, ', g, 
G = (V, E) of game Γ connected a priori, 
partition A, 
difference_threshold for coalition membership 
Output:   G, the network optimized for overall security 
 
Pure_strategy_game( Γ, G, A, difference_threshold) 
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1. while improvement to each player’s security si can be made 
2. { 
3.           call Algorithm 5.1: Coalition formation(G, A, difference_threshold) 
4.     for each player i  V 
5.           {       
6.                call Algorithm 5.2: Attack_tree_analysis(G, A, difference_threshold,  
7.                                                                                   danger_threshold)    
8.                // Algorithm 5.3 is used with equation (4.18) whereby players move  
9.               //       according to their pure strategy: 
10.                call Algorithm 5.3: Reduce_vulnerability (X, danger_threshold)                  
11.                receive utility ui 
12.           } 
13.   } 
14. return (G) 
 
 
 
5.6 Mixed strategy game 
A mixed strategy game is identical to a pure strategy game with the exception that 
players choose an action according to a probability distribution over the pure strategies.  
In other words, players choose the equilibrium action some percentage of the time, and a 
less than optimum (non-equilibrium) action the remaining percentage of the time.  The 
percentage is chosen by the game designer, and has to do with the rate of player error the 
designer wants to model in a game.  Exact potential games are used to optimize mixed 
strategy games.  Our mixed strategy game algorithm, Algorithm 5.5, is identical to 
Algorithm 5.4 above with the exception that players move according to mixed strategies. 
The equilibrium action by player i within its constraints, 
, 
		, given the 
probability of taking the equilibrium action, is denoted with the symbol | to indicate 
probability of that action as 
+
, 
		 j 
,     (5.5) 
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where the probability of taking the equilibrium action ranges from 0 to 1. 
Utility of i is maximized if it takes the best action within its constraints, +
, 
	,, 
given the probability of taking that action 
, when all other players take their best action 
"
 , ""
 		 given the probability of taking that action.  Again, the symbol | indicates 
probability of that action, where 
 \ T+
, 
	, k 
U , +"
 , ""
 		 j "
 ,]
  T +, 		 j ,, +", ""		 j ",U 
 (5.6) 
We define a game Γ using mixed strategies as a weighted exact potential game if 
there exists a potential function ∏ such that the result calculated by potential function ∏ 
is equal to the result calculated by the utility function, which is for the equilibrium action 
of node i and the equilibrium actions of all other nodes –i, denoted 
Π \ T+
, 
	, k 
U , +"
 , ""
 		 j "
 ,]
  T +
, 
		 j 
,, +"
 , ""
 		 j "
 ,U 
  (5.7) 
 
 
Algorithm 5.5: Mixed strategy game: 
 
This algorithm references equations (3.25) and (5.6) for actions according to a probability 
distribution over the mixed strategies.  
 
Input: Γ = fh, ', g, 
G = (V, E) of game Γ connected a priori, 
partition A, 
difference_threshold for coalition membership 
Output:   G, the network optimized for overall security 
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Mixed_strategy_game ( Γ, G, A, difference_threshold) 
1. while improvement to each player’s security si can be made 
2. { 
3.           call Algorithm 5.1: Coalition formation(G, A, difference_threshold) 
4.     for each player i  V 
5.           {       
6.                call Algorithm 5.2: Attack_tree_analysis(G, A, difference_threshold,  
7.                                                                                   danger_threshold)    
8.                // Algorithm 5.3 is used with equation (5.6) whereby players move  
9.               //       according to a probability distribution over the pure strategies: 
10.                call Algorithm 5.3: Reduce_vulnerability (X, danger_threshold)                  
11.                receive utility ui 
12.           } 
13.   } 
14. return (G) 
 
 
 
5.7: Game-based architecture 
If we are to apply our game theoretic network security optimization algorithm to 
optimize an actual physical network, we need to develop an architecture to accomplish 
this task.  While our simulations in prototypes one through four allowed us to use metrics 
to test and evaluate our work and its ability to optimize network security, these are 
simulations nonetheless.   
If we were to implement our algorithm, and extend our prototypes, to an actual 
network composed of PCs and other devices that make up a heterogeneous wireless 
network, then we could better evaluate our algorithm’s performance and possibly gain 
insight into additional ways our prototype might be improved.   In addition, 
implementing our algorithm on an actual network would allow us to better test any future 
game theoretic work whereby we extend our definitions of security to include 
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authentication as a metric, and implement this in the heterogeneous network.  We did not 
consider authentication in our model due to the fact that our game uses only symmetric 
information; all the nodes in the network can observe all events in the game, including 
the identities of the other nodes.  Computers in an actual network would likely have 
asymmetric information and therefore would often need to authenticate other nodes 
before sharing data or extending other privileges. 
As a first step in accomplishing these tasks, we will specify an architecture that 
describes the relationship between hardware, software, the network, and our game 
theoretic algorithm.  First, we must examine our assumptions and specifications in 
developing our architecture.  We assume that the nodes forming the network do not 
change during the network lifetime.  As such, we will not deal with new nodes entering 
the network at this time.  Adding this capability to our architecture will be considered in 
future work.  In addition, we will only address the top level layer of the TCP reference 
model; our work is considered to take place at a layer above the application layer of the 
TCP protocol stack.  How our architecture interacts with the lower layers of the TCP 
reference model is considered to be beyond the scope of this work.  This includes the 
interactions brought about by routing protocols and the topology extractor as detailed 
below, as these take place at the application layer of the TCP stack, which is the next 
layer beneath our work. 
We must reiterate that our security architecture is for a network without a 
centralized coordinator.  All nodes in the network are independent from one another and 
are heterogeneous.  All of the nodes have the capability to implement our game based 
architecture as shown below in Figure 5.2, enabling the nodes to improve their own 
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security in addition to improving the overall security of the network.  Furthermore, the 
ability to independently construct an attack tree is available to each node in the network, 
and each node can consequently analyze the network using its implementation of an 
attack tree per Algorithm 5.2: Attack tree analysis.   
In addition, we must detail our assumptions relating to the symmetry of 
information in our game, and how this symmetry is implemented in our architecture.  As 
mentioned above, nodes are able to see the other nodes and the actions taking place in the 
game.  Information in this network is symmetric.  In our architecture, we assume routers 
are located in the network, and routing tables are used to show which neighboring nodes 
in the network are reachable.  These nodes to which another node is connected form the 
local neighborhood, or local network, of a node and are the nodes with which any direct 
communication takes place.  A topology extractor is used to determine which nodes are 
connected to other nodes.  The topology extractor works by extracting information from 
the routing tables.  This information describes any connections in the network, including 
node IP addresses and the characteristics or attributes of the links between nodes in the 
network.  These attributes describe the encryption strength of the connection, the 
constraints on the link with regard to minimum and maximum security values of each 
node forming the link, and any hardware information used in creating the link itself.  
Furthermore, the topology extractor is able to provide information on the physical 
relationships and locations of the nodes in the network, including any path information 
describing available routes to a node.   
The routing protocols used to disseminate information available in the routing 
tables include BGP and RIP over TCP or UDP.  Border Gateway Protocol, or BGP, is 
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used to exchange routing information regarding nodes, links, and destinations in the 
network.  Routing Information Protocol, or RIP, is used to exchange information 
regarding the distance or number of nodes from a path to a destination.  We assume that 
these routing tables are kept updated as the network changes during the optimization 
phase.  The actual implementation of the routing tables and any packet information sent 
between nodes and routers is beyond the scope of this work, but will make for interesting 
future work.  We also assume there are no errors in the routing tables and that no 
information has been falsified.  Consideration of any errors in the routing table is 
reserved for future exploration, as these errors in addition to false node identities, are 
what would cause asymmetric information in our game theoretic architecture.  We are 
currently considering only symmetric information.  In using a topology extractor and 
routing tables in such a scenario, our assumptions allow us to fulfill the architectural 
implementation corresponding to the symmetric information in our game.   
The diagram shown below in Figure 5.2 illustrates how our architecture will work 
and its relationship to the lower levels of the TCP stack.  Our architecture forms a new 
layer, which we call the Game layer, and contains the actual implementations of our 
Algorithms 5.1 – 5.5 above.  Each node is assumed to possess this layer.  In its diagram 
below, we can see the relationship between the attack tree analysis of Algorithm 5.2, the 
coalition formation of Algorithm 5.1, and the subsequent actions taken by a node to 
increase its security by reducing its vulnerability through taking the optimal action.  The 
topology extractor plays an essential role.  It gathers, or extracts, all information about 
the topology of the network, including hardware and route information, distance between 
nodes, security levels, constraints of nodes and links, and encryption of links. 
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The order of execution of each part of our architecture is shown, listed by number, 
in Figure 5.2 below.  The numbers on the arrows specify the order of the steps.  The 
arrows themselves show the relationship between the algorithms, whereby the direction 
of the arrows show the input to that part of the architecture.  When a node performs 
attack tree analysis of the network using Algorithm 5.2, the information previously 
gathered by the topology extractor is assumed to be current.  As such, the topology 
extractor is run just prior to attack tree analysis in step 1.  At step 2, attack tree analysis is 
performed.  At steps 3 and 4, the information gathered by the topology extractor and the 
attack tree analysis is input to both the bidding and side payments aspects of Algorithm 
5.3: Reduce vulnerability.  Here in our architecture, these aspects of our Algorithm 5.3 
are separated in order to better show their relationship.  In addition, if an optimal action 
for a node is specified as including bidding to form a link and, if needed, a side payment, 
it would be separated as shown in our diagram.  Such a separation is considered to be 
valid within the specifications of our game.   
The two components of Algorithm 5.3: Reduce vulnerability are executed.  First, 
the network is evaluated to determine the best action; actions will involve bids, and prices 
for actions must be determined.  This work is done by the component identified as the 
bidding algorithm, and must take place prior to any side payments; hence its location and 
order in Figure 5.2.  Whether the optimal action is determined to be a side payment or 
creating a link, bids must be made between nodes to agree upon the price.  Then, this 
information is passed on to the latter component of Algorithm 5.3, which is represented 
in our architectural diagram as the side payments algorithm.  Here, evaluation of the 
possibility of side payments takes place.  The information gathered by the topology 
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extractor regarding the current state of the network is essential, as this information will be 
used to route a message and payment regarding the action induced by the side payment.   
Once the optimal action is determined through the bidding and side payments 
algorithms, the node moves on to step 6 in Figure 5.2 and re-evaluates its coalition 
membership and updates it if needed according to Algorithm 5.1: Coalition formation.  
Finally, the node executes its optimal action by moving through step 7 to steps 8 or 9, 
depending upon whether or not our node is executing a mixed strategy or pure strategy.  
If a node is executing a pure strategy, it takes the optimal action according to Algorithm 
5.4.  However, as detailed in Algorithm 5.5, nodes can use mixed strategies whereby they 
take a suboptimal action instead of an optimal action some percentage of the time.  Mixed 
strategies can be deliberately used by nodes because there is the possibility that the 
exploration induced by the suboptimal action, in combination with the optimal action 
itself, can lead to a higher level of security than a node always choosing the optimal 
action.  Determining the best percentage of the time that nodes correctly choose the 
optimal action is not addressed in our work; however, we assume it to be high.  We did 
not consider the scenario in our prototype implementations where some nodes play mixed 
and some play pure strategies, but this can be explored in future work. 
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Figure 5.2: Game layer diagram   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
VALIDATION 
 
This chapter deals with describing an architecture which is very different from our own 
architecture; its purpose is enhanced evaluation and validation of our own architecture’s 
performance by comparing the two using similar measurements.  As detailed above, our 
work takes place at a very high layer of the TCP protocol stack.  Kerberos, the 
architecture which is used to compare to our own, pervades all layers of the TCP 
reference model.  Kerberos has just enough in common with our definition of security 
that it can be described using our own security metrics, and hence its performance can be 
quantitatively evaluated and measured using these same metrics that describe and 
quantitatively evaluate the security optimization of our algorithm.  As a result, we can 
quantitatively compare our architecture with Kerberos, with the ultimate goal of showing 
how well our algorithm optimizes network security in our simulated networks.   
 
6.1 Comparing our algorithm to an established algorithm 
While this section involves describing the Kerberos system using our metrics of 
encryption and authentication, any comparison to our work beyond utilizing our metrics 
for evaluation ends there.  If we compare our network security optimization algorithm   
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to an established network security optimization algorithm, we may more effectively study 
and evaluate the performance of our own algorithm, if the same measurements are used 
to gauge performance.  We chose Kerberos over other algorithms because it is well-
known and has some similarities to our own algorithm, enough to be measured using 
metrics.  Like our algorithm, Kerberos is designed to optimize security of an entire 
network, uses encryption, and has a means of access control.  However, the similarities 
end there as Kerberos has an unrefined system of access control, whereby other nodes 
have all access to all data if they are connected.  Furthermore, unless a node can achieve 
high encryption, it cannot join the network.  And, Kerberos access control is implemented 
via a centralized controlling server.  Our algorithm is not. 
While we know its specifications, we must determine the methodology to 
represent the Kerberos system in a way that it can be fairly and appropriately compared 
to our game theoretic algorithm in both its mathematical model and prototype 
implementation simulations for actual tests and analysis.  Kerberos will be represented 
using a mathematical model in the same vein as our own algorithm, but will stay faithful 
to the pure Kerberos algorithm.  In no way will the Kerberos algorithm be massaged to 
look better than it actually is, as the purpose of this part of our work is to compare, as 
accurately as possible, our algorithm with another algorithm for the purposes of 
evaluating our own algorithm’s security optimization.  This will allow us to use metrics 
to measure its security and better compare Kerberos to our own algorithm.  We will 
define and analyze Kerberos and implement a Kerberos prototype simulation to compare 
to the prototype simulations of our algorithm.  We believe this is an effective way to 
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measure the Kerberos system’s optimization of network security and compare it to our 
own, and better measure our algorithm’s own performance.   
The Kerberos system consists of a ticket-granting server and the participating 
computers in the network.  As we will see in the short proofs below, Kerberos cannot be 
characterized by a potential game and is not Pareto-optimal.  In fact, developing a 
Kerberos game is not nearly as sophisticated or interesting as the game of our own 
algorithm.  The game that characterizes Kerberos is barely a game at all; it has some 
striking similarities to a game with only one player since the valid moves are severely 
limited.  The Kerberos system is entirely dependent on a node in the Kerberos network 
having high encryption: if it cannot achieve high encryption, it cannot participate in the 
network.  Thus, without high encryption, there is no valid move for a node to join the 
network, and if no nodes can reach high encryption Kerberos is useless, and the network 
disintegrates.  
The Kerberos system consists of the computers to be optimized in the network 
and the Kerberos server.  The Kerberos server is not optimized; it is a centralized 
controller that grants tickets to computers which give access privileges to other 
computers in the Kerberos network.  These access privileges are not at all refined, but 
according to the pure Kerberos specification, can be characterized by an almost 
sledgehammer-like approach to granting privileges: if a computer i has a ticket to get 
access to another computer j, then i has both read and write access to all data of j, both 
sensitive and insensitive.  Unlike our own algorithm which has no central controller, 
allows nodes to have high or low encryption, and distinguishes between granting access 
to read or write of sensitive or insensitive data, Kerberos does not possess any of these 
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characteristics; any distinction which goes beyond this level of permissions is beyond the 
definition of the Kerberos system and is instead defined by the operating system of a 
computer in the network, which is outside the scope of our work.  We will thus use the 
level of permissions as specified by the pure Kerberos system.   
Since the Kerberos server granting tickets is not optimized, we assume that the 
computers in the network that are attempting to participate in the Kerberos network are 
the same computers in our own network.  Ticket-granted permissions for node i to have 
read and write access to all data of j we shall denote using a different notation from our 
own model.  K represents Kerberos-granted per the ticket from the server, where  
l, 1	)   )+7$	,  m  1) +7$	,   (6.1) 
l, 1	)  .0,                      07 & 49 97 97 1& 922 0 9// 7$	1, 07 & 70 0 49 97 97 1& 922 0 9// 7$	6 (6.2) 
 
We will denote 7$	= 0 and 1 in equation (6.1) because any node that has access to 
another node’s data has access to all of it, both sensitive and insensitive.  Because the 
nodes in the Kerberos network implement encryption, but we already defined our 
encryption metric yij earlier, we can use the same encryption metric to describe the 
encryption of connections between nodes i and j in the Kerberos network. Thus, security 
provided by Kerberos can be defined using security metrics as  
l+),   l, 1	) : -)  '    (6.3) 
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Which denote the existence of a one-way link from node i to j at security level l+), 
with possession of Kerberos ticket l, 1	) granting i access to all data of j.  Kerberos 
security for a node i will be thus defined using a two-tuple Cartesian-product of access 
control and encryption.  Access control is represented by the possession of a ticket 
granted by the central server to some node i to have access to node j, encryption pertains 
to the encryption for the connection from i to j.  Since nodes in a Kerberos network must 
use high levels of encryption to contact the Kerberos server in order to get a Kerberos 
ticket l, 1	) granting i access to all data of j, and then use high encryption to connect 
to j, without high encryption the node cannot join the network. 
 
Lemma 6.1 
A node i can participate in the Kerberos network to get the ticket  l, 1	) if-
and-only-if  -)  1. 
Proof of Lemma 6.1 
 We will first write the statement symbolically whereby 
q:  l, 1	)  
r:  -)  1 
and is thus denoted  
    ) 
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If:  
 Since we are not trying to prove that all tickets grant access to all nodes because 
all nodes have high encryption, but rather that a node possessing high encryption can 
obtain a ticket, we have the existential quantifier whereby  
Z  Z 
According to the requirements for a high level of encryption for connections between 
nodes in the Kerberos network, if a node i possesses a ticket to node j, written 
 Z: l, 1	)  
then the node i has high encryption,  
Z: -)  1 
Since according to the definition of the Kerberos system requirements, if 
  : -)  0 
node i cannot participate in the Kerberos network to create a link to node j since  
n: l, 1	) 
because Kerberos excludes low encryption -)  0 thus preventing the Kerberos server 
from granting a ticket to allow Z: l, 1	).  Thus, if 
-)  1 
then the server allows for a node i to obtain a ticket whereby 
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Z: l, 1	) 
yielding the existence of statements q and r for the Kerberos system making 
Z  Z 
true. 
Only-if: 
According to the requirements for a high level of encryption for connections 
between nodes in the Kerberos network, if a node i has high encryption,  
Z: -)  1 
then it can have a ticket, written 
Zq:  l, 1	)  
According to the requirements for a Kerberos server to grant a ticket to some node i for 
connection to node j, whereby 
Z:  l, 1	)  
can exist only if 
: -)  1 
meaning there exists a high level of encryption for connections between nodes i and j in 
the Kerberos network, allowing for node i to participate in the Kerberos network for 
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connection to j, since the Kerberos server excludes nodes who have links with low 
encryption, making  
Z  Z 
true.   
Q.E.D 
 
 
Note that -)  0 (low encryption) is not a valid action that a computer, or node, i 
can choose from the domain of actions to participate in the Kerberos network.  This 
makes Kerberos significantly different from our own algorithm.  Unless encryption is 
high, node i cannot possess a Kerberos ticket to connect to any other computer; if it 
cannot connect to any other computer, it only uses part of the definition of its security, 
whereby security is equal to its low encryption. 
Connection is only possible with -)  1.  As such, any game definition of 
Kerberos has a primitive utility function, since a player either has high encryption and 
maximizes security, or it does not and gets the security equal to its low encryption.  All 
metrics, including read and write, thus require that encryption be high.  Only then can a 
node i be granted, by the Kerberos server, possession of ticket l, 1	).  Since all 
metrics pertain to the need for node i to possess encryption level -)  1 in order to 
subsequently possess Kerberos ticket l, 1	), this Kerberos requirement (constraint) 
for high encryption we denote  
109 
 
o        (6.4) 
which applies to all Kerberos-server granted security connections, l+),.  We shall thus 
denote this interdependence pertaining to the whole of Kerberos security as 
o Tl+),U      (6.5) 
If we assume for all direct connections i makes to its neighbors, we can define K(si), the 
Kerberos security level of node i, as the weakest of all the direct connections from node i 
l	  & +l)	 *  l")	,    (6.6) 
Keep in mind that a node i defining security in equation 3.58 has an incomplete definition 
unless encryption is high.  We next write the action profile in equilibrium for Kerberos.  
However, this is somewhat of a trivial definition since the truly best actions in a Kerberos 
network are all depending upon high encryption.  Still, for completeness’ sake, we define 
a Kerberos action profile in equilibrium as  
l
	  To+l
	,, o+l
	,, … , o+l!
	,U   (6.7) 
 
We define Kerberos equilibrium for player i as player i’s best action (yielding maximum 
utility) given the actions of all the other players –i, 
 
l To+l
	,, o+l"	,U  l To+l	,, o+l"	,U   (6.8) 
However, the Kerberos game is not a potential game.  Our reasons for this are discussed 
below. 
110 
 
Theorem 6.1: 
The Kerberos game is not a potential game. 
 
Proof 6.1 Proof of Theorem 6.1 
The Kerberos game is not a potential game due to its lack of potential function.  By the 
definition of Kerberos constraints in Lemma 6.1 which requires  
yij = 1 
for a node i to participate in the Kerberos network and form a link to any other node j; 
and by the definition of G all nodes are heterogeneous, and thus  
Z  &: -") % 1 
making nodes –i unable to join the network.  Since the definition of a potential game is 
one in which the potential function is maximized by all players, then to participate in the 
Kerberos network 
p  &: -")  1 
in order to maximize the potential function, which contradicts the definition of a 
heterogeneous network.  Thus any players –i ≠ 1 fail to maximize the function, which 
would otherwise have been the potential function, if their encryption level y
–ij = 0.  Thus, 
the Kerberos game is not a potential game as it lacks a potential function maximized by 
all players. 
Q.E.D. 
111 
 
Theorem 6.2:  
The Kerberos game is not Pareto-optimal. 
Proof 6.2 Proof of Theorem 6.2 
This proof is given using a direct proof. 
While the Kerberos game is a game possessing an equilibrium function, Pareto 
optimization is more optimal than equilibrium.  Since according to Lemma 6.1 players –i 
having weak encryption 
y
-ij = 0 
cannot form a connection to the network, they cannot maximize the utility; there is no 
potential function.  And, since any player i with high encryption taking an equilibrium 
action to maximize its utility Kui causes all other players -i with low encryption to have 
utility Ku
-i decreased, the Kerberos game is not Pareto-optimal. 
Q.E.D. 
 
We consider implementing a mixed strategy game for Kerberos to be beyond the 
scope of our work.  While doing so might help us better evaluate the performance of our 
prototype four, we are unsure whether implementing a mixed strategy version of 
Kerberos is faithful to the algorithm.  Kerberos is not a potential or Pareto optimal game, 
as it has high inter-dependability of the variables and constraints which restrict the moves 
112 
 
of the game.  We believe that a mixed strategy game would be unfaithful to the pure 
Kerberos algorithm and its moves, and thus create a new algorithm altogether.   
 
6.2 O(n) analysis 
An O(n) analysis of our algorithm and Kerberos is below.  We begin by 
examining the process of forming a connection from node i to node j for n nodes in the 
network. The actions taken for link formation in the Kerberos network are: 
1. Node i sends request to central server node, presenting its credentials. 
2. Node i receives answer from server. 
3. Node i sends request to j presenting credentials (ticket and key) from central 
server node. 
4. Node j sends request to central server node, presenting its credentials and those of 
i. 
5. Node j receives response from server, allowing i to log in. 
6. Node j sends message to i and grants permissions to i all that server allows, thus 
forming link eij. 
 
Thus applying eij for n nodes, there are at most six actions, which can be written using 
O(n) notation  
O(6n) 
Furthermore, there are at least six actions, meaning the Kerberos network is 
Ω(6n) 
and thus making it  
θ(6n) 
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or, more commonly 
θ(n) 
However, this fails to account for the number of m nodes not allowed to participate in 
Kerberos at all due to their low encryption, thus making the more likely case  
O(6n-m) 
and 
Ω(6n-m) 
giving thus 
θ(6n-m) 
for Kerberos. 
The actions taken in to form a link our game theoretic security algorithm are: 
 Best-case scenario: 
1. Node i sends request and bid to j which includes its   - :  : 1 
2. Node j accepts bid, and thus allows i to connect, granting access to its data per 
its constraints. 
 
Thus extrapolating for n nodes, there are at least two actions, which can be written 
 Ω(2n)  
 or, rather, 
 Ω(n) 
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 Worst-case scenario: 
1. Node i sends request and bid to j which includes its   - :  : 1. 
2. Node j rejects bid. 
3. Bidding continues for some b number of iterations, whereby b < n or b ≥ n 
depending on how soon j accepts the bid. 
4. Node j accepts bid, and thus allows i to connect, granting access to its data per 
its constraints. 
 
Thus for n nodes, there are at most  · G actions, which can be written 
 O( q G)      
 Which, to give greater meaning to b, can be refined using the following: 
  Best-case for number of iterations in b, whereby  
G r        
G Q   1      
  Using O(n) notation, we write the best or “omega” case of O(n) as  
O q G	 Q O q   1		 = O(	    
And similarly,  
Worst-case for number of iterations in b, whereby  
G c  
      G   > 1 
Then using O(n) notation, we write the worst or “big-oh” case of O(n) as 
O q G	 = O(	 
115 
 
= O q 2	 
= O+ q  > 	, 
≥ O+ q  >   1	,  …  O+ q  > 2	,  
   O+ q  > 1	,  O q 		  ≥ O q   1		 
And thus we can conclusively say, in a worst-case scenario our algorithm 
is O(	.  Since it is also Ω(n), there is no way to write our algorithm 
using theta-notation θ(n). 
For O(n) analysis of time, Kerberos has the advantage, whereas for Ω(n) analysis 
our algorithm has the advantage in some cases, but Kerberos has the advantage in 
other cases.  Kerberos has the advantage when 
 Q  
Giving 
Ω6  	 r u	 
Since 
Ω6  	  Ω1	 as m  n 
 
However, our algorithm has the advantage, or performs not worse than Kerberos, 
when 
116 
 
 c  
Giving 
Ω6  	 c u	 
Since in this case 
Ω6  	  Ω	 as m  1 
 
This O(n) analysis demonstrates that under optimum conditions, our algorithm 
performs as quickly as the Kerberos algorithm, but in a worst-case scenario is slower than 
Kerberos.  However, our algorithm’s worsened performance is partially due to the fact 
that all nodes participate, whereas Kerberos will exclude those nodes that fail to have 
high encryption.  Thus, the O(n) analysis shows the tradeoff between speed and security 
in Kerberos versus our own  algorithm. 
 
117 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
FINDINGS 
 
We used the C++ programming language to write the prototype simulations for our game 
theoretic network security optimization algorithm, as well as the Kerberos system.  The 
network consisted of n = 43 nodes; this number was chosen because of its Gaussian 
distribution over a 10 by 10 matrix, but we will later examine varying node population to 
study the effects on network security at the end of this chapter.  Constraints of our 
networks were related to hardware and software of each node, and were quantified 
numerically.  For each prototype, the networks tested consisted of nodes that were 
general representations of heterogeneous computers, each with different hardware and 
software.  The hardware and software differences between each node, and thus the 
differences in constraints, were represented numerically by positive real numbers.  Any 
more specific hardware or software details beyond this general representation were not 
considered.  In light of the fact that as discussed regarding constraints, we understand that 
there are a large number of hardware and software combinations that can result in 
different constraints, we felt that until we are able to confidently represent the actual 
numerical quantization of hardware and software, or even a subset of the domain of all 
computer hardware and software, the approach we would take is to follow from the 
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definitions in equations (4.1) – (4.4).  These functions take as input hardware and 
software of a node and map the domain of possible security values, which consist of the 
combination of all hardware and software, to a range of allowed security values for that 
particular node’s hardware and software.  This range of values is the node’s constraints 
on security.  We can confidently examine what is common and what is different among 
nodes according to equations (4.1) – (4.4).  We refer to what is common among nodes as 
what is similar, and as such measures the homogeneity.  We refer to what is not in 
common among nodes as what is different, and as such measures the heterogeneity.  In 
our simulations, we can say for example node (1,7) is 36% similar to node (4,5).  We can 
also say node (1,7) is 46% similar to the average of the constraints of the nodes of the 
network.  The network consisted of 43 nodes with lowest possible minimum security of 1 
and maximum of 10.  Homogeneous minimum security means that all had minimum 
security of 1, and homogeneous maximum security means that all had maximum security 
of 10.  Heterogeneous, or different, minimum security is defined as follows: thirty-three 
nodes started at minimum security of 1, seven nodes started at minimum security of 2, 
two nodes started at minimum security of 3, and one node started at minimum security of 
5, for an average heterogeneous minimum security of 1.3.  Results shown in the figures 
below are for the end of each iteration.  Since all simulations began counting at zero, 
improvement at iteration zero is the improvement at the end of the “first” iteration versus 
previous improvement, which for that iteration was none. 
The different prototypes one through four incorporated some or all of Algorithms 
5.1 – 5.5 listed above; preliminary tests were made in prototype one before moving on to 
the intermediate prototype two and the complete prototypes three and four to model our 
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game theoretic security optimization algorithm.  Our initial tests of the first prototype 
were primarily confidence-building exercises to determine if our prototype was correct 
and the results made sense.  In the second prototype, we implemented nearly all aspects 
of our game theoretic security optimization, with the exception of side payments.  
Prototypes three and four fully implemented our game theoretic network security 
optimization technique.  The following table, Table 7.1, shows an overview of the 
similarities and differences between our prototypes.  The details are below in the 
description of each prototype.  See Table 7.4 for an overview on prototypes, networks, 
and results of security. 
 
 Strategies Side 
Payments 
Minimums Maximums Coalitions Algorithms 
Proto 
1 
Pure None Hom./Het. Hom.(10)/Het.(Min.+ 
6 to 8) 
N 5.2-5.4 
Proto 
2 
Pure None Het. Het. Y 5.1-5.4 
Proto 
3.1 
Pure Effective Het. Het. Y 5.1-5.4 
Proto 
3.2 
Pure More 
Effective 
Het. Het. Y 5.1-5.4 
Proto 
4.1 
Mixed Effective Het. Het. Y 5.1-5.3, 5.5 
Proto 
4.2 
Mixed More 
Effective 
Het. Het. Y 5.1-5.3, 5.5 
Kerb. Pure N/A Het. Het. N/A N/A 
 
Table 7.1: Overview of all prototypes’ similarities and differences  
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Here, for example, we see that prototype three version two (labeled “proto 3.2”) had side 
payments that were able to decrease vulnerability to a greater extent than prototype three 
version one (labeled “proto 3.1”).  In doing so, the utility for the side payment was 
increased.  Likewise, we tested a similar scenario for prototype four, which contained a 
game where players moved according to mixed strategies.  This is discussed in greater 
specification in each prototype below.  Table 7.1 is meant to serve as an overview and as 
a guide for the reader to aid in sorting out the differences between the prototypes while 
examining the details below. 
 The networks considered in our tests varied according to heterogeneity.  For our 
initial tests in prototype one, we used homogeneous networks whereby all nodes could 
reach the maximum security, followed by semi-heterogeneous networks with nodes 
having different minimum security from one another, but the same maximum security.  
The third type of network tested in prototype one contained nodes possessing both 
different minimum and maximum security, where the maximum security was a function 
of the minimum security.  In the first network tested for prototype one, the maximum 
security of each node was equal to its minimum security plus six levels above it, followed 
by a second network with maximum security equal to the minimum plus seven, and a 
third network with maximum security equal to the minimum plus eight.  Prototype one 
was primarily a confidence-building exercise, and as such we only tested it on these 
networks; these heterogeneous networks tested for prototype one were but a subset of the 
entirety of the heterogeneous networks tested on prototypes two through four.  For the 
complete or nearly-complete implementations of our algorithm as done by prototypes two 
through four, as well as Kerberos, we tested only heterogeneous networks since the 
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purpose of our algorithm is to optimize security of a heterogeneous network, and the 
purpose of Kerberos is to better evaluate how well our algorithm optimizes security.  We 
will examine each prototype in detail and its results, and compare the results between 
them.  After doing so, we compare all prototypes’ performance with different network 
sizes, n. 
 
7.1 Prototype One 
The objective of our first prototype test is to examine utility improvement for 
individual nodes, and overall utility improvement.  Prototype one was based on 
Algorithm 5.2: Attack_tree_analysis, Algorithm 5.3: Reduce_ vulnerability, and 
Algorithm 5.4: Pure_strategy_game.  Algorithm 5.1 was not included as all nodes 
belonged to the same coalition from the beginning and no coalitions were formed during 
the game.  An analysis of the output produced by our first prototype is shown below.  The 
game is initialized at security level 1, all constraints and bids are assumed to have been 
resolved, and the utility function excluded side payments from calculations.  As such it 
does not entirely implement our game theoretic security model, but will be used for 
preliminary tests before moving on to the intermediate second prototype and the final, 
complete model implemented by the third and fourth prototypes.   
The simulation data from prototype one is found in Figures 7.1 through 7.13, as 
well as Tables 7.2 and 7.3.  Some networks tested for prototype one were theoretically 
capable of reaching the maximum security level of ten, giving a homogeneous maximum.  
Other networks tested for prototype one had heterogeneous maximums, giving different 
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maximum security levels for each node depending upon their minimum security level.  
These heterogeneous networks were a subset of the networks tested for prototypes two 
through four.  All nodes were able to observe all G = (V, E) and, consequently, moves in 
the game.  Nodes had varying degrees of heterogeneity with respect to one another’s 
security.   
When we initially started testing, we chose two nodes to observe whether our test 
results were turning out in a way that made sense.  After this confidence-building 
exercise, we switched to showing just our average network data, since the purpose of our 
work is to test whether our algorithm improves overall network security.  Two candidate 
nodes are first examined, chosen at random, one with more heterogeneity compared to 
other nodes in the network (46% similar to the average of all security constraints of all 
nodes in the network, as described earlier according to equations (4.1) – (4.4)), and a 
second node with less heterogeneity (37% similar to the average of all security 
constraints of all nodes in the network, as described according to equations (4.1) – (4.4)).  
These two nodes differed from one another, with respect to each other’s security 
constraints, by 36%, as according to equations (4.1) – (4.4).  Figure 7.1, shown on the 
next page below, gives utility improvement for these two candidate nodes.   
 
 
 
 
123 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Utility improvement, candidate nodes, network consisting of nodes 
with a homogeneous minimum security level, prototype one, n = 43 
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Utility improvement is studied because it shows the improvements in security 
during game play, which aids in evaluating the performance of our game theoretic 
algorithm.  These results show greater initial improvement by the heterogeneous node 
(130% vs. 110%), but both have comparable utility improvement after the first few 
iterations.  This pattern indicates stabilization for the nodes and demonstrates equilibrium 
for varying degrees of heterogeneity.   
Next we examine the result for average utility improvement for all nodes in the 
network, shown in Figure 7.2 below.  We can compare these results with the above chart 
to see that the utility improvement of the two candidate nodes stabilized at the same 
number of game turns (iterations), but the initial utility improvement of the candidate 
nodes was greater than the average of the network utility improvement.  The result shown 
in the graph confirms that the utility improvement demonstrated by the two candidate 
nodes is representative of the network average.  Security levels are compared similarly in 
Figures 7.3 – 7.5. 
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Figure 7.2: Network where all nodes had a homogeneous minimum security level, 
 prototype one, n = 43.  This is the average security of the entire network which 
contained the two candidate nodes in Figure 7.1 
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Figure 7.3: Candidate nodes security level (1 - 10), homogeneous minimum 
security level, prototype one, n = 43 
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The above chart compares the security of the two candidate nodes.  We see that 
the more heterogeneous node achieved a greater maximum security at stabilization, but 
took longer to stabilize than the more homogeneous node which had less security.  As we 
will see later in prototype four, there exists a correlation between extended convergence 
time and greater security.  Our initial tests of prototype one only hinted at this possibility 
at this point. 
The next chart, Figure 7.4, shows the average security for the entire network, 
which contained the candidate nodes.  This is the same simulation, but different data, in 
the above figures.  If we compare the chart below showing the average network security 
to the one above showing the individual candidate node security, we observe that the 
average network security is slightly higher than if we calculated the average security 
between the two candidate nodes.  These charts illustrated to us that our network and 
algorithm’s results made sense, and we began to move on to testing our prototype on 
networks with increasingly greater heterogeneity.  By same minimum we mean 
homogeneous minimum of security of 1 for all nodes in the network, and by different 
minimum we mean heterogeneous minimum of security for the nodes forming the 
network, as defined at the start of this chapter. 
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Figure 7.4: Average security, same (homogeneous) minimum security level, n = 43 
 
Figure 7.5: Average security, different (heterogeneous) minimum security levels, n = 43 
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The chart above, Figure 7.5, represents data for new simulations from in the previous 
figures.  It shows the average network security for a new network with heterogeneity; the 
nodes had different, but not necessarily unique, minimum security.  In the next chart we 
see this data compared to the security of the previously-tested homogeneous network.  
This chart combines data in Figure 7.4 and 7.5, the initial tests of prototype one. 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Comparison of average security for network with homogeneous minimum 
(same minimum) vs. heterogeneous minimum (different minimum) security, n = 43 
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Figure 7.6, shown above, illustrates that the more heterogeneous network starting at 
different minimum security reached a somewhat higher level of security (6.9) than the 
network that had the same minimum security (6.7).  We hypothesize that greater 
differences might lead to even higher security, which will be examined in further tests.  
However, this graph illustrates that our work is applicable to any level of security and 
will give similar results regardless of a node’s achievable security level. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Average utility improvement for networks with different minimum security 
level, prototype one, n = 43 
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Figure 7.7, shown above, illustrates the difference in utility improvement when all nodes 
start at different minimum security versus the same minimum security, as in Figure 7.6. 
The graph of the network containing nodes starting at different minimum security 
converged somewhat similarly to the one starting at the same minimum security. 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Security level comparison, candidate nodes, different versus same minimum 
security (prototype one, n = 43) 
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Figure 7.8, shown above, returns to showing the performance of the two candidate nodes 
and relates them to the network variations in which all nodes have the same or different 
minimums.  In Figure 7.8, we examine our two candidate nodes’ performance in 
networks where they had homogeneous (same) minimum security and networks with 
heterogeneous (different) minimum security.  Both sets of nodes, the set with the 
different minimum security and the set with the same minimum security, reached the 
same overall maximum securities, respectively.  The homogeneous node with a different 
minimum security converged to the same maximum security by one iteration faster than 
its counterpart with the same minimum security.  It is interesting to note that the faster 
convergence corresponds to the higher security level from which the network started.   
Since our tests of our candidate nodes showed similarity to the average network 
security and utility, we were confident that our algorithm was working as expected.  We 
moved on to the focus of our work, that of evaluating the improvement in average 
network made by our algorithm.  In the next chart, Figure 7.9, we see the utility 
improvement for networks with varying minimum and maximum security.  This chart 
takes the networks shown in Figure 7.7 and adds tests of prototype one on a third network 
containing nodes with different minimum and maximum security.  This new network was 
our first test of any truly heterogeneous network, as each node had a different minimum 
and maximum security compared to the other nodes.   
For this initial test, we did not want the maximum to be overly different from the 
other networks, so we chose a heterogeneous maximum which gave some nodes the 
capability to reach the same maximum as the nodes in the other networks (a theoretical 
maximum of 10), and made other nodes so they reached a lower maximum.  However, 
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this being our first test of a network with this degree of heterogeneity, we did not want 
the nodes starting out at a minimum security of 1 to be capable of less than 70% of the 
theoretical maximum as the nodes in the other networks.  Therefore, we established the 
theoretical maximum security of each node to be 6 levels of security above a node’s 
minimum security, enabling all nodes to have a theoretical maximum of at least 7.  For an 
average minimum security of 1.3, the average theoretical maximum security of the 
network was calculated to be 7.3, or 6 levels of security above the minimum of 1.3.  
Regardless of a node’s minimum security, it could not exceed a maximum theoretical 
security of 10.  The performance of the new network with greatest heterogeneity was 
almost identical to that of the previous networks in Figure 7.7. 
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Figure 7.9: Average utility improvement comparison, different versus same minimum 
and different maximum security (prototype one, n = 43) 
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In Figure 7.10, shown below, we see the average security of the same three 
networks from Figure 7.9.  Since the network containing nodes with different minimum 
and maximum security (most heterogeneity) had slightly lower security than the network 
where all nodes could reach the same maximum security, lowering maximum security for 
some nodes affects the maximum network security.  This is consistent with what we 
would expect.  However, our algorithm still maximizes overall security to a quantity that 
is comparable to the network where all nodes can reach the same maximum.  More 
importantly, at six iterations the new network with the most heterogeneity converges at 
least 33% faster than the other two networks with less heterogeneity.  These results 
indicate that the algorithm is robust and actually improves as networks become more 
heterogeneous, causing faster convergence as the heterogeneity increases. 
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Figure 7.10: Comparison of average security for same minimum vs. different minimums 
vs. different minimums and maximums (prototype one, n = 43) 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
S
e
cu
ri
ty
 L
e
v
e
l
Iteration
Average security of three networks, 
Prototype one
Different minimum security
Same minimum security
Different minimum and maximum security
Different minimum 
security, Different 
minimum and maximum 
security
137 
 
As in Figure 7.9, Figure 7.10 demonstrates that the network with heterogeneous 
minimum and maximum security matched almost perfectly that of the heterogeneous 
minimum and homogeneous maximum network, but only until six iterations are reached.  
At that point the heterogeneous minimum and maximum security network stabilizes and 
the other networks continue to improve.  The most heterogeneous network, having 
different minimum and maximum security, reached the lowest maximum average 
security of 6.5, while the next most heterogeneous network, having the same minimum 
and different maximum security, reached the highest maximum security of 6.9.  The 
network with the most homogeneity, having the same minimum and maximum security, 
was between the two other networks with maximum average security equal to 6.7.   
We examined the actual versus theoretical performance of the networks in order 
to determine how well our algorithm is improving overall network security for a 
heterogeneous network with different minimum and maximum security.  This test was 
another confidence-building exercise prior to moving on to testing our algorithm on 
exclusively heterogeneous networks.  Since this heterogeneous network tested will have a 
lower achievable security than a network where all nodes can theoretically reach the 
upper limit of security (10), comparison of average security values does not reflect how 
well the heterogeneous network is performing.  Figure 7.11 shows the actual performance 
relative to the theoretical performance of the three networks we have evaluated.  Since 
the most heterogeneous network, having the different minimums and maximums, 
demonstrated an actual average security level of 6.5 out of a theoretical average of 7.3 (6 
greater than the average minimum of 1.3), its performance far exceeded that of either of 
the previous two networks, which had a theoretical maximum of 10.   
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Figure 7.11: Comparison of maximum achievable vs. achieved security for networks with 
varying heterogeneity (prototype one, n = 43) 
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The next chart, Figure 7.12, shows results for the networks from in Figure 7.9 and 
adds a fourth network containing nodes with different minimum and a higher 
heterogeneous maximum security.  We label the networks from above: “Different 
minimum security” is “Heterogeneous minimum,” “Same minimum security” is 
“Homogeneous minimum security,” and “Different minimum and maximum security” is 
“Max = hetero min +6.”  The latter network name, “Max = hetero min +6,” identifies 
what the maximum security is for each node in that network in order to better distinguish 
that network from the fourth network we add to our examinations below.  The 
“heterogeneous min” refers to the heterogeneous minimum security of the nodes forming 
that network; in other words, the nodes in the network have minimum security according 
to the statistics of minimum security as described at the start of this chapter.  For 
example, for a node in the network of “Max = hetero min +6,” if the node has minimum 
security of 1, then its maximum security is 1 + 6 = 7.  No node has security greater than 
10 regardless of its minimum.  The introduction of the fourth network is to test whether 
increasing the maximum heterogeneous security yields a better tradeoff between speed 
and security versus the third network.  Like the third network, the fourth network 
contains nodes with varying minimum and maximum security.  However, the fourth 
network enables a higher heterogeneous maximum than the nodes in the third network.  
With the third network, the heterogeneous maximum security was equal to the six levels 
above the heterogeneous minimum, or in other words, was equal to the heterogeneous 
minimum plus six.  The fourth network has heterogeneous maximum security equal to the 
heterogeneous minimum plus seven.  For example, nodes that had minimum security of 1 
were able to reach a theoretical maximum of 8.   
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Figure 7.12: Comparison of maximum overall network security, selected networks with 
varying heterogeneity and security (prototype one, n = 43) 
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The results in Figure 7.11 and 7.12 show that the new network, which increased the 
maximum possible security to seven greater than the heterogeneous minimum, gave an 
increased average maximum from 6.5 to 6.7.  However, the performance of the new 
network was decreased as the third network (maximum security equal to minimum plus 
six) converged faster.   
 For additional tests, we added a fifth network with increased heterogeneous 
maximum security, where the maximum security was equal to the heterogeneous 
minimum plus eight.  As shown below in Table 7.2, the new network yielded nearly 
identical results to the heterogeneous minimum network.  All nodes in the heterogeneous 
minimum network were capable of reaching the theoretical maximum security of 10; this 
network had been labeled “different minimums” in earlier charts, and is re-labeled 
“heterogeneous minimum” for comparison in subsequent tables and figures.  These 
results of varying maximum security, as shown in Table 7.2, indicate that there exists an 
optimum network configuration for fastest convergence with the maximum average 
network security.  However, the heterogeneity of the new network still paid off in terms 
of maximum security, as the network achieved a maximum average of approximately 6.9, 
the highest of the tests thus far.   
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Average security comparison, Prototype one 
  
    
  
            
Iteration 
Heterogeneous 
minimum 
Homogeneous 
minimum 
Max = 
hetero min 
+ 6 
Max = 
hetero min 
+ 7 
Max = 
hetero min 
+ 8 
0 1.372 1.000 1.349 1.349 1.349 
1 2.372 2.000 2.349 2.349 2.349 
2 3.349 2.930 3.326 3.326 3.326 
3 4.279 3.860 4.256 4.256 4.256 
4 5.163 4.744 5.14 5.14 5.14 
5 5.953 5.581 5.953 5.953 5.953 
6 6.535 6.233 6.535 6.512 6.512 
7 6.767 6.512 6.535 6.744 6.744 
8 6.86 6.628 6.535 6.744 6.86 
9 6.884 6.674 6.535 6.744 6.907 
10 6.884 6.698 6.535 6.744 6.907 
 
Table 7.2: Comparison of average security and iteration time for the varying degrees of 
maximum security (prototype one, n = 43) 
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Figure 7.13: Average Utility Improvement comparison, varying security and 
heterogeneity (prototype one, n = 43) 
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Average utility improvement comparison, Prototype one 
Iteration 
Heterogeneous 
minimum 
Homogeneous 
minimum 
Max = 
hetero 
min + 6 
Max = 
hetero 
min + 7 
Max = 
hetero 
min + 8 
0 142% 118% 144% 144% 144% 
1 63% 78% 63% 63% 63% 
2 26% 32% 25% 25% 25% 
3 13% 13% 12% 12% 12% 
4 10% 11% 10% 10% 10% 
5 5% 6% 5% 5% 5% 
6 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
7 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
8 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 
9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
Table 7.3: Average utility improvement comparison, varying degrees of heterogeneity.  
This is the same data as is presented in Figure 7.13. 
 
In the above Table 7.3 and, in graphical form, Figure 7.13, we see nearly identical utility 
improvement performance for the varying degrees of heterogeneous maximum security, 
nearly matching that of the homogeneous maximum where all nodes could reach the 
same maximum of 10.  While a security and convergence optimization occurred for 
networks with heterogeneous maximum plus seven or plus eight, this was not the case for 
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utility improvement as shown in Figure 7.13 and Table 7.3.  Here, networks performed 
similarly.  These results ultimately show that the game theoretic algorithm presented in 
this work gives robust performance in terms of utility for varying degrees of maximum 
achievable security on the part of the nodes that make up the network, demonstrating that 
implementing our algorithm is feasible in terms of security improvement versus cost, as 
utility is largely unaffected by network heterogeneity. 
 
7.2 Prototype Two 
The objective of our second prototype is to test the effect on convergence time, 
utility improvement, and maximum overall security for a nearly complete implementation 
of our game theoretic security algorithm.  Networks have greater and varying degrees of 
heterogeneity versus those tested for prototype one, which was a preliminary model.  
Nodes forming the networks have heterogeneous minimum and maximum security, 
which is representative of our heterogeneous network to be optimized.  When performing 
our initial tests on our algorithm in prototype one, we used two networks with 
homogeneous and nearly-homogeneous nodes to observe whether our results were 
logical.  After we were confident that our algorithm was working properly, we moved on 
to tests with truly heterogeneous networks.  For our tests of prototype two, we used 
heterogeneous networks which included the networks from the latter tests of prototype 
one, and added networks with a maximum security equal to three, four, five, and six 
levels above the heterogeneous minimum security of each node.  We will use these 
146 
 
results for prototype two as a basis for comparison to the complete implementation of our 
algorithm in prototype three.  
 Like prototype one, prototype two does not entirely implement our game 
theoretic security model.  However, with the exception of side payments, prototype two 
completely implements our game theoretic security model.  Thus our second prototype 
implements Algorithm 5.3: Reduce_ vulnerability, with the exception lines 13-17, which 
relate to side payments.  As it includes all else in Algorithm 5.3, as well as Algorithm 
5.2: Reduce_ vulnerability and Algorithm 5.1: Coalition_formation, prototype two 
includes coalitions.  Furthermore, in the prototype simulations all nodes have knowledge 
of all other nodes in G = (V, E) and are thus able to observe events in the game in the 
same way that the nodes were able to for prototype one; all nodes in prototype two 
correspondingly have knowledge of nodes’ maximum bidding price which in effect 
resolves the bidding scheme in our prototype from any iterative, logarithmic, or 
exponential process to immediate bid maximization.  Also, as mentioned above each 
node has varying minimum and maximum security levels.  This varying security and 
heterogeneity is representative of the heterogeneous network we seek to optimize; thus 
the networks examined in prototype one are a subset of the ones examined henceforth.   
The nodes are otherwise the same as the simulations for prototype one, with a network 
again consisting of n = 43 nodes. 
As described in Algorithm 5.1: Coalition_formation and Algorithm 5.2: 
Attack_tree_analysis, at each turn of the game a node must re-examine its security and 
that of its neighbors through attack tree analysis and by applying the partition function.  
Those nodes that meet the security requirements for joining a coalition are added, those 
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that no longer meet the requirements are removed, and the others are kept within the 
coalition.  Those nodes that meet the security criteria and fall within difference_threshold 
from Algorithm 5.1: Coalition_formation, will join the coalition and be given access to 
insensitive data.  Through the attack tree analysis of Algorithm 5.2, those nodes whose 
security is evaluated to be even higher are granted access to sensitive data.  The 
simulation data for results from prototype two is displayed in Figures 7.14 through 7.18 
below.  In the first graph of prototype two, shown in Figure 7.14, we see average security 
for the network compared for variations on maximum achievable security; compare this 
to prototype one results from Figure 7.12.   
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Figure 7.14: Average security comparison for varying maximum security, full prototype 
minus side payments (prototype two, n = 43) 
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Comparing the security data for prototype two shown in Figure 7.14 versus prototype one 
in Figure 7.12, we see a nearly consistent maximum for prototype one among all 
variations on heterogeneous maximum available security, reaching maximum of 
approximately 6.5 to 6.9.  However, with prototype two there exists a divergent 
maximum among all variations on heterogeneous maximum achievable security for the 
network.  In this graph, Figure 7.14, we see the difference achieved by the addition of 
coalitions, bidding, and analysis according to Algorithms 5.2 through 5.3.  While the best 
two networks that had maximum security equal to minimum plus five through plus eight 
were slightly lower than that of prototype one, having a maximum of approximately 6.0, 
this is not a huge divergence from the average maximum of the same networks for 
prototype one at approximately 6.7.  Because of the similarity, we believe it demonstrates 
the consistency of the foundation of our game theoretic algorithm for improving overall 
network security for the heterogeneous network.  Furthermore, we believe that the 
marked difference between the performance on the network maximum plus four versus 
plus five shows that there is a point at which the optimum security can be reached, and 
that compressing the overall maximum security for the network has a detrimental effect 
on overall security, but only to a point, at which the algorithm is able to perform nearly as 
well as if all nodes had the same homogeneous maximum. 
In Figures 7.15 through 7.18 shown below, we see the data generated for 
prototype two regarding relationships between nodes.  Figure 7.15 shows average local 
neighborhood count and in the next chart, Figure 7.16, we see average utility 
improvement for the same simulation.  Figure 7.17 shows corresponding information 
regarding the number of nodes forming a coalition, and Figure 7.18 the percentage of 
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coalition members with sensitive data access.  We examined the number of nodes to 
which a node is connected, number of nodes forming a coalition, and percentage of 
coalition members granted sensitive data access in order to better evaluate what is going 
on in the system, with respect to whether there exists any correlation between these 
statistics and network security.  Also, by examining the number of connections, we are 
able to ensure the network is staying fully connected with the introduction of coalitions in 
prototype three.  We are able to examine whether all nodes in a coalition are granted 
sensitive data access, or what percentage of nodes were granted sensitive data access.  
Recall that sensitive data access is granted to coalition members who meet more stringent 
security requirements than those to simply belong to a coalition.  As it turns out, most, 
but not all coalition members are granted sensitive data access.  Analysis and discussion 
of the data in these figures follows Figure 7.18 below.   
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Figure 7.15: Comparison of average number of nodes making up local neighborhood for 
varying maximum security and heterogeneity, full prototype minus side payments 
(prototype two, n = 43) 
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Figure 7.16: Average utility improvement comparison, varying maximum security and 
heterogeneity, full prototype minus side payments (prototype two, n = 43) 
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Figure 7.17: Comparison of average number of nodes forming a coalition, varying 
maximum security and heterogeneity, full prototype minus side payments (prototype two, 
n = 43) 
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Figure 7.18: Comparison of coalition nodes granted sensitive data access, full prototype 
minus side payments (prototype two, n = 43) 
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In Figures 7.15 and 7.17, the average number of nodes forming a coalition for prototype 
two was the same as its average local neighborhood count.  However, this was not the 
case for prototype three.  In Figure 7.16, we see utility improvement, which shows 
decreasing improvement as the game progresses.  In general, this pattern was observed 
for all prototypes.  In Figures 7.14, 7.17, and 7.18, we see that there is an inverse 
relationship between network security and number of nodes granted sensitive data access, 
as well as between network security and the number of nodes forming a coalition.  We 
hypothesize that as the difference in the nodes' maximum security increases, the 
minimum security required to join a coalition increases and consequently includes fewer 
nodes.  Beyond these observations, there was no network-for-network correlation 
between number of neighbors and security. 
In the above Figure 7.18, showing the percentage of nodes granted access to 
sensitive data, we see a great deal of divergence among the different networks with 
varying degrees of maximum heterogeneous security at approximately five to six 
iterations.   If one examines the above graphs in Figures 7.14 through 7.18 for the same 
simulation, we see that approximately five iterations is the point at which stabilization of 
the network takes place for security, utility, coalition, or nodes forming a local area 
network.  This finalization of decision-making by each node is most likely the cause of 
the divergence among the networks with varying degrees of maximum security as shown 
in Figure 7.15, which simply represents the near-finalization of partial preferences by 
each node in the network.  This stabilization is thus most likely related to the utility 
equation itself, and not necessarily restricted to coalition formation with partial 
preferences, because in addition to the data presented in Figures 7.14 through 7.18, the 
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previous figures for the prototype as represented in Figures 7.1 through 7.13 shows 
stabilization at approximately the same number of iterations.   
 
7.3 Prototype Three  
The objective of prototype three is to study the effect on overall network security 
and convergence by adding side payments to simulations, yielding a full implementation 
of our game theoretic security Algorithm 5.4: Pure_strategy_game.  We examine 
convergence time, utility improvement, and maximum overall network security and 
compare our results with those of prototype two.  Like prototype two, prototype three 
includes coalitions, and all nodes have knowledge of events in the game and network.  
This knowledge includes maximum bidding price.  Network size was the same as for 
earlier prototypes, consisting of 43 nodes.  Side payments, which established the 
difference between prototype three and prototype two, are denominated in terms of 
security; this is described earlier in Algorithm 5.3: Reduce_ vulnerability.  The decision 
to make a side payment is based on attack tree analysis, whereby nodes prefer to solve 
possible vulnerabilities when they are close to nodes which currently have diminished 
vulnerability rather than allow a possible vulnerability to become an immediate problem 
to a node with sensitive data.  We chose the cost of payments in our prototype simulation 
as equivalent to twice the immediate security benefit; while this is cynical it is more 
representative of the principal of delayed gratification which is at the core of the 
reasoning behind attack tree decision-making which leads nodes to address problems 
sooner rather than later, receiving less immediate benefit.  Again, while addressing a 
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problem late after its manifestation will likely yield more immediate gross benefit, it 
represents greater vulnerability and cost to the node itself.  Besides being poor attack tree 
analysis, addressing a problem late also gives lower net benefit after costs are considered.  
The results from tests of prototype three are found in Figures 7.19 through 7.36 below. 
The first chart of the results for prototype three, shown in Figure 7.19, compares 
average security among the networks with the same variations in heterogeneous minima 
and maxima as found in the tests of prototype two.  Compared to maximum security for 
prototype two in Figure 7.14, we see results that show similar if not improved maximum 
security for the networks that could reach the highest security levels.  Like prototype two, 
networks that had a maximum equal to heterogeneous minimum plus five and higher 
achieved a consistent maximum security.  This similarity of performance, with marked 
improvement starting at plus five above minimum security, again demonstrates that our 
game theoretic security algorithm can perform equally well under less than optimum 
conditions.  
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Figure 7.19: Comparison of average overall network security for networks with 
varying security and heterogeneity, full implementation of our algorithm (prototype three, 
n = 43) 
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Security for prototype three, represented in Figure 7.19, shows similar stabilization as the 
corresponding security graph for prototype two in Figure 7.14.  Both stabilized after 
approximately five iterations.  Prototype three had higher security, however.  Since the 
only difference between prototypes two and three was the introduction of side payments, 
these test results show the effectiveness of side payments in improving security. 
In general, utility for prototypes two and three showed similar convergence, as 
shown in Figures 7.16 and 7.21.  However, we observed under repeated tests that utility 
for prototype three worsened at iterations 5 and 6 for two of the networks.  These 
networks had the maximum security equal to the heterogeneous minimum plus five and 
plus eight.  We do not know why this occurred for these specific networks. 
Even though we see generally similar security and utility stabilization with (for 
prototype three) or without (for prototype two) side payments, this is not the case for the 
number of interactions taking place between nodes.  In Figures 7.20 and 7.22 through 
7.24 below, we see that prototype three takes nearly double the time to converge versus 
prototype two; see the corresponding graphs for prototype two in Figures 7.15 and 7.17.  
Since the only difference between prototypes two and three is the addition of side 
payments, we must conclude that side payments lengthen the stabilization time with 
respect to forming a local network and coalition.  The increased time is likely a result of 
the added overhead to make and accept side payments. 
For Figures 7.19 and 7.21 we see a pattern that after the same number of 
iterations, some of the networks diverged from other networks.  This divergence was not 
based entirely on how similar the networks were to one another.  In fact, security 
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maximization was nearly identical for the networks with maximum security equal to the 
heterogeneous minimum plus five and plus eight.  These are the same two networks that 
had the unusual decrease in utility at approximately iterations 5 and 6, which coincides 
with the point at which these networks began to outperform the others.  For all networks, 
stabilization and convergence takes place after the same number of iterations, regardless 
of the graph, for the security, utility, and side payments made in different simulations of 
prototype three.  Again, this stabilization is exemplar of the network being optimized 
according to our game theoretic algorithm.  Despite the differences in prototypes one 
through three, the fundamental algorithm is the same, and we see this represented in the 
similarity of stabilization with respect to utility and security among the three prototypes.  
These results again show that our fundamental game-theoretic algorithm has the greatest 
effect on network performance with respect to security and utility, and the fundamental 
algorithm has greater significance than any other variations on the algorithm itself as in 
the early prototypes one and two.   
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Figure 7.20: Comparison of average number of nodes forming a local neighborhood for 
networks with varying security and heterogeneity, full implementation of our algorithm 
(prototype three, n = 43) 
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Figure 7.21: Comparison of average utility improvement for same networks as above, full 
implementation of our algorithm (prototype three, n = 43) 
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Figure 7.22: Comparison of average number of nodes forming a coalition, varying 
maximum security and heterogeneity, full implementation of our algorithm (prototype 
three, n = 43) 
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Figure 7.23: Comparison of percentage of local neighborhood (directly connected nodes) 
forming coalition, varying network heterogeneity, full implementation of our algorithm 
(prototype three, n = 43) 
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Figure 7.24: Percentage of coalition members granted access to a node’s sensitive data, 
d(i) = 1, for networks with different maximum security and heterogeneity, full 
implementation of our algorithm (prototype three), n = 43 
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In Figure 7.25, shown below, we see data unique to prototype three, that of the 
percentage of nodes making side payments.  After twelve iterations, the network 
variations converge to stabilization and no more side payments are made.  Since for the 
data shown in Figures 7.20 and 7.22 through 7.24 shows convergence after ten iterations 
and we hypothesized that this longer convergence time versus prototype two was directly 
related to the addition of side payments, we can see that there is some correlation 
between the percentage of nodes making side payments and stabilization of the related 
interactions between nodes in a graph.   
In addition, we believe that there may be a point at which the percentage of nodes 
making side payments has no further effect on convergence time, as the side payment 
stabilization took two iterations longer than the security and utility stabilization.  At 
iterations 11 and 12, the percentage of nodes making side payments dropped below 20% 
of the total number of nodes; this may be the point at which the percentage of nodes 
making side payments has no further effect on convergence time. 
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Figure 7.25: Comparison of percentage of network nodes making side payments, full 
implementation of our algorithm (prototype three), n = 43 
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It is interesting to note, in Figure 7.25 above, the correlation between side 
payments and the best-performing networks, in terms of security, as shown earlier in 
Figure 7.19: networks that maximized the use of side payments had the highest security.  
In fact, the networks with heterogeneous maximum of five or more above the minimum 
security had nearly identical graphs for side payments.   This shows that side payments 
indeed do improve security beyond what would be achievable in their absence, thus 
benefitting network security as a whole.   
There is also an interesting correspondence between local network size (and 
coalition size) and side payments in prototype three: those networks making more side 
payments tend to have smaller local area networks.  Nodes are thus granting fewer other 
nodes access to sensitive or insensitive data.  Because of the decrease in the number of 
nodes forming a local area network in prototype two versus prototype three by a factor of 
two or three (see Figures 7.15 and 7.20, respectively), in addition to the similar decrease 
in the percentage of nodes allowed sensitive data access in the best-performing 
heterogeneous networks (heterogeneous maximum of plus five through eight, see Figures 
7.18 and 7.24), we hypothesize that the nodes in the network, through the feedback 
mechanism of side payments to reduce vulnerability to other nodes, are in effect learning 
to reduce their own vulnerability by communication via the side payment mechanism.  
This hypothesis merits future study.  As above in prototype two, there was no network-
for-network correlation between number of neighbors and security in prototype three.  
However, there was a pattern for the networks having highest security, those of max = 
hetero min +5 through +8.  With the exception of the two lowest-security networks, 
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networks with the highest security had fewer connections.  The max = hetero min +5 
through +8 networks had a smaller average local neighborhood count, smallest average 
number of nodes forming a coalition, smallest percentage of local neighbors in coalition, 
and smallest percentage of coalition members with sensitive data access.   
 
 
7.3.1 Prototype Three Version Two 
The purpose of prototype three, version two is to study the impact of more 
effective side payments on the network as a whole.  It is otherwise identical to the earlier 
version of prototype three, which we shall henceforth denote as prototype three version 
one.  Effectiveness is measured in terms of a two-fold increase in security versus side 
payments for prototype three version one.  We chose to alter this side payment 
effectiveness quantization to determine whether our logic for choosing to denominate 
earlier side payments more closely to the principal of delayed gratification was correct, 
and also to see whether allowing nodes the capability of making changes to security that 
are more effective have an impact on overall network security.  The data shown in Figure 
7.26 gives the security of the network for this change in side payments. 
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Figure 7.26: Average overall network security, more effective side payments, full 
implementation of our algorithm (prototype three version two), n = 43 
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Henceforth we label prototype three as prototype three version one, or, in short, 
prototype three v.1.  If we compare the data in Figure 7.26 for prototype three version 
two to the corresponding data in Figure 7.19 for prototype three version one, we see little 
difference in improvement in overall network security for the best performing 
heterogeneous networks.  However, we do see a marked decrease in convergence time for 
networks in prototype three version two, the network with more effective side payments, 
by a factor comparable to the increase in side payment effectiveness.   Figure 7.27 below 
compares the performance of the fastest-converging network (heterogeneous maximum 
equal to the minimum plus five) in prototype three version one and prototype three 
version two.  The data shown in Figure 7.27 illustrates the decrease in convergence time 
by almost half for prototype three version two, seven versus 11 iterations.  We see nearly 
identical results in Figure 7.28 for the second-fastest converging network, with a 
maximum security equal to the heterogeneous minimum plus six.  We also see similar 
results for the remainder of the heterogeneous maxima as shown in Figure 7.26 compared 
to the corresponding results for prototype three version one in Figure 7.19. 
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Figure 7.27: Average security comparison for prototype three versions one and two, (full 
implementations of our algorithm), network maximum security equal to minimum plus 
five, n = 43 
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Figure 7.28: Average security comparison for prototypes three versions one and two, (full 
implementations of our algorithm), network with maximum security equal to minimum 
plus six, n = 43   
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Note in Figures 7.27 and 7.28 that security maximization is similar between the two 
prototypes.  From these results we conclude that increased effectiveness of side payments 
decreases convergence time of the network by a comparable amount, almost half. 
Figure 7.29, shown below, shows the percentage of nodes making side payments 
for prototype three, version two.  If we compare this data with that of the corresponding 
data for prototype three version one as shown in Figure 7.25, we see a decrease in the 
number of side payments for prototype three version two.  This decrease in side payments 
corresponds with the decreased convergence time of this variation on prototype three. 
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Figure 7.29: Percent of nodes making side payments, (full implementation of our 
algorithm), prototype three version two, n = 43 
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Figure 7.30: Average local neighborhood count, (full implementation of our algorithm), 
prototype three version two, n = 43 
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Comparing an average of the networks’ results shown above in Figure 7.30 for 
number of nodes forming a local neighborhood with the average of the same data for the 
less effective side payments of prototype three version one in Figure 7.20, as shown in 
Figure 7.31 we see there is an increase in the number of nodes forming a local 
neighborhood when effectiveness of side payments is increased.  There does exist, 
however, an initial increase by prototype three version one over that of version two.  We 
hypothesize that this is caused by the effectiveness of side payments themselves in 
combination with nodes’ initial perceived improvement, which gives way to the observed 
effect of side payments after a few iterations, whereby nodes learn that the increased side 
payments’ effectiveness are not as predicted.  It is also possible, and we believe more 
likely, that the nodes with less effective side payments are making more of them in order 
to overcome their deficiency in security improvement; whereas when side payments are 
more effective in improving security, nodes do not have to make as many payments to 
achieve the same effect. 
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Figure 7.31: Number of nodes forming local neighborhood comparing side payment 
effectiveness in full implementation of our algorithm, (prototype three), n = 43 
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Figure 7.32: Average maximum security comparing side payment effectiveness in full 
implementation of our algorithm (prototype three), n = 43 
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In Figure 7.33 below we again see nearly identical utility improvement for the averages 
of prototypes three versions one and two, again illustrating that despite the increased 
convergence time the more effective side payments have almost no other effect.  Note 
also that at six iterations, the utility improvement drops below zero, indicating a loss of 
utility, but recovers at the next iteration.  Future work should include further study of the 
possible causes of this anomaly, as it was not predicted by any of our mathematical 
models. 
 
 
Figure 7.33: Utility improvement, comparing side payment effectiveness in full 
implementation of our algorithm (prototype three), n = 43 
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In Figure 7.34 below, we examine side payment effectiveness on coalition size.    
We see nearly identical results as in Figure 7.31 above, local neighborhood count.  Again, 
prototype three version one, implementing less effective side payments, had more nodes 
in the coalition early on, but fewer nodes in the coalition at the stable maximum.  This 
correlation indicates that increasing effectiveness in side payments has the most impact 
on improving network connectivity. 
 
 
Figure 7.34: Average quantity of nodes forming coalition, comparing side payment 
effectiveness in full implementation of our algorithm (prototype three), n = 43 
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Figure 7.35 below shows the percentage of coalition members granted access to 
sensitive data for the continuing averages comparison.  Here we observe that networks 
with more effective side payments have an increase in terms of number of coalition 
members granted sensitive data access.  Based on these results and those described above 
for Figures 7.31 and 7.34, we conclude that the side payment effectiveness acts as a 
measure of increasing trust and collaboration between nodes. 
 
 
Figure 7.35: Percent of coalition granted sensitive data access, comparing side payment 
effectiveness in full implementation of our algorithm (prototype three), n = 43 
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If we examine the best performing networks for prototype two, prototype three 
version one, and prototype three version two, we may be able to see how well each 
prototype compares to the other’s security improvement.  Because prototype one made 
the assumption that all costs, constraints, and bids were resolved ahead of time and all 
nodes belonged to the same coalition, and no side payments took place, as such it did not 
implement several key points in our fully mature algorithm that are needed to effectively 
compare its results with those of prototypes two and three.  Prototype one lacks the fully 
mature cost function and utility calculation of Algorithms 5.2 through 5.4.  Thus 
prototype one is omitted from the graphs below as in Figure 7.36.  As demonstrated in 
prototype three, version two, we see an improvement in security as shown in Figure 7.36 
when side payments are used versus no side payments.  We also see a slight increase in 
security when these side payments are more effective, but again not corresponding to the 
rate of improvement.   Again, improved side payments decreased the convergence time, 
giving speedup nearly equivalent to omitting side payments from consideration 
altogether.  The prototype that had the fastest convergence, prototype three version 2, had 
largest average local neighborhood count, average number of nodes forming a coalition, 
and average percentage of coalition members granted sensitive data access. 
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Figure 7.36: Maximum security comparison of best performing networks on prototypes 
that fully or nearly-fully implement our game theoretic algorithm for pure strategies, 
n=43 
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7.4 Prototype Four 
The objective of prototype four is to implement Algorithm 5.5: 
Mixed_strategy_game in its entirety, and compare its results with prototype three.  With 
the exception of players moving according to a mixed strategy, prototype four is 
otherwise identical to prototype three.  Side payments are again used in the context of the 
same networks tested in prototype three.  Coalitions are formed and nodes follow the 
same rules as prototype three.  As with prototype three, nodes in prototype four are able 
to observe all events.   
Since the players are moving according to a mixed strategy, they by definition 
move according to a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies.  The 
probability distribution chosen for prototype four was for the players to choose the 
optimal strategy approximately 97% of the time.  We implemented at least five runs of all 
variations on prototype four and visually inspected the results to ensure that the players 
did indeed choose the correct strategy, on average, 97% of the time.  The actual 
numerical percentage we observed ranged from approximately 95% to 99% for an 
average of 97%; hence it is identified as the average percentage of the time that players in 
prototype four chose the optimal strategy.  We chose this probability distribution because 
it gave the most consistent and repeatable results with random number generation.  For 
more detail on the random number generator, we refer the reader to [41], [42], [47], and 
[48].   
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While the increased side payment effectiveness in prototype three version two 
directly decreased convergence time versus prototype three version one, we did not know 
whether this would hold true for the mixed strategies of prototype four.  We tested the 
same variation in side payment effectiveness for prototype four version two.  Prototype 
four version one kept all side payments at the same level as version one of prototype 
three, whereby the cost is equal to twice the security benefit.  But in either prototype, if a 
node receiving a side payment chooses a suboptimal strategy, it will fail to receive or act 
upon the side payment.  Its mistake also influences the node that made the side payment 
because the benefit to security is lost and never recovered.   
Since the players in prototype four are moving according to a mixed strategy, we 
would expect there to be a decrease in overall security for prototype four versus prototype 
three.  However, this was not the case.  Instead, we found that convergence time 
increased significantly, but so did average security.  Our results are shown in Figure 7.37, 
below, where we compare average security for prototypes two through four, this time 
averaged over all the networks’ security for each prototype.  Each chart below that lists 
average security by prototype means it represents the average of the security of all 
networks tested by prototype, ranging from maximum security equal to heterogeneous 
minimum plus three to maximum security equal to the heterogeneous minimum plus 
eight.   
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Figure 7.37: Average maximum security comparison, prototypes fully or nearly-fully 
implementing our game theoretic security algorithm, n = 43 
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As shown above in Figure 7.37, which gives the average security per prototype, we see 
that the introduction of side payments in prototype three improve average security by 
approximately 10%.  Prototype two, which fully implemented our game theoretic 
algorithm with the exception of side payments, had an average security of approximately 
5.5, while prototype three versions one and two had an average security of approximately 
5.9.  As mentioned earlier in comparing prototypes two and three, the introduction of side 
payments also caused an increased convergence time to stable network security.  
However, its convergence time is not nearly as significant as the convergence time for a 
prototype of a game using mixed strategies.  While the average security for prototype 
four, using mixed strategies, took the longest time to stabilize at approximately 90 
iterations, its security was greater than any other prototype. 
In Figure 7.38 we see that each network’s maximized security in prototype four is 
near or at its theoretical average maximum.  Recall that networks made up of nodes with 
lower maximum theoretical security (e.g., maximum security equal to the heterogeneous 
minimum plus 3) had smaller maximum achievable average security.  For example, since 
the average minimum security for each network was approximately 1.3, the average 
theoretical maximum for the network with maximum security equal to the heterogeneous 
minimum plus 3 would be equal to 1.3 (the heterogeneous minimum) plus 3, giving a 
theoretical maximum of 4.3.  The theoretical maximum is reached for this network as 
shown in Figure 7.38.  With the exception of the network that had a maximum security 
equal to the heterogeneous minimum plus seven, the networks shown in Figure 7.38 
reached their theoretical maximum. 
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Figure 7.38: Average network security, full implementation of our algorithm for mixed 
strategies, prototype four, varying heterogeneous networks, n = 43 
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We hypothesize that the improvement in security for prototype four is either related to the 
extended iterations and thus interactions between nodes, or is related to players 
attempting to compensate for mistakes via additional side payments.  It is also possible 
that the side payments may be acting as a sort of feedback mechanism for learning.  
Recall that through side payments, utility is decreased while security is increased 
for a node paying a second node to make a security change; but if the player who 
received the payment (payee) makes an error according to the mixed strategy, the action 
to improve the payer’s security is not made, causing the security improvement and utility 
to be lost and the payer to recalculate its security to correct for the other node’s mistake.  
However, we observed no correlation with the decrease in utility and increase in side 
payments as shown in Figure 7.39.   
 When we compare security for prototype four shown in Figure 7.38 with the 
security for prototype three in Figure 7.26, we see some similarity in the network security 
distributions.  In both prototypes three and four, the network with maximum security 
equal to the heterogeneous minimum plus eight is highest, the network with maximum 
security equal to the heterogeneous minimum plus four is in the midrange, and the 
network with maximum security equal to the heterogeneous minimum plus three is 
lowest, which is generally consistent with what we would expect.  However, we did not 
expect the marked improvement in security made by prototype four.  Since each 
network’s security approaches its theoretical maximum in prototype four, we do not see 
the grouping of similar maximum securities for some of the networks as occurred in 
prototype three, shown in Figure 7.26. 
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Figure 7.39: Mixed strategy utility improvement, full implementation of our algorithm 
for mixed strategies, (prototype four), n = 43 
 
Figure 7.40 shown below shows the percentage of nodes making side payments.  
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equivalent to four levels higher than a node’s minimum security had an unusual spike at 
approximately 45 iterations, even after repeated tests.  We hypothesize that this occurred 
as a result of the network’s attempt to increase its own security through side payments in 
order to overcome its own security limitations.  It is interesting to note that this 
phenomenon occurred exclusively to this network at approximately 45 iterations, which 
is approximately halfway through the optimization process (stabilization occurs at 
approximately 90 iterations).  In this network, many nodes have a maximum security of 5 
out of 10.  Whether there is a correlation between convergence, maximum security, and 
side payment interaction is to be determined in future work. 
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Figure 7.40: Percent of nodes making side payments, full implementation of our 
algorithm for mixed strategies, prototype four, n = 43 
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Figure 7.41: Average local neighborhood count, full implementation of our algorithm for 
mixed strategies, prototype four, n = 43 
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connected and the overall network security.  In this case the performance of prototype 
four is similar to that of prototype three versions one and two, as shown earlier in Figures 
7.20 and 7.30.  However, the networks with the greatest maximum security, as shown in 
Figure 7.38, were the networks with the smallest average local neighborhood count. 
 
7.4.1 Prototype Four Version Two 
The objective of prototype four version two was to test whether the increased 
effectiveness in side payments had the same decrease in convergence time as with 
prototype three version two.  Henceforth we shall identify the previous prototype four as 
prototype four version one.  As shown in Figure 7.42 below, there was generally little or 
no effect.  This is most likely caused by the mixed strategies extending the time to 
converge to maximum security.  However, in some cases the more effective side 
payments actually increased convergence time versus the less effective side payments, 
which we did not expect.  We hypothesize that this is the result of increased error in 
security calculations when a node makes a side payment to a second node, but the second 
node chooses a suboptimal decision and thus fails to act on the side payment.  However, 
we do not know why the extended convergence time occurred for some networks but not 
others.  Compare these results with the same diagram for prototype four version one as 
shown in Figure 7.38 above.  This phenomenon bears future study. 
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Figure 7.42: Average security, full implementation of our algorithm for mixed strategies, 
prototype four version two, n = 43 
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7.5 Kerberos comparison 
The objective of developing a prototype of the well-known Kerberos algorithm is 
to compare our own algorithm’s effectiveness versus an established algorithm in a 
manner that can be consistently and accurately measured.  Using the Kerberos algorithm 
which implements the Kerberos system, we developed a prototype and compared its 
results with that of the prototypes of our own game theoretic algorithm.  We normalized 
the definition of high security as defined by our metric onto Kerberos, thus correlating 
with the three highest security levels which correspond to eight through ten.  Since until a 
ticket K(r, w) is granted by the Kerberos server for the session, the definition of security 
for a node is incomplete as it consists only of encryption y; thus until the ticket is granted 
encryption strength y represents security. 
 The first result of testing the Kerberos prototype is shown in Figure 7.43 below 
for the nodes able to participate; here we see the advantages and disadvantages of 
Kerberos exemplified.  Kerberos performs very well when nodes in a network can reach a 
sufficiently high level of security, but its exclusivity as shown in Figure 7.44 prevents 
other nodes from participating in the network at all, resulting in a loss of network 
connectivity.  Note that in Figure 7.44, even when all nodes in a network can reach 
security level eight (as can be done with the max = hetero min plus 7 network), a 
sufficiently high number of nodes are still excluded from joining the Kerberos network.  
We did not expect this to happen.  While it is possible we established constraints on 
security that were too high, we attempted to follow the pure Kerberos system as closely 
as possible, and believe that that the high security constraints of the system are what is 
indeed excluding those nodes from participating in the network.   
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Figure 7.43: Kerberos network average security, participating nodes, n = 43 
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Figure 7.44: Kerberos network, variations on maximum security, percent of all nodes 
able to participate, n = 43 
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As demonstrated above in Figure 7.44, a significant number of nodes are unable to 
participate in the Kerberos network.  In all but one of the networks tested, less than 10% 
of the nodes were able to join the network.  Even for the network where all nodes were 
able to reach high encryption, 20% of the nodes were unable to join the Kerberos network 
due to security restrictions imposed by the Kerberos ticket-granting server.  Contrast this 
with the definition of our own algorithm designed to optimize security for heterogeneous 
networks, in which no node is excluded.  Our prototypes three and four have no graph 
corresponding to Figure 7.44 because no nodes are excluded by our algorithm. 
In Figure 7.45, we extend the average security comparison of Figure 7.37 from 
earlier to include Kerberos.  This chart will be used for comparison to Figures 7.59 – 
7.61, which contain tests of all prototypes on different network sizes.  Prototype one, 
while not fully implementing our security algorithm with respect to cost function, bids, 
coalitions, and side payments, is included in Figure 7.45 because of this comparison 
which is below.  However, when one examines its numerical quantization, prototype 
one’s performance is thus somewhat deceptive compared to the other prototypes.  Again, 
this is due to the fact that prototype one was used for initial tests, and only considered a 
limited number of networks versus later prototypes.  Recall that the networks tested in 
prototype one had high security.  Networks had either homogeneous maximum security, 
where all nodes could reach the maximum theoretical security of ten, or high 
heterogeneous maximum security that was six or seven levels above the heterogeneous 
minimum.  Prototype one was designed to perform initial tests of our basic game 
theoretic algorithm.  Prototype two and later prototypes were designed to fully test our 
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algorithm.  Because of its differences with the more fully developed prototypes, 
prototype one’s security quantization should be considered more ordinal than exact and 
can thus be considered similar to the performance of the prototypes two through four.   
In Figure 7.45, Kerberos performs poorly compared to our algorithm’s prototypes.  
In most cases fewer than 10% of the nodes met the security requirements to join the 
Kerberos network, leaving the remainder to have a decreased level of security.  As shown 
in Figure 7.44, at least 20% of all nodes are unable to participate and join the Kerberos 
network.   
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Figure 7.45: Average security comparison, all prototypes, n = 43. Compare with Figures 
7.59 – 7.61 below for n = 20, 60, and 80, respectively. 
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As shown in Figures 7.45 through 7.50, Kerberos’ weakness due to its 
inapplicability to heterogeneous networks is apparent.  But comparing Kerberos to the 
performance of our own security algorithm in the same figures, the strength of our 
algorithm is apparent.  No nodes are excluded in our algorithm’s prototypes, and security 
is improved overall, for all possible members of the network.  Still, for a more 
homogeneous network where most or all nodes are able to reach high levels of 
encryption, as in Figure 7.51, Kerberos can provide improved average security and much 
faster convergence versus our own security algorithm.  Kerberos performs better when 
the nodes in the network can reach the highest security.  Note that prototype one is 
excluded from the graphs in Figures 7.46 through 7.51 as it did not test all of these 
networks.  These graphs are below. 
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Figure 7.46, n = 43, security comparison for a network where the maximum security is 
equivalent to three levels above a node’s minimum security.   
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Figure 7.47, n = 43, security comparison for a network where the maximum security is 
equivalent to four levels above a node’s minimum security 
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Figure 7.48, n = 43, security comparison for a network where the maximum security is 
equivalent to five levels above a node’s minimum security 
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Figure 7.49, n = 43, security comparison for a network where the maximum security is 
equivalent to six levels above a node’s minimum security 
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Figure 7.50, n = 43, security comparison for a network where the maximum security is 
equivalent to seven levels above a node’s minimum security 
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Figure 7.51, n = 43, security comparison for a network where the maximum security is 
equivalent to eight levels above a node’s minimum security 
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In Figure 7.51, we see that Kerberos is ideal for a network composed primarily of nodes 
that can reach maximum security.  However, prototype four performed nearly as well 
despite the longer convergence time.  This may not be a fair comparison, however, since 
prototype four implements mixed strategies while Kerberos only implements pure 
strategies.   
 
7.6 Varying network size: a comparison 
The purpose of the following tests of security for prototypes one through four is to 
examine whether varying the size of the network, n, has an effect on the network security 
for our game theoretic algorithm.  The above prototypes were run on our first network, 
which as mentioned earlier, had 43 nodes.  To determine the effect increasing or 
decreasing the number of nodes has on the network security, we will examine networks 
with 20, 60, and 80 nodes in our 10 by 10 matrix averaged over the networks with 
varying heterogeneous maxima, as applicable.  Similar tests for Kerberos are also shown 
below.  All nodes were heterogeneous.  For the network of 20 nodes, fourteen nodes 
started at minimum security of 1, three nodes started at minimum security of 2, two nodes 
started at minimum security of 3, and one node started at minimum security of 5.  The 
average minimum security was 1.55.  For the network of 60 nodes, fifty nodes started at 
minimum security of 1, seven nodes started at minimum security of 2, two nodes started 
at minimum security of 3, and one node started at minimum security of 5.  The average 
minimum security was 1.25.  For the network of 80 nodes, seventy nodes started at 
minimum security of 1, seven nodes started at minimum security of 2, two nodes started 
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at minimum security of 3, and one node started at minimum security of 5.  The average 
minimum security was 1.1875.  These graphs follow below. 
 Our first graph, Figure 7.52, shows the effect varying the size of the network has 
on our first prototype, prototype one.  Here we see a fairly consistent level of security 
among the varying network sizes; note that for 20 nodes the security was lowest, but 
beyond this size of network there was no significant difference between the average 
network security levels.  This same phenomenon occurred for prototype two as well, 
which is shown in Figure 7.53.  We believe that these results demonstrate the robustness 
of our core game theoretic security algorithm.  Discussion of these results in Figure 7.52 
– 7.55 follows Figure 7.55. 
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Figure 7.52: Security for prototype one, varying network size n 
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Figure 7.53: Security for prototype two, varying network size n 
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Figure 7.54: Security for prototype three version one, varying network size n 
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Figure 7.55: Security for prototype three version two, varying network size n 
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The results shown in Figures 7.52 and 7.53 indicate that varying the network size 
had little or no effect on prototypes one or two.  The introduction of side payments 
brought on in prototype three versions one and two, shown in Figures 7.54 and 7.55, 
respectively, demonstrate improvements in security for all network sizes versus prototype 
two.  The smallest network, n=20, showed the most improvement with the more effective 
side payments of prototype three version two.  The larger networks, n=60 and n=80, had 
higher security than the smaller sized networks for either prototype.  However, the 
middle-sized network, n=43, had the lowest or nearly the same security as the smallest 
network, n=20.  For prototype four, however, we did not observe the phenomenon of 
larger networks having greater average security.  See Figures 7.56 and 7.57 below.  For 
prototype four version one, which had less effective side payments than prototype four 
version two, the smallest network of n=20 performed the best.  However, for prototype 
four version two, all networks performed similarly.  Note in Figure 7.57 (prototype four 
version two) there is a tighter bound in maximum security variations for network size 
versus prototype four version one in Figure 7.56.  This tighter bound is clearly related to 
the more effective side payments, since that is the only difference between the two 
prototypes.  It is evident in these graphs that the more effective side payments decreased 
security for larger networks, if only by a small amount.   
Overall, however, the maximized average security for all networks stabilized 
between 6 and 7 for both prototypes.  However, the network with n=43 nodes performed 
poorest.  We do not know why this network had the lowest security.  It may be possible 
that small networks optimized by mixed strategy games perform best, but if so there is no 
correlation beyond what we observed for a network of 20 nodes.   
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Figure 7.56: Security for prototype four version one, varying network size n 
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Figure 7.57: Security for prototype four version two, varying network size n 
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As shown below in Figure 7.58, Kerberos is also relatively consistent for varying 
network size, but shows an inverse relationship between network size and achieved 
security.  This may be caused by the decreased overhead of a smaller Kerberos network 
resulting in improved efficiency and security.   
 
 
Figure 7.58: Security for Kerberos network, varying network size n 
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In Figures 7.59 through 7.61 we see the average security compared for all of our 
prototypes, including Kerberos.  Network size varied from 20 to 60 to 80 nodes.  The 
graph for the network of 43 nodes is in Figure 7.45 above.  In Figure 7.45 and Figures 
7.59 through 7.61, we observe Kerberos is consistently poorest when averaged over 
networks varying by heterogeneity, with the exception of the network consisting of 20 
nodes.  Instead, Kerberos performs approximately as well for security as prototype two, 
which implemented coalitions but no side payments; prototype two, however, converged 
more quickly to stable network security.   
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Figure 7.59: Average security comparison of all prototypes, n = 20 
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Figure 7.60: Average security comparison of all prototypes, n = 60 
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Figure 7.61: Average security comparison of all prototypes, n = 80 
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These graphs in Figure 7.45 and Figures 7.52 – 7.61 demonstrated the 
improvement in network security made by prototype implementations of our game 
theoretic algorithm regardless of network size.  Again, our algorithm includes all nodes in 
any network, regardless of heterogeneity, which is something that Kerberos fails to do.  
As a result, our algorithm improves network security and is better suited to optimize 
security for a more heterogeneous network than Kerberos.  Our detailed summaries are 
discussed below the overview of our results is given in Table 7.4.   
 
 Theor. Max. Security Levels Avg. Security Convergence Nodes Included in Network 
Proto 1 Minavg + 6 to 8 High Fast All 
Proto 2 Minavg + 3 to 8 Mid Fast All 
Proto 3.1 Minavg + 3 to 8 Mid Fast All 
Proto 3.2 Minavg + 3 to 8 Mid Fast All 
Proto 4.1 
Minavg + 3 to 6 Mid Fast All 
Minavg + 7 to 8 High Slow All 
Proto 4.2 
Minavg + 3 to 5 Mid Fast All 
Minavg + 6 to 8 High Slow All 
Kerb. 
Minavg + 3 to 5 Low Fast <10% 
Minavg + 6 to 7 Mid Fast <10% 
Minavg + 8 High Fast 80% 
 
Table 7.4: Table of Prototypes and General Results     
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7.7 Detailed summary of results 
When comparing different networks with varying heterogeneity with respect to 
minimum and maximum security, the results of our first prototype show that our game 
theoretic security algorithm converges faster for more heterogeneous networks.  The 
achieved security for this network was, naturally, somewhat decreased when nodes could 
not reach the same maximum, but the security was not very different from the network 
where all nodes could reach the same maximum.  Varying the size of the network had 
little effect on the overall network security.  
The objectives of our second prototype were to develop a baseline before studying 
the effect of side payments and to study the results of a near-full implementation of our 
game theoretic security algorithm.  As with prototype one, our second prototype was 
largely unaffected by variations in network size.  With regard to the relationships 
between nodes forming the network, in particular coalitions, we saw a great deal of 
divergence among the different networks with varying degrees of maximum 
heterogeneous security.  Nodes with a greater heterogeneous maximum granted fewer 
nodes access to sensitive data once security stabilization was reached.   
The objective of prototype three was to study the effect on overall network 
security by adding side payments to implement a full version of our game theoretic 
security algorithm.  As in prototype two, the third prototype achieved a consistent 
maximum security nearly equal to their theoretical maximum for the respective network.  
This similarity between prototypes demonstrates that the core of our security algorithm is 
sound, improving overall network security regardless of the degree of heterogeneity.  We 
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observed a correlation between those networks that maximized the use of side payments 
with those that performed best in terms of security.  We conclude that there may be an 
optimum percentage of nodes making side payments which allow a network to maximize 
its overall security, since we observed that once side payments dropped below 20% they 
had little overall effect on security.  Whether this can be used to reduce energy 
consumption or improve security will need to be explored in the future. 
Comparing prototypes two and three with respect to convergence time, prototype 
three took longer to converge to stable network security.  This extended convergence 
time is clearly brought on by the introduction of side payments, which are the only 
difference between prototypes two and three.  However, when we increased the 
effectiveness of the side payment itself in terms of security, convergence time decreased 
substantially.   In some tests this prototype converged to maximum security nearly 50% 
faster than the prototype with less effective side payments.  We also observed, for the 
same prototype, faster convergence with respect to maximum security, utility, and 
coalition formation.   
The introduction of side payments in prototype three resulted in a significant 
decrease in the number of nodes to which another node is directly connected versus in 
prototype two.  We also observed a corresponding decrease in the percentage of nodes 
that were granted sensitive data access for the same.  We hypothesize that through the 
feedback mechanism of side payments, the nodes in the network are in effect learning 
more about the other nodes in the graph and in turn act to reduce their own vulnerability 
by revoking sensitive data access to a greater number of nodes, going beyond the 
requirements of coalition membership to do their own vulnerability analysis.  In studying 
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the effect of changing side payments' effectiveness, we would expect to see similar 
improvement as in both versions of prototype three.  However, because of the observed 
decrease in coalition members and nodes forming a local network for prototype three 
version two, we hypothesize there may be a point at which the network would degenerate 
if side payments' effectiveness was sufficiently increased.  Such a threshold would be 
detrimental to the network.  As such, we believe there is a corresponding maximum 
security level that is detrimental because of unrealistic security constraints; this 
hypothesis is further supported by the evidence of the Kerberos prototypes.  These 
hypotheses should be explored further in future work. 
Prototype two was consistent with regard to security regardless of network size; 
prototype three, which implemented side payments, was affected by network size with 
larger networks generally reaching higher security.  This difference would make sense in 
the context of quantitative effect of side payments on network security, except we 
observed that this was not always the case: the lowest security was observed for the 
middle-sized network made up of 43 nodes.  Furthermore, increasing side payment 
effectiveness caused a tie for networks made up of 60 and 80 nodes, which may indicate 
that there is an ideal network size for our algorithm, or possibly the existence of an ideal 
size for any network.  Still, the increased security for the network via side payments 
demonstrates that side payments improve network security overall for pure strategies.  
In prototype four which used mixed strategies, however, we observed a different 
phenomenon with respect to side payments.  Increase in side payment effectiveness had 
no observed effect on convergence time in the way that it did for prototype three, 
indicating that the effect is nullified by the increased number of interactions and possibly 
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lost side payments brought on by mixed strategies.  In addition, security for each network 
in prototype four approached its maximum theoretical average security, but only did so 
after a substantially larger number of iterations when compared to pure strategy 
prototypes.  While it is possible such manifestation may be due to some sort of error in 
our prototype implementation, we believe the following three theories most likely.  First, 
it is possible that the improved security is caused simply by the added interactions 
between the nodes.  Or, the improved security may be resulting from an attempt to 
recover from mistakes made by playing mixed strategies.  Furthermore, it is also possible 
that the combination of extended interactions with side payments may be creating a 
mechanism for nodes to learn from one another via the side payments, passing on 
information about other nodes in the network.  While such occurrence was not observed 
for pure strategies, it is possible the nodes may need an extended number of interactions 
to learn from one another, much like a neural network.  This hypothesis will need to be 
explored in future work. 
We also observed prototype four had a spike in the percentage of nodes making 
side payments for networks at approximately 45 iterations, but only for a network with 
maximum security equal to four levels above the heterogeneous minimum security.  We 
repeated our tests to verify this phenomenon.  In this network, many nodes have a 
maximum security of 5 out of 10, and the spike in side payments occurred at slightly less 
than halfway through convergence to stable network security.  Whether there is a 
correlation between convergence, maximum security, and side payment interaction has 
yet to be determined.   Its repeatability combined with the fact that it is only observed for 
prototype four, implementing mixed strategies, leads us to conclude that it is related to 
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the mixed strategies in combination with maximum average security for the network; this 
phenomenon merits further study in future endeavors.   
We compared our work with the Kerberos security system to better measure the 
results generated by our network security algorithm. We measured the effectiveness of 
Kerberos and our own algorithm with the security metrics we developed.  Metrics 
allowed us to verify and compare the security optimization generated by each very 
different approach in a manner that allowed us to substantiate the results.  In our 
prototypes’ experimental results, we found that while Kerberos did very well when the 
network was able to reach high levels of security, converging faster and reaching higher 
overall average network security levels than any of our own solutions, it excluded some 
nodes from the network because of the constraints imposed by the Kerberos server and 
system security requirements.  In other cases where an increasing number of nodes 
forming the network were unable to reach high levels of security, Kerberos excluded 80-
90% of the nodes from the network due to security constraints, and consequently had 
much lower average network security versus our own.  Our approach always included 
nodes regardless of their maximum achievable security, allowing all nodes to join the 
network and receive improved security not to mention preventing any network from 
splitting apart.  In this respect Kerberos was a failure, as the definition and purpose of a 
network is to connect computers so that they may share resources, communicate, and 
receive security benefit from one another.  While it is possible the security constraints in 
our Kerberos prototype were higher than needed, our goal in designing the simulation 
was to stay as close as possible to the Kerberos system and avoid going beyond it to some 
sort of relaxed Kerberos that stretches the requirements to the point of creating a new 
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security system.  We felt our Kerberos model was fairly representative of the actual 
Kerberos system.  Kerberos lacks the ability to restrict access to sensitive or insensitive 
data.  Once the node in the Kerberos network accepts tickets it cannot reject access to 
specific items, such as allowing access to sensitive or insensitive data that were granted 
by the Kerberos server.   
The experimental results of our own prototypes versus Kerberos matched our 
analysis.  Prototypes implementing our algorithm were consistent with the mathematical 
models and proofs of our work, in particular regarding weighted potential games and 
Pareto-optimality.  Our results exemplified a game possessing a Pareto optimal weighted 
potential game equilibrium, which eliminates any sub-optimal equilibrium.  Contrast 
these results with those of Kerberos, wherein there were always some nodes unable to 
join the network; this is consistent with our mathematical proofs that Kerberos is neither 
a potential game nor is it Pareto optimal.   
For prototype two and prototype three versions 1 and 2, among the networks with 
highest security was observed an inverse relationship between network security and the 
number of nodes forming a coalition and granted sensitive data access.  Both prototype 
three versions 1 and 2 showed that these same networks with highest security had 
smallest local neighborhood count, but this was not consistent for prototype two.  We can 
conclude that side payments affect the security and can reduce the number of neighbors, 
thereby reducing the number of connections in the network overall.  Based upon the 
results of prototype three version 1 and 2, we can also conclude that side payments affect 
coalition size, as well as number of nodes granted sensitive data access.    
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We considered the problem of maximizing security for an entire network when it 
is made up of heterogeneous computers or devices that act autonomously, and attempted 
to solve this problem by our game theoretic solution with a potential function.  We chose 
game theory because it can solve problems that would otherwise be difficult using 
traditional AI approaches, as game theory has the advantage that once the problem and 
corresponding game are properly specified, the players of the game act on their own 
according to the game specifications, resulting in a solution to the problem.  Furthermore, 
we identified a subset of constraint satisfaction problems that can be used with a subset of 
games to solve our security problem, and laid out the game theoretic approaches to solve 
the problem.  We determined that the subset of games known as noncooperative weighted 
potential games fit the subset of constraint satisfaction problems possessing an objective 
function.  Our work differed from previous approaches to constraint satisfaction problems 
and games by taking into account the requirements of optimizing overall security for the 
entire network, and using a game to solve the problem itself. We also devised a new 
system for measuring network security using security metrics, allowing for a quantitative 
rather than qualitative measurement of security; we believe metrics are essential in 
improving the definition of security itself.  We were able to introduce security metrics to 
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our problem by defining the problem itself as a game possessing a system of variables 
and constraints.  Using our metrics, we developed several equations defining network 
security, which enabled us to validate our work and create an algorithm that integrates 
attack tree analysis for the entire network at each step of network formation. Our work 
contrasts with previous works that focus on analyzing only network components, or 
perform late evaluation of security.   
The results of our prototypes demonstrate the effectiveness of our game theoretic 
security algorithm with regard to optimizing overall network security in a heterogeneous 
environment.  Our results also empirically demonstrate the validity of our theorems and 
proofs, showing the applicability of our game theoretic algorithm to improving the 
security of the heterogeneous computer network of today, with computers acting 
independently without a central coordinator.  As opposed to Kerberos, our work can be 
generalized to optimize security for almost any network or system because it can be 
applied to a network made up of devices that possess any degree of heterogeneity.   
Determining whether there may be an optimum configuration or percentage of nodes 
making side payments that leads to faster convergence and greater utility bears further 
study.    
Our work was able to show improved security and efficiency through the 
introduction of coalition formation with partial preferences for our game.  By forming 
coalitions with partial preferences, we were able to integrate coalition formation into the 
optimization process during the game itself.  Previous approaches to coalition formation 
depended heavily on knowing complete preferences prior to coalition formation and were 
not able to be directly integrated into the optimization process itself, leading to a system 
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in a sub-optimal state.  However, it may be possible to alter the definition of equilibrium 
itself so that coalition formation could be postponed until after this new equilibrium state 
had been reached, and subsequent formation of coalitions would not change the 
optimality of the solution for the system.  In this, if we were to redefine equilibrium as 
imposing a total order instead of a partial order on the actions, so that every action in the 
set of actions is comparable instead of reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive, then it 
may be possible to postpone coalition formation until stabilization.  This hypothesis 
should be explored in future work. 
Granted that Pareto optimal equilibrium assumes that every element in an action 
profile is comparable, meaning there exists a total ordering on its elements, it does not 
necessarily mean that all elements between different action profiles are comparable.  To 
address this issue, it may be possible to redefine the Pareto optimal solution using a 
definition whereby it is not just a total order within an action profile, but also a total order 
between all elements of all action profiles.  We know that a potential function, by 
definition, reduces the number of all possible actions and action profiles to one action 
profile in equilibrium; within that action profile there must be a total order.  Thus all 
nodes maximizing the potential should also have a total order on the actions.  However, 
achieving this definition may be difficult, since we understand what we are defining is a 
solution that is already optimized, and we would be working backwards from an already 
optimal solution to a suboptimal problem.  We are thus uncertain whether or not this is a 
paradox, as it is likely that the action profiles need to be comparable to one another or 
proven to be comparable, so that each element of every action profile is comparable, 
giving a total order between the action profiles.  Exploring this possibility and its 
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implication of equality or improvement will need to be done in the future; it could speed 
up the network optimization process as well as possibly strengthen the definition of an 
optimized network.   
Overall, our solution improved overall security for any measured degree of 
heterogeneity in a network.  Prototypes empirically demonstrated our mathematical 
models for Pareto-optimality.  The introduction of coalitions and side payments to form 
connections showed approximately 10% security improvement, but somewhat slower 
convergence to stable network security.  Our prototype also demonstrated that our 
approach was largely unaffected by variations in network size.  Computers with greater 
maximum security granted fewer nodes access to sensitive data once security 
stabilization was reached.  A correlation existed between networks that maximized the 
use of side payments with those that performed best in terms of security.  Convergence 
time was observed to decrease as much as 50% when side payment effectiveness was 
improved in terms of security.  With mixed strategies, increase in side payment 
effectiveness had no observed effect on convergence time.  Security for mixed strategy 
prototypes approached the theoretical maximum after a substantially larger number of 
iterations when compared to pure strategy prototypes.   
Through the solutions presented in our work, we were able to model and 
successfully test our network security optimization technique for a network formed of 
heterogeneous computers.  Furthermore, by comparing its results to the known Kerberos 
algorithm, we were able to demonstrate the usefulness of our approach.  We hope that our 
work can be used in the future to improve network security, and that our work in 
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quantitative security measurement will be applied to other areas for a paradigm shift in 
the definition of security from the qualitative to the quantitative.  
 
8.1 Future work 
Because of the observed decrease in coalition members and nodes forming a local 
network for prototype three version two, we hypothesize there may be a point at which 
the network would degenerate if side payments' effectiveness was sufficiently increased.  
Such a threshold would be detrimental to the network.  We also believe there is the 
possibility of hardware and software combinations that are harmful to a heterogeneous 
network because they can lead to unrealistic security constraints compared to the rest of 
the nodes in the network.  This hypothesis is supported by the evidence of the Kerberos 
prototypes’ performance on a network with low security.  These hypotheses should be 
explored further in future work, as they may characterize limitations of our game 
theoretic algorithm.  We also do not know why security for networks playing mixed 
strategies was so high versus corresponding networks playing pure strategies, or why it 
stabilized after a substantially large number of iterations.  We believe future work should 
be done to determine its cause.  In addition, we would like to consider the scenario where 
some nodes play mixed and some play pure strategies for the purpose of evaluating its 
effect on network security.   
We would also like to evaluate the effect on convergence time and overall 
security using a hypothesis that may enable coalition formation to be postponed until 
after equilibrium has been reached.  In this, it may be possible to alter the definition of 
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equilibrium itself so that it imposes a total order instead of a partial order on the actions, 
so that every action in the set of actions is comparable instead of reflexive, anti-
symmetric, and transitive.  Future work should also include developing games with 
asymmetric information.  Games with asymmetric information are more complicated than 
games with symmetric information, but as part of implementing such a game the issue of 
authentication and false impersonation can be explored as it fits the description of 
asymmetric information.   
Furthermore, we would like to continue strengthening the relationship between 
our architecture and its application to a hardware and software security scheme in an 
actual network implementation.  In particular, we would like to further develop our 
architecture to implement it on the TCP reference model.  This work would involve 
specifying the relationship of our game theoretic algorithm with the lower layers of the 
TCP reference model, as well as specifying greater detail regarding packets and 
protocols.  Furthermore, we would like to extend our work to optimize new nodes 
entering the network.  All of these issues to be explored in future work can contribute to 
improving the means of optimizing network security through game theory and security 
metrics.   
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Findings and Conclusions:   
Our solution is presented as a noncooperative weighted potential game using pure 
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viability of quantitative security analysis using metrics.  Our game theory model 
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improvement reduced convergence time by 50%.  Our game theory model of 
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model of optimization improved security for networks of varying size.  Through 
these solutions, our work presents a novel optimization technique that improves 
overall security for a heterogeneous network.    
 
 
 
